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Summary 
 
 
Intellectual property rights (IPRs) play a very important role for innovations. They serve as 
a mechanism for innovators (e.g., individuals, companies, universities) to protect their intel-
lectual property and enable the holder of the IPR to profit from the innovation. Patents and 
trademarks constitute the two most important and most frequently utilized IPRs. This thesis 
contains five empirical studies that address recent research gaps in research on patents and 
trademarks. 
 With regard to patents, this thesis focuses on patenting in China, which underwent a 
remarkable and explosive growth recently: Only 15 years ago, Chinese applicants filed 1.9% 
of the patents they filed in 2014. This is because China is trying to transition itself from an 
imitation-based to innovation-based economy. However, even though China is actively and 
prominently fostering innovation in trying to become a leading innovator, China is still far 
away from reaching the world’s innovation frontier. In light of this ongoing and still rela-
tively unexplored phenomenon, this thesis addresses several important issues regarding the 
antecedents of patenting and the value of patents in China that are crucial, but have received 
little attention so far. In particular, this thesis addresses the more specific topics of university 
patenting, the impact of acquisitions on innovation performance, and patent value in China. 
 Findings show that an increase in patenting by Chinese universities, fostered by two 
subsidy programs, is an important antecedent of the overall increase in patenting in China 
(Chapters 2 and 3). Also, this thesis finds that Chinese companies profit from acquisitions 
that enable them to increase their post-acquisition innovation performance under certain 
conditions, hence contributing to the overall increase in patenting (Chapter 5). For example, 
Chinese firms successfully draw on the often more developed knowledge in foreign coun-
tries and use cross-border acquisitions to catch-up to developed countries in terms of patent-
ing. While the increase in patent applications in China is remarkable, several findings in this 
thesis also indicate that patent quality has not yet risen to a similar degree (Chapter 3) and 
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that the value of Chinese patents is, overall, lower than that of patents from other countries 
(Chapter 4). The development of patent applications of high quality and value is, however, 
important to realize a meaningful and sustainable increase in a nation’s innovative capacity 
and to reach China’s goal of becoming a leading nation in terms of innovation.  
 In contrast to research on patenting, where most basic questions have been investigated 
thoroughly and demand a more nuanced perspective (e.g., a focus on patenting in China), 
research on trademarking is in comparatively early stages. Trademarks are a very important 
IPR for firms to distinguish themselves from competitors and have been linked positively to 
the market valuation, survival, and productivity of firms. However, little is known on why 
firms file trademarks, which is the focus of the final study in this thesis (Chapter 6). 
 A better understanding of trademarking motives is crucial to fully understand the mean-
ingfulness and importance of trademarks. Therefore, this thesis analyzes firms’ motives to 
file trademarks using data from small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in innovative 
industries. It identifies and empirically validates three trademarking motives: protection, 
marketing, and exchange. The thesis also finds that firms can be grouped into four clusters 
based on their trademarking motives (i.e., trademark skeptics, marketing-focused trademark-
ing SMEs, and marketing- plus protection-focused trademarking SMEs. These results enrich 
previous research and add a new layer of discussion to previous trademark research by show-
ing the uniqueness and variability of SMEs with regard to their usage of IPRs. Because 
stimulating IPR usage by small firms is of particular interest for innovation policies, this 
finding has important implications and informs policy makers to develop better suited poli-
cies for the heterogeneous group of SMEs that better motivate them to increasingly engage 
in trademarking. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
This thesis analyzes the motivations, antecedents, and value of patents and trademarks in 
industrialized and emerging markets. With regard to patents, this thesis focuses on exploring 
patenting in the emerging market context of China. Chapters 2 and 3 more specifically an-
alyze university patenting in China, which is an important antecedent of the overall increase 
in patenting in China. Chapter 4 investigates the value of Chinese patents, while Chapter 5 
assesses whether Chinese companies benefit from acquisitions in terms of their innovation 
performance. With regard to trademarks, this thesis explores SMEs’ motivations for trade-
mark applications. Hence, the final study (Chapter 6) addresses the question of why SMEs 
file trademarks. 
 The introductory chapter (Chapter 1) is structured as follows: Section 1.1 describes 
the motivation of this thesis and introduces the research contexts explored. Section 1.2 out-
lines the research questions investigated in this thesis, while Section 1.3 describes the five 
studies included in this thesis in more detail. Finally, Section 1.4 provides an overview of 
the publication status of the studies included in this thesis. 
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1.1 Motivation 
Intellectual property rights (IPRs) play a very important role for innovations. They serve as 
a mechanism for innovators (e.g., individuals, companies, universities) to protect their intel-
lectual property assets and enable the holder of the IPR to profit from the innovation. By 
providing protection, IPRs provide incentives and benefits to inventors, while simultane-
ously disclosing the intellectual property to the public. In this way, IPRs are stimulating 
innovation at the individual and societal level (e.g., Teece, 1986; Cohen et al., 2000; Yueh, 
2009, WIPO, 2016b). 
 Patents and trademarks constitute the two most important and most frequently utilized 
IPRs (Cohen et al., 2002; Thomä and Bizer, 2013; WIPO, 2016a). They act as complemen-
tary assets in the allocation of returns from an innovation and can therefore be of huge eco-
nomic significance to the innovator (e.g., Teece, 1986). Therefore, this thesis addresses im-
portant research gaps regarding the motivations, antecedents, and value of patents and 
trademarks in industrialized and emerging markets. 
1.1.1 Research context: Patenting in China 
Patents constitute an important protection mechanism for inventions and are one of, if not 
the most frequently utilized proxy to measure innovation in innovation research. A patent is 
an exclusive right, usually issued by a government, which grants the patent’s owner the right 
to exclude others from using the patented invention. Patents are granted to provide inventors 
with a mechanism to protect new technology from free riding by third parties. In exchange, 
the patented invention is disclosed to the public (WIPO, 2016c). 
 By their very nature, patents are closely related to innovation because they are only 
granted for the development of a new technology that is commercially useful and thus of 
some economic significance (e.g., Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Alcaide-Marzal and Tortajada-
Esparza, 2007; Godinho and Ferreira, 2012). Also, patents must pass the criteria of “novelty” 
and “non-obviousness”. “Novelty” describes the requirement that the invention must not 
have been available to the public before the patent was filed. “Non-obviousness” requires 
that the invention must be sufficiently different from previous knowledge (USPTO, 2016a). 
Both criteria (theoretically) ensure a minimum level of innovativeness of the underlying 
technology (Ahuja and Katila, 2001). Underlining the usefulness of patents to measure in-
novation, previous research has described them as an externally validated measure of tech-
nological novelty. Also, patent statistics correlate with various other measures of innovation 
(e.g., Griliches, 1990; Ahuja and Katila, 2001). Empirical studies find that patents are closely 
related to new products (Comanor and Scherer, 1969), expert ratings (e.g., Narin et al., 
1987), innovation and invention counts (e.g., Acs et al., 2002). 
 Because of their close link to innovation, statistics on patent applications have histori-
cally been dominated by countries generally known as innovative, such as the US, Japan, 
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and Germany. Since the 1980s, the worldwide number of patent applications has skyrock-
eted. This explosive growth has drawn a lot of scholarly attention and has been attributed to 
factors like the emergence of research and development-intensive and patent-intensive in-
dustries, an overall increase in research and development (R&D) investments, and manage-
rial improvements with regard to intellectual property (e.g., Kim and Marschke, 2004; Hall, 
2005). Further studies partially attribute the increasing prevalence of patents to a more stra-
tegic use of patents, for example to block competitors or to signal innovativeness (e.g., Co-
hen et al., 2000; Blind et al., 2006). 
 Figure 1.1 provides an overview of the countries whose residents filed the most patent 
applications in 2014.1 The surprising conclusion is that China, an emerging economy, takes 
the top spot. While the patent applications by applicants from the industrialized nations 
(South Korea, Japan, USA, and Germany) increased steadily, applications by Chinese appli-
cants almost grew exponentially. In 2011, Chinese applicants filed the third most patent ap-
plications worldwide, slightly surpassed by the US and Japan. Since 2012, however, China 
takes the undisputed top spot and continuously increases the distance from other nations: In 
2014, Chinese applicants filed 837,897 patent applications; 64.4% more than US applicants 
and 79.8% more than Japanese applicants. Only 15 years ago, Chinese applicants filed 1.9% 
of the patents they filed in 2014. While applications by Chinese applicants grew 52-fold 
since then, applications by US applicants grew 2-fold and applications by Japanese appli-
cants even decreased by 3.3% (WIPO, 2016a). These numbers illustrate the remarkable and 
explosive growth in Chinese patenting. 
 As shown above, the development of China in terms of innovation is particularly intri-
guing and recent. In 1978, China introduced a large economic reform to open up its economy 
and to start the transition from a planned to a market-based economy. Since then, China has 
successfully transformed itself into a leading industrial nation. The Chinese economy has 
grown at a scale that has been unprecedented since the industrial revolutions of the 18th 
century (e.g., Tian and Yu, 2012; Scherngell et al., 2014). This extensive growth has largely 
been facilitated by a growth of the manufacturing industry, by utilizing the worldwide stock 
of knowledge in combination with low costs and a large scale, and by large inflows of for-
eign direct investment (FDI) (Wu, 2001; Brandt and Rawski, 2008; Hu and Mathews, 2008). 
Because of this development, China is often referred to as the “world’s factory” (Ma et al., 
2009). 
                                                          
1 This is the most recent data available as of April 2016. 
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Figure 1.1: Comparison of patent applications by the applicant’s origin. 
 
Source: WIPO (2016a). 
 With its industrial transformation well underway, China now faces the follow-up chal-
lenge of transitioning from an imitation-based to innovation-based economy in order to com-
plete its attempt to catch-up to further developed countries (Kim, 1997; Hu and Mathews, 
2008). Past economic growth in China was largely driven by cheap labor and physical cap-
ital. These drivers, however, raise questions about the sustainability of this development and 
whether a similar development can be achieved in terms of innovation (Wu, 2001). To con-
tinue its economic growth, China needs sustainable growth and innovations to further im-
prove its competitiveness moving away from low-cost manufacturing. China is aware of this 
problem and has undertaken several efforts to stimulate its transformation to an innovation-
based economy by focusing their policies more on science and technology. The Chinese 
government reformed the funding system, developed high-tech industries, and encouraged 
private enterprises to engage in patenting (Scherngell et al., 2014; Guan and Yam, 2015). 
Also, China is actively trying to increase its patenting numbers even further: As part of the 
“National Patent Development Strategy” the Chinese government officially states that its 
goal is to quadruple invention patent applications by 2020 (SIPO, 2011) and the surge in 
patents can be seen as one indicator of a shift from imitation to innovation (Dang and Mo-
tohashi, 2015). 
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 However, even though China is actively and prominently fostering innovation, research 
indicates that China is still far away from reaching the world’s innovation frontier (Hu and 
Jefferson, 2009). This is mainly due to the rigidities of a planned, closed-market economy, 
in which innovation was neglected (Peng, 2003; Brandt and Rawski, 2008; Zhao et al., 
2011). In light of this ongoing and still relatively unexplored phenomenon, this thesis ad-
dresses several important issues regarding the antecedents of patenting and value of patents 
in China. 
1.1.2 Research context: Motives to file trademarks 
While patents are the most frequently analyzed IPR, they are not the most frequently used 
IPR: As Figure 1.2 shows, trademarks are the most filed IPR overall. In 2014, 7.2 million 
new trademarks were registered worldwide, which is almost three times the number of new 
patent applications (2.7 million). Other important IPRs such as (industrial) designs and util-
ity models are the third and fourth most filed IPRs, respectively. 
Figure 1.2: Total number of applications of different IPRs. 
 
Source: WIPO (2016a). 
 A trademark is an IPR that protects a distinctive sign in order to distinguish the goods 
and services of one individual or company from those of other individuals or companies 
(WIPO, 2016d). Trademarks protect words (e.g., product names), letters, and numerals. 
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They may also consist of drawings, symbols, logos, or three-dimensional signs. In some 
countries, non-traditional marks may be registered for distinguishing features such as holo-
grams, motion, color, and non-visible signs (sound, smell, or taste) (WIPO, 2016d).  
 While patents are granted for technical inventions, the main function of a trademark is 
to distinguish the commercial source of a good or service in the eyes of customers, hence 
protecting the marketing assets and branding efforts of a company (Mendonça et al., 2004; 
Sandner and Block, 2011; De Vries et al., in press). Thus, trademarks constitute the legal 
basis of brands and enable a firm to protect its brands from free riding efforts by competitors 
(Block et al., 2014b). Through a trademarked brand name, consumers are able to identify 
the products that are offered by a specific firm. For example, by establishing an image of 
product quality, trademarks enable firms to demand premium prices for their products 
(Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2008; Jensen et al., 2008; Srinivasan et al., 2008). Also, brands can 
be among the most valuable assets that firms possess: For example, Apple’s brand value, 
which is protected by trademarks, was estimated to be $170 billion in 2015, followed by 
Google ($120bn) and Coca-Cola ($78bn) (Interbrand, 2016). 
 In contrast to research on patenting, where most basic questions have been investigated 
thoroughly and demand a more nuanced perspective (e.g., a focus on patenting in China), 
research on trademarking is in comparatively early stages. While trademarks have been 
linked to the market valuation, survival, and productivity of firms (e.g., Srinivasan et al., 
2008; Krasnikov et al., 2009; Sandner and Block, 2011; Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2012) little 
is known about firms’ motivations to file trademarks, which is the second focus of this thesis. 
1.2 Research questions 
1.2.1 Antecedents and value of patenting in China (Chapters 2–5) 
First, this thesis addresses the very recent research topic of patenting in China. The previous 
section outlined China’s remarkable development in terms of patenting and described 
China’s intention to become a leading nation in terms of innovation. Several previous studies 
exist that assess the overall development of patenting in China (e.g., Hu and Mathews, 2008; 
Li, 2012). These studies identify increases in China’s national innovative capacity, for ex-
ample, through increasing technology transfer, large government subsidies, innovation clus-
ters, and strategic alliances (e.g., Chen and Kenney, 2007; Hu and Mathews 2008; Fang, 
2011; Li, 2012). 
 In order to contribute to this literature, this thesis investigates multiple research ques-
tions that refer to the antecedents of patenting and the value of patents in China. While sev-
eral studies have empirically analyzed the explosive increase in patenting in China, there are 
some particularities that have received scant attention. Therefore, this thesis addresses three 
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more specific topics that relate to this development: university patenting, acquisitions, and 
patent quality and value. 
 University patenting (Chapters 2 and 3): Universities play a prominent and increas-
ing role for a country’s national innovative capacity (e.g., Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000). 
While the historical contribution of universities to innovation lies in providing education and 
performing (basic) research, today, universities increasingly pursue a “third mission” (Etz-
kowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000), which takes the form of a more direct technology transfer 
from university to industry, for example via patenting (e.g., Henderson et al., 1998; Geuna 
and Nesta, 2006). This is particularly true for China, where the role of universities with 
regard to the creation of knowledge has traditionally been very important (e.g., Hu and 
Mathews, 2008; Li, 2009; Huang and Wu, 2012). However, so far, little is known about 
university patenting and its role in the recent development of patenting in China. Chapters 2 
and 3 will address this research gap and address the following research questions. In partic-
ular, Chapter 2 approaches the subject of university patenting from a global perspective, 
while Chapter 3 exclusively focusses on China: 
RQ 2.1: How do universities worldwide compare with regard to their patenting out-
put? 
RQ 2.2: How do university characteristics (e.g., location, size, publication record) af-
fect a university’s patent output? 
RQ 3.1: How did Chinese university patenting develop in terms of patent quantity and 
quality over the past 20 years? 
RQ 3.2: What are the effects of two types of governmental subsidy programs on Chi-
nese universities’ patent quantity and quality? 
 Patent quality and patent value (Chapters 3 and 4): While there are studies that 
assess the increase in Chinese patent applications and its antecedents, little is known about 
the corresponding development of patent quality or patent value as an outcome of this in-
crease. However, the rapid increase in patent applications in China (see Section 1.1.1 above) 
raises questions regarding patent quality and patent value, which are equally important char-
acteristics when evaluating the sustainability and meaningfulness of the Chinese innovation 
development (e.g., Li, 2012). Particularly, the impressive increase in patent quantity might 
hide the fact that China’s catch-up in terms of innovation is rather superficial. Both con-
structs (i.e., patent quality and value) are very similar and can be used as a proxy for the 
(economic) significance of a patent, most commonly measured via a patent’s citations (e.g., 
Harhoff et al., 2003; Luan et al., 2010; Acosta et al., 2012). RQ 3.1 and RQ 3.2 therefore not 
only address the development of Chinese university patenting in terms of patent quantity, 
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but also in terms of patent quality. In addition, Chapter 4 addresses the following research 
question: 
RQ 4: How does the value of Chinese patents compare to the value of international 
patents? 
 Acquisitions (Chapter 5): In changing environments, such as during a transformation 
from imitation to innovation, organizations face two choices: They can either develop capa-
bilities internally, or they can acquire knowledge externally and utilize other’s experiences 
(Peng, 2003; Zhao et al., 2011). The external acquisition of knowledge is particularly attrac-
tive for companies with limited capabilities that wish to expand their knowledge base fast, 
which is the case for China (Hitt et al., 2000; Zhao et al., 2011). Vehicles to acquire 
knowledge externally include strategic alliances, joint ventures, and mergers and acquisi-
tions (M&As) (Peng, 2003). 
 Chapter 5 focuses on knowledge transfer in acquisitions because of its paramount im-
portance in the Chinese context. For example, acquisitions by Chinese companies have in-
creased at remarkable rates. China’s FDI outflows (which include acquisition activity) are 
the third largest worldwide and are increasing rapidly (Ramasamy et al., 2012; UNCTD, 
2015). Particularly, the access to technology and knowledge is often named as one of, if not 
the most important motivation for those acquisitions (e.g., Deng, 2004; Morck et al., 2008; 
Buckley et al., 2014). Previous research on the post-acquisition innovation performance has 
largely focused on developed countries and has questioned the ability of Chinese firms to 
successfully integrate acquired knowledge because of a lack of absorptive capacity (Rugman 
and Li, 2007; Anderson et al., 2015). Therefore, this thesis addresses the following research 
questions: 
RQ 5.1: To what extent can Chinese firms increase their patent output following an 
acquisition? 
RQ 5.2: Which acquisition-specific factors influence the post-acquisition patent out-
put?  
1.2.2 Motives to file trademarks (Chapter 6) 
As outlined in Section 1.1.2, trademarks are a very important type of IPR for firms to distin-
guish themselves from competitors. While previous research on trademarking has investi-
gated various antecedents and outcomes of trademarking (e.g., Srinivasan et al., 2008; Kras-
nikov et al., 2009; Sandner and Block, 2011), little is known on why firms file trademarks. 
 However, to interpret the increase in trademark filings and its economic effects, a better 
understanding of firms’ trademarking motives is crucial. We chose to investigate SMEs be-
cause previous research has shown SMEs to be more active in trademarking than large firms 
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(Rogers et al., 2007; Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2008). Also, we expect SMEs to have a more 
clear motivation for filing trademarks, as they suffer from resource constraints. These con-
straints force them to more deliberately choose whether to file a trademark or not. Hence, 
this thesis investigates the trademarking motives of SMEs in an explorative way. More spe-
cifically, the following research question is addressed: 
RQ 6: Why do SMEs file trademarks? 
 To provide an overview of the following chapters, Figure 1.3 illustrates the structure 
of this thesis. The chapters are described in detail in the following section. 
Figure 1.3: Structure of the dissertation. 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
1.3 Chapter outlines 
Chapter 2 addresses previously unexplored facets in the domain of university patenting. 
Universities play a very prominent role in a country’s national innovation system (Mowery 
and Sampat, 2005b). Previous work on university patenting has mainly focused on the US 
and Europe, while there is very little research conducted at an international level. Moreover, 
prior research has focused on evaluating the impact of regulatory changes on patenting, such 
as the US Bayh-Dole Act, while research investigating university-specific determinants of 
patenting is scarce (e.g., Mowery et al., 2001; Geuna and Rossi, 2011). To address these 
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shortcomings, Chapter 2 examines whether and how university characteristics affect a uni-
versity’s patent output and also provides a comparative overview of the universities’ patent 
applications: While the ranking shows a huge predominance of US universities when inves-
tigating PCT (Patent Cooperation Treaty) applications (which provide a greater level of in-
ternational comparability), Chinese universities take the top spots when only considering the 
total number of patent applications. 
 Chapter 3 more narrowly focuses on university patenting in China. Often, university 
patenting is stimulated by governmental subsidy programs or patent-friendly regulatory 
changes; for example, the Bayh-Dole Act in the US or similar regulations in Europe (e.g., 
Henderson et al., 1998; Sampat et al., 2003; Geuna and Rossi, 2011). Even though these 
regulatory changes intend to stimulate university patenting, their effects on patent quantity 
and especially on the equally important patent quality are not always straightforward (e.g., 
Mowery and Ziedonis, 2002; Sampat et al., 2003). In order to increase university patenting, 
the Chinese government has issued various initiatives in recent years. Chapter 3 focuses on 
two particular types of subsidy programs: First, China introduced cost-reimbursement sub-
sidy programs at the regional level, which enabled patent applicants to receive a (partial) 
reimbursement of the costs of the patent application (Li, 2012). Second, the Chinese gov-
ernment introduced a large subsidy program to promote research excellence at selected lead-
ing Chinese universities and establish world-class universities (“Project 985”). In addition 
to analyzing the development of Chinese university patenting in terms of patent quantity and 
quality over the past 20 years in a descriptive way, Chapter 3 investigates and compares the 
effects of these two types of subsidy programs. 
 While Chapter 3 provides initial insights about the quality of Chinese university pa-
tents, Chapter 4 deals with the economic value of Chinese patents in a more detailed way. 
Particularly, Chapter 4 assesses the value of Chinese patents compared to the value of inter-
national patents from further developed countries. Because there is no universally accepted 
definition of patent value, a patent’s citation lag is used as a proxy for patent value. Citation 
lag refers to the time that elapses between the publication of a patent application and the first 
forward citation (i.e., citation received by a subsequent patent). A longer citation lag indi-
cates a lower patent value, while a more valuable patent should be cited more quickly (Gay 
et al., 2005; Marco, 2007). 
 Chapter 5 focuses on acquisitions by Chinese companies. These acquisitions can be 
important vehicles for firms to increase their innovation performance (e.g., Hitt et al., 2000; 
Zhao et al., 2011). This is particularly true for Chinese firms, which partially rely on the 
external acquisition of knowledge to increase their innovation performance (e.g., Deng, 
2004; Morck et al., 2008; Buckley et al., 2014). In addressing this unexplored phenomenon, 
Chapter 5 analyzes whether or not Chinese firms profit from acquisitions in terms of their 
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innovation performance and also investigates which acquisition-specific factors influence 
the outcome. 
 While the previous chapters dealt with patenting in China, Chapter 6 contributes to 
recent research on trademarking. To provide a systematic investigation of SMEs’ trademark-
ing motives, we conduct an empirical analysis comprising three steps using data from 600 
SMEs in innovative industries. First, we draw on the extensive literature on patenting mo-
tives (e.g., Cohen et al., 2000; Blind et al., 2006) and develop a set of potential trademarking 
motives. We identify and empirically validate three trademarking motives using factor anal-
ysis: protection, marketing, and exchange. Second, we use these trademarking motives as 
active cluster variables in a cluster analysis to explore the empirical variation in the sample 
firms. We also compare the identified clusters with regard to passive cluster variables in 
order to provide a more detailed and nuanced description of the companies within these 
clusters (e.g., with regard to market, industry, and firm characteristics). 
 Finally, Chapter 7 concludes with a summary and discussion of the main results of 
this thesis. In addition, the main implications of this thesis for both theory and practice are 
outlined. This thesis ends with a brief description of limitations and an outline for future 
research. 
1.4 Publication status of the chapters and contribution of the author 
Table 1.1 provides an overview on the publication status of the chapters included in this 
thesis. The chapters where co-authored by the following people (in alphabetical order): Joern 
H. Block, Tobias M. Hassel, Alexander Hahn, Philipp G. Sandner. Overall, three chapters 
have been published in international, peer reviewed journals. One of the remaining two chap-
ters has been submitted for publication and is currently under review, while the other chapter 
is being prepared for submission. Table 1.1 also includes other completed manuscripts to 
which the author of this thesis contributed during the writing of this thesis and which have 
been published or are currently being submitted to journals. The manuscripts deal with the 
topics of entrepreneurship, innovation, patents, trademarks, and venture capital. Out of these 
seven manuscripts, six have been published or accepted for publication. 
 The following paragraphs describe the contribution of the author of this thesis to the 
different chapters: 
 Chapters 1 and 7: Both chapters were written independently by the author of this 
thesis. 
 Chapter 2: Large parts of the chapter were done by the author. The author of this thesis 
drafted and wrote large parts of the introduction, the literature review, the development and 
refinement of the hypotheses, as well as the discussion and conclusion. Also, the author was 
responsible for large parts of the data collection and for conducting and extending the em-
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pirical analyses. The paper is published in the Journal of Technology Transfer. The publish-
ing process involved multiple rounds of major revisions, which were led and largely carried 
out by the author. 
 Chapter 3: The majority of work in this chapter has been done by the author of this 
thesis. The author wrote large parts of the introduction, performed the literature review, con-
ducted the data collection analyses, interpreted and discussed the findings. The paper is pub-
lished in the Journal of Technology Transfer. The publishing process involved multiple 
rounds of major revisions, which were led and largely carried out by the author of this thesis. 
 Chapter 4: In this chapter, the author wrote large parts of the introduction and con-
clusion, as well as the conceptual framework. Also, the author of this thesis was responsi-
ble for conducting the final empirical analyses. 
 Chapter 5: The majority of this manuscript was written by the author of this thesis. 
The author wrote the introduction, theory and hypotheses, collected all of the data, per-
formed the empirical analyses, interpreted and discussed the findings. The manuscript is 
currently submitted to a journal. 
 Chapter 6: In this chapter, the author of this thesis contributed to the introductory 
section by drafting the motivation and contributions of the study. Also, the conceptual frame-
work was largely written by the author. The author also conducted the final versions of the 
empirical analyses, and contributed to the interpretation and discussion. The paper is pub-
lished in the Research Policy. The publishing process involved multiple rounds of major 
revisions, which were led and largely carried out by the author. 
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Table 1.1: Publication status of this thesis’ chapters and other manuscripts the author of 
this thesis contributed to during the writing of this thesis. 
Note: “Other manuscripts” are ordered alphabetically based on the names of authors. 
Chap. Full title Publication status Co-authors Reference 
Manuscripts used in this dissertation 
2 University patenting: a comparison of 300 
leading universities worldwide 
Published in Journal 
of Technology Transfer 
Hassel, T.M., 
Sandner, P.G., 
Block, J.H. 
Fisch et al. 
(2015) 
3 Chinese university patents: Quantity, qual-
ity, and the role of subsidy programs 
Published in Journal 
of Technology Transfer 
Block, J.H., 
Sandner, P.G. 
Fisch et al. 
(2016a) 
4 The value of Chinese patents: an empirical 
investigation of citation lags 
Submitted Sandner, P. G., 
Regner, L. 
Fisch et al. 
(2016c) 
5 The impact of acquisitions on Chinese ac-
quirers’ patent output 
- Block, J.H., 
Sandner, P.G. 
Fisch et al. 
(2016b) 
6 Why do SMEs file trademarks? Insights 
from firms in innovative industries 
Published in 
Research Policy 
Block, J.H., 
Hahn, A., Sandner, 
P.G. 
Block et al. 
(2015) 
 
Other manuscripts 
 Socialist heritage and the opinion on entre-
preneurs: Micro-level evidence from Eu-
rope. 
Published in Business 
Administration Review 
Adam-Müller, A.F., 
Andres, R., Block, 
J.H. 
Adam-Mül-
ler et al. 
(2015) 
 Trademark families: characteristics and 
market values 
Published in Journal 
of Brand Management 
Block, J.H., 
Sandner, P.G. 
Block et al. 
(2014b) 
 Who prefers working in a family firm? An 
exploratory study of individuals’ org. pref-
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Published in Journal 
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Block, J.H., Lau, J., 
Obschonka, M., 
Presse, A. 
Block et al. 
(2016a) 
 Labor market institutions and the prefer-
ence to work in family firms: A cross-coun-
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- Block, J.H., Lau, J., 
Obschonka, M., 
Presse, A. 
Block et al. 
(2016b) 
 Trademark or patent? The effects of market 
concentration, customer type, and venture 
capital financing on start-ups’ initial IP ap-
plications 
Accepted for publication 
in Industry and Innova-
tion 
De Vries, G., 
Pennings,  H.P.G., 
Block, J.H. 
De Vries et 
al. (in 
press) 
 The significance of the CEO for the inter-
nationalization of small and medium-sized 
enterprises 
Published in 
Wirtschaftspolitische 
Blätter 
Block, J.H. Fisch and 
Block 
(2013) 
 The Schumpeterian entrepreneur: A review 
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in Industry and Innova-
tion 
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Praag, M., 
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(in press) 
  
 
  
2. University patenting: A comparison of 
300 leading universities worldwide 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
 
University patenting: A comparison 
of 300 leading universities worldwide 
 
 
Despite a worldwide increase in university patenting, empirical studies have largely focused 
on analyzing university patenting in individual countries and regions. We provide analyses 
from an international perspective, examining patents at the top 300 universities worldwide. 
By providing a patent ranking system and an analysis of the determinants of university pa-
tenting, we enable an international comparison not only between different countries but also 
between universities within countries. A ranking of the top-patenting universities shows a 
huge predominance of US universities: 18 of the top 25 universities are located in the US, 
with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) being ranked first. Our results show 
that the propensity to apply for patents is very high among US and Asian universities, while 
European universities lag behind. In addition to the home country, further determinants of 
university patenting are the quantity of the universities’ publications and a technological 
focus in areas such as chemistry and mechanical engineering. However, the size of a uni-
versity and the quality of its publications are not found to be significant determinants. 
 
 
This chapter is based on Fisch et al. (2015).  
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2.1 Introduction 
Universities are an important part of a country’s national innovation system, which is the 
institutional landscape shaping the innovativeness of a country (Mowery and Sampat, 
2005b) and contributes to its economic growth and international competitiveness (Furman 
et al., 2002; Van Looy et al., 2011). Historically, the contribution of universities to innova-
tion lay in providing education and performing (basic) research (Rosenberg and Nelson, 
1994; Henderson et al., 1998; Agrawal and Henderson, 2002). 
 Complementing the classical tasks of education and research, there has been a shift in 
universities’ aims toward a more direct contribution to economic development (Etzkowitz 
and Leydesdorff, 2000). Today, most universities worldwide pursue this “third mission” 
(Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000) in the form of a wide range of technology transfer activ-
ities from universities to industry. Consequently, there has been a large increase in univer-
sity-industry technology transfer to commercialize the research results of universities (Hen-
derson et al., 1998; Siegel et al., 2003b). As one means of technology transfer, the 
universities’ propensity to file patents has grown markedly (e.g., Henderson et al., 1998; 
Geuna and Nesta, 2006). 
 While previous work on university patenting has mainly focused on the US, evidence 
on European and Asian universities is growing (e.g., Henderson et al., 1998; Hu and 
Mathews, 2005; Geuna and Rossi, 2011). Despite the recognition of a worldwide upswing 
in university patenting, there is a surprising dearth of empirical studies on this topic at an 
international level. Because the increase in university patenting is observable worldwide, an 
analysis encompassing this international scope should lead to interesting and novel insights. 
Furthermore, prior literature on the determinants of university patenting has largely focused 
on evaluating regulatory changes such as the US Bayh-Dole Act (e.g., Mowery et al., 2001; 
Geuna and Rossi, 2011). While these policies are shown to be important determinants of the 
recent increases in university patenting, research on university-specific determinants is 
scarce, though there is a considerable heterogeneity among universities (e.g., size, R&D ex-
penditures, and publication output) that is likely to influence technology transfer activities 
(Hewitt-Dundas, 2012). 
 To fill this gap, we examine the patent applications filed by the 300 leading universities 
worldwide as ranked by the renowned Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU) 
in 2013 (Shanghai Jiao Tong University, 2014). Drawing from this sample of the “best” 
universities worldwide, we analyze whether and how a range of university characteristics 
(e.g., location, size, and publication record) affect patent their output in terms of the number 
of patent applications. Further, we generate a university ranking comparing the top patenting 
universities worldwide. The main goal of our study is twofold. First, we want to analyze the 
determinants of university patenting on an international level, which will allow us to con-
tribute to the literature on university patenting. Second, we aim to enable an international 
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comparison of the patenting activity of universities and, as a result, generate a patent ranking 
of the top universities worldwide. 
 Our results show that the propensity to apply for patents is very high among US and 
Asian universities, while European universities lag behind. Furthermore, universities across 
all regions apply for significantly more patents in their country of residence. Additionally, 
the results show that a university’s technological focus in the areas of chemistry, electrical 
engineering, and mechanical engineering lead to a higher patent output. The size of a uni-
versity and the quality of its publications are not found to be significantly associated with 
the number of patent applications. 
 The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Prior literature on university 
technology transfer is reviewed in Section 2.2. Hypotheses are derived in Section 2.3, and 
data and variables are described in Section 2.4. Descriptive statistics, a patent ranking of the 
universities in our sample, and multivariate statistics are presented and discussed in Section 
2.5. Section 2.6 concludes the chapter and provides avenues for future research. 
2.2 Literature review on university patenting 
Universities increasingly prioritize technology transfer (Henderson et al., 1998; Siegel et al., 
2003b). Henderson et al. (1998) describe the search for new ways of funding and an increas-
ing competition for funding as some of the main reasons for the increasing engagement. 
Common forms of university-industry technology transfer include research co-operations, 
start-ups, and licensing, with licensing being the primary mechanism for universities to ben-
efit from inventions (Shane, 2004). This notion is also reflected in the organizational struc-
ture of universities, as most universities have established technology transfer offices (TTOs) 
to specifically manage and coordinate the activities associated with the commercialization 
of their research (Thursby et al., 2001; Siegel et al., 2003b). These increased commerciali-
zation efforts have also been supported by policymakers. Several regulations to facilitate 
technology transfer have been implemented worldwide. A prime example is the US Bayh-
Dole Act, which enabled universities to retain intellectual property and appropriate licensing 
revenues from federally funded research (Mowery and Sampat, 2005a). It has since been 
emulated by most European countries (Geuna and Rossi, 2011). 
 The increasing interest in commercialization at universities has led to a large body of 
literature on university technology transfer. Patents, which are crucial for licensing, are fre-
quently used to capture the innovative capacity of universities (Henderson et al., 1998; 
Mowery et al., 2001; Baldini, 2009). In accordance with the aforementioned increase in 
technology transfer, the previous literature has noted a huge surge in university patenting in 
the US (e.g., Henderson et al., 1998; Sampat et al., 2003), Europe (e.g., Geuna and Nesta, 
2006; Geuna and Rossi, 2011), Asia (e.g., Hu and Mathews, 2005), and particularly China 
(e.g., Chapter 3). However, previous literature on university patenting has been regionally 
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focused. Although universities worldwide have been analyzed, no study has examined uni-
versities’ innovative capacities (i.e., patent output) from an international point of view (i.e., 
taking into account more than one country or region). A notable exception is the work of 
Wong and Singh (2010), who analyze the relationship between publishing and patenting in 
an international setting. However, the authors only use patents filed at the US Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) and the European Patent Office (EPO). 
 Regarding the determinants of the increasing importance of technology transfer, prior 
literature has largely focused on assessing the effects of regulatory changes such the Bayh-
Dole Act on university patenting (Henderson et al., 1998; Geuna and Rossi, 2011). These 
policies have been shown to have an important effect on the recent increases in university 
patenting on a general level; that is, the universities in a country are assumed to be affected 
in a uniform way. However, there is a considerable heterogeneity not only among universi-
ties in different regions but also among universities in the same country. This heterogeneity, 
as illustrated by the multitude of university rankings that have emerged in recent years, is 
likely to be reflected in technology transfer activities, thereby explaining differences in uni-
versity patenting to some extent (Hewitt-Dundas, 2012). However, evidence on university-
specific determinants is scarce and often limited to (individual) institutions or technological 
fields (Mowery et al., 2001; Crespi et al., 2011). 
 Due to these shortcomings, i.e., a regional focus and the negligence of university-spe-
cific factors, we believe that an international overview of university patenting that focuses 
on university-specific aspects can provide valuable insights. 
2.3 Hypotheses 
The number of university patents in the US has increased radically since the 1980s, in part 
due to the Bayh-Dole Act (Sampat et al., 2003). Inspired by this example, several European 
countries introduced Bayh-Dole-like legislations to facilitate patenting and licensing for uni-
versities in subsequent years (Baldini, 2009; Geuna and Rossi, 2011). These initiatives, 
which have enabled universities to more easily retain patents on academic inventions, were 
established to address the so-called “European Paradox”: Although Europe produces a high 
academic research output, Europe is lagging behind the US in technology transfer (Baldini, 
2009; Conti and Gaule, 2011). 
 Despite these initiatives, huge differences remain between the rate of research com-
mercialization between US universities and European universities (Baldini, 2009; Conti and 
Gaule, 2011). Prior literature has shown that a large share of university-invented patents is 
still assigned to non-academic institutions or individuals, not the university engaged in de-
veloping the patent. For example, Lissoni et al. (2008) indicate that more than 60% of the 
patents by academic scientists in France, Italy, and Sweden are assigned to companies or 
other entities. Similarly, Crespi et al. (2006) show that approximately 80% of the patents 
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with academic inventors in Europe are not university-owned. Additionally, Conti and Gaule 
(2011) largely attribute this gap to differences in TTO structure and staffing. The authors 
find that one of the main reasons that US TTOs are able to generate more licensing income 
is that they employ staff with more industry experience than European TTOs. 
 Differences in university patenting between Europe and the US are prioritized in this 
study. Besides, university patenting in Asia underwent a remarkable growth and is of great 
importance for the technological catch-up for countries such as China (Hu and Mathews, 
2008; Chapter 3). As such, it will be interesting to further assess how Asian universities 
perform in comparison. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H2.1: European universities file fewer patent applications than US universities do. 
 Patent applicants tend to file patent applications domestically, first and foremost. This 
“home advantage effect” affects patenting rates at most patent offices worldwide (Criscuolo, 
2006). Firms tend to file disproportionally large numbers of domestic patents to protect an 
already established market, which is usually their home market (Criscuolo, 2006). For uni-
versities, Leydesdorff and Meyer (2010) expect this home advantage effect to be even more 
prevalent. This prevalence could arise because university research has a tendency to be less 
market-oriented compared with industry research, leaving universities with fewer incentives 
to patent in foreign regions. This locality of knowledge transfer is further supported by lit-
erature describing the increasing knowledge spillovers from university to industry based on 
geographical proximity. As such, Acosta et al. (2009) note that companies located near uni-
versities benefit from early access to local inventions, while Owen-Smith and Powell (2003) 
describe that universities located in university-industry clusters tend to patent more as a re-
sult of extensive contacts to firms located in the cluster. Thus, these clusters support univer-
sity knowledge transfer locally. Additionally, the home advantage effect is augmented by a 
familiarity with the domestic patent system. For example, Liegsalz and Wagner (2013) show 
that domestic applicants in China are able to achieve significantly faster patent grants than 
are foreign applicants because the former have more experience with the Chinese patent 
system, among other factors. Based on this familiarity, the home advantage effect should be 
present worldwide and should not differ greatly between regions. We suggest the following: 
H2.2: Universities file more patent applications domestically than they do in foreign 
countries. 
 Although universities are heterogeneous not only between but also within regions and 
countries, research on university-specific determinants of university patenting is scarce 
(Hewitt-Dundas, 2012). Generally, there are various characteristics that are likely to affect 
a university’s patent output (Mowery and Sampat, 2005a; Hewitt-Dundas, 2012). A univer-
sity-specific characteristic that has been shown to affect patenting is the size of a university 
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because universities of a greater size tend to have more resources to use in the development 
of patents. For example, Landry et al. (2006) found that the size of a university is a signifi-
cant determinant of university-industry knowledge exchange based on a survey of 1,554 
researchers in Canada. Based on US university patenting data, Bulut and Moschini (2009) 
and Coupé (2003) find a similar influence of university size. This importance is further un-
derlined by Hewitt-Dundas (2012). Similarly, Carlsson and Fridh (2002) and Siegel et al. 
(2003a) find that the size of a university TTO is a relevant factor in explaining the number 
of university patents. Therefore, we similarly propose a positive relationship of university 
size on patent output of universities worldwide: 
H2.3: The size of a university is positively related to the number of patent applica-
tions filed. 
 The productivity of a university in terms of scientific publications is connected to its 
patent output. Publishing and patenting might be expected to substitute each other, as the 
publication of a paper might, for example, limit the patentability of the same results and vice 
versa (Breschi et al., 2005; 2008). Despite this potential trade-off, empirical work has fre-
quently found the relationship between patenting and publishing to be complementary and 
positive (e.g., Breschi et al., 2005; 2008; Meyer, 2006; Stephan et al., 2007; Crespi et al., 
2011). In this vein, Agrawal and Henderson (2002) indicate that one explanation is non-
exclusivity between publishing and patenting because most research can lead to both publi-
cations and patents. Another explanation is that publishing, or the prestige resulting from it, 
might serve as an advertisement (Fabrizio and Di Minin, 2008) that can lead to potential 
collaborations with industry partners and can stimulate both publishing and patenting. Other 
explanations include synergies between publishing and patenting that arise from the discov-
ery of fertile research questions in collaboration with industry, access to new data and in-
struments, and increasing prestige (Breschi et al., 2005; 2008).  
 Although this topic has already received considerable attention, empirical work has 
primarily been conducted at the individual level of the scientist rather than at the university 
level. Moreover, previous studies have been limited in their scope because they generally 
refer to a set of universities within individual countries or specific disciplines such as nano-
technology. As a notable exception, Wong and Singh (2010) show that the publication quan-
tity of international universities positively influences patenting numbers. Therefore, we pro-
pose the following: 
H2.4: The quantity of a university’s publications is positively related to the number 
of patent applications filed. 
 While prior literature on the relationship between publishing and patenting mostly re-
fers to the quantitative effect of publishing, the quality of the published results might also 
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affect patenting. The quality or the importance of publications is commonly measured by 
the citations they receive. Di Gregorio and Shane (2003) suggest that researchers who de-
velop high-quality innovations may want to capitalize on them by engaging in not only pub-
lishing the results but also technology transfer. Furthermore, high-quality innovations might 
be better suited for commercialization (O’Shea et al., 2005; Perkmann et al., 2011). While 
Di Gregorio and Shane (2003) and O’Shea et al. (2005) empirically show that researchers 
with a high-quality publication output lead to a higher number of start-ups per university, 
this argument can be extended to explain increased patenting as another means for a scientist 
to capitalize on the information advantage from high-quality research results. As such, Lach 
and Schankerman (2008) find a positive effect of citations in publications on licensing in 
public US universities. Similarly, Meyer (2006) describes that in the field of nano-technol-
ogy, university researchers engaged in patenting tend to outperform their non-patenting 
counterparts in publication citations, while Zucker and Darby (1996) discover similar results 
for bio-scientists. Finally, Wong and Singh (2010) find that publication citations positively 
influence the number of US patents for US universities. Taken together, the research results 
published in high-quality publications should be more likely to be patented. We thus suggest 
the following: 
H2.5: The quality of a university’s publications is positively related to the number 
of patent applications filed. 
 Many studies on university patenting focus on different technology-intensive areas 
such as biotechnology or biomedicine (e.g., Mowery and Ziedonis, 2002; Mowery and Sam-
pat, 2005a; Sapsalis et al., 2006). This is not coincidental, as prior literature suggests that 
the surge in academic patenting has been largely driven by the emergence and increasing 
importance of these technology-intensive areas (Van Zeebroeck et al., 2008; Foltz et al., 
2000). Zucker et al. (1998) highlight the importance of universities as central to the for-
mation of the relatively young sector as a whole, which evolved around the scientific break-
throughs achieved largely in universities and by “star” scientists. Accordingly, Van Zee-
broeck et al. (2008) describe biotechnology as the main area of growth for university 
patenting in the US and Belgium, while Geuna and Nesta (2006) identify biotechnology as 
showing the highest university activity in further European countries patenting in Europe. 
Note that biotechnology and pharmaceuticals are categories of the broader area of chemistry. 
Hence, we conjecture the following: 
H2.6: A university’s share of patent applications in the area of chemistry is posi-
tively related to the number of patent applications filed. 
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2.4 Data 
2.4.1 Dataset 
Our empirical analysis is based on a newly created dataset. The data were collected from 
two independent sources. Patent data were obtained from the database PATSTAT (version 
of October 2013). PATSTAT is currently the most comprehensive international database on 
patents. Data on university characteristics were obtained from the Academic Ranking of 
World Universities of the year 2013 (Shanghai Jiao Tong University, 2014). The ARWU is 
widely used and is one of the most comprehensive rankings of universities worldwide. The 
ranking is based on multiple objective indicators, such as the quantity and quality of its pub-
lications, primarily capturing the research performance of a university. We identified the 
patent applications by the top 300 universities as ranked in the ARWU of 2013. Because 
these universities are among the most research intensive universities worldwide, they can be 
expected to account for a large share of university patenting (Wong and Singh, 2010). 
 We identified all patents that list one of the 300 universities as applicant or assignee. 
Because PATSTAT is organized on the level of patent documents and not applicants, we 
developed a variety of search patterns to match patents to universities. To account for dif-
ferent variations of applicant names, we refined these search patterns in 13 iterations. For 
example, the search patterns accounted for name changes, different university names in dif-
ferent languages, spelling errors in the patent document, and entities that do not always share 
the name of the respective university but belong to it (e.g., hospitals, institutes, or TTOs). 
For instance, the University of Oxford files very few patent applications itself but instead 
files them through its technology transfer company ISIS Innovation Ltd. Thus, only identi-
fying patents that list the University of Oxford as an applicant would severely underestimate 
its patent output. 
 Furthermore, the ARWU includes US universities on a campus level if they belong to 
a multi-campus university or university system. The prime example is the University of Cal-
ifornia (UC), which is represented by 8 different campuses (e.g., Berkeley, Los Angeles, and 
San Francisco) in the top 300 of the ARWU ranking. These universities file most of their 
patents as “The Regents of the University of California” so that the particular campus to 
which the patents belong is unclear. Wong and Singh (2010) describe the same problem and 
decide to exclude the UC. Another way would be to include UC as 1 instead of 8 universities. 
However, both approaches severely bias the analysis. As a solution, we divide the patents 
that are not clearly assignable to mirror their actual patenting output. In the case of the UC, 
information on patents filed per campus in 2011 is provided directly by the UC’s technology 
transfer report (University of California, 2012). We use the shares of patent applications per 
campus reported and assign the patents in our sample accordingly. If information on patent 
applications per campus is not obtainable for the respective university, we use data on R&D 
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expenditures by campus to approximate the share of patents applied for by individual cam-
puses and distribute them accordingly. These data are provided by the US National Science 
Foundation that was published in 2011 (National Science Foundation, 2013). 
 In total, our approach results in a sample of 300 universities from 32 different countries. 
These universities applied for 316,393 patents from 2001 to 2011. We limit our analysis to 
this more recent time frame because a longer history of university patenting in a country 
(e.g., in the US compared with China) would bias the estimates severely. Furthermore, 2011 
was the most recent year that has been completely included in PATSTAT when the analyses 
were conducted. 
2.4.2 Variables 
Dependent Variable: To measure patent output, we use the number of patent applications 
filed by each university between 2001 and 2011. To account for potential differences be-
tween patents filed in different legislations and to assess the prevalence of a home advantage 
effect, we use different variants of this variable: patent applications under the Patent Coop-
eration Treaty (PCT applications), patent applications at the USPTO, patent applications at 
European patent offices including the EPO, patent applications at Asian offices, and the 
overall number of patent applications. 
 However, our main focus is on the number of PCT applications. A PCT application is 
an international patent application that can be filed instead of national applications and can 
lead to simultaneous patent protection in up to 140 contracting states. Hence, PCT patent 
applications are standardized worldwide with regard to different aspects, such as formal re-
quirements and a high-quality international search. Consequently, PCT applications provide 
a high comparability among different countries and are frequently used in international anal-
yses (e.g., Criscuolo and Verspagen, 2008; Godinho and Ferreira, 2012). 
 As a further check of robustness, we include the number of patent families per univer-
sity. Patent families are frequently used to account for a potential overrepresentation of pa-
tents filed at multiple patent offices. At their core, patent families represent patented inno-
vations, whereas patent applications or patents correspond to the geographic coverage where 
protection is sought for these innovations, i.e., multiple patent applications refer to and are 
filed to protect the same or a similar invention in multiple jurisdictions (Li, 2012). Members 
of a patent family are identified by the standard processes enshrined in patent law and build 
on the priority applications of a patent. Priority applications are highly important to deter-
mine the date on which an invention was recorded in the patent register. One such standard 
of grouping patent applications to patent families is the INPADOC classification, which is 
also included in PATSTAT. We rely on this standard to reconcile the patent families in our 
data. As a further measure used in the descriptive statistics, we calculate the average size of 
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a family as the average number of different legislations in which the members of a family 
are filed. 
 Independent Variables: To address the differences between universities from the US, 
Europe, Asia, and other countries, we include a dummy variable for each region. Table 2.A1 
(Appendix) provides further details on the specific countries in each region. 
 The size of a university is frequently measured in terms of its employed staff (Hewitt-
Dundas, 2012) or its resource endowment (e.g., R&D expenditures or R&D budget) (Landry 
et al., 2006; Bulut and Moschini, 2009). The ARWU includes specific data on both a uni-
versity’s R&D staff (R&D staff) and its R&D budget in terms of external funds received 
(R&D budget). Both variables are provided as ordinal variables, ranking universities from 1 
(best) to above 500. Harvard University was ranked first in terms of R&D staff, while the 
University of Pennsylvania was ranked first regarding the R&D budget. If the information 
was missing for a university, we assign the mean value in the respective scale to it. 
 To measure publication quantity, we use an indicator also obtained from the ARWU 
(publication quantity). A university’s score is based on the number of papers that were in-
dexed in the Science Citation Index-Expanded and Social Science Citation Index in 2012. 
The scores are normalized and given values from 0 to a maximum of 100 (only reached by 
Harvard University). Similarly, the quality of universities’ research performance is meas-
ured using the HiCi score from the ARWU (publication quality). The values are calculated 
from the number of highly cited researchers in 21 subject categories. The measure is nor-
malized taking values from 0 to 100 (the latter if which is only reached by Harvard Univer-
sity). 
 Finally, we account for the different areas in which patent applications are filed by 
including the share of applications filed in each area per university. We classify the patents 
according to Hinze et al. (1997), thus distinguishing the areas of chemistry, consumer goods, 
instruments, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, and process engineering. 
 Control Variables: To account for further differences between countries in terms of 
IPR, we include the patent protection index developed by Park (2008), in its latest version 
from 2005. The index assigns each country a score based on different dimensions of the 
national patent system, such as the participation in international treaties or enforcement 
mechanisms. It is scaled from 0 to 5, with the US achieving the highest score of 4.88. Fur-
thermore, we include a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the university is a technical univer-
sity (i.e., carries a variation of the term technology in its name). We expect technical univer-
sities to file more patents due to their more patent-affine orientation. 
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2.5 Analysis 
2.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.1. The majority of universities in our sample 
are European (42.0%), closely followed by universities from the US (35.7%). Approxi-
mately 9.7% of the universities are Asian, while the remaining 12.7% are not located in these 
regions. Table 2.A1 (Appendix) provides further details on the countries of origin, indicating 
that the country with the most universities ranked in the ARWU top 300 is the US (35.7%), 
followed by the United Kingdom (9.7%), and Germany (7.7%). 
 The universities in our sample obtained an average rank of 179.1 in terms of research 
staff and 152.7 in terms of research budget. While the maximum rank (i.e., the worst rank) 
is 1,000, the universities in our sample reach ranks from 1 to 556 (R&D staff) and 635 (R&D 
budget). Note that multiple universities can be ranked at the same rank. Regarding publica-
tion quality and quantity, the universities reach scores from 0 (publication quantity) and 13.1 
(publication quality) to the maximum of 100. Again, there are multiple universities receiving 
equal scores, with Harvard University being exclusively ranked first in both dimensions. 
 The universities in our sample applied for approximately 1,055 patents on average be-
tween 2001 and 2011. However, the patenting rates vary considerably between universities. 
Zhejiang University (China) filed the overall most patent applications (16,339), and seven 
universities did not file any patents in the period considered. While the average number of 
patent families per university is 487.8, the average patent family consists of applications 
filed in 4.3 legislations. Note that there are many patent families with a size of 1. For exam-
ple, while Zhejiang University filed the most patents in our sample (16,339), it also ac-
counted for the maximum number of patent families (16,136), as most of the patents were 
filed only in China. 
 Similar to publication citations, forward citations (i.e., citations that patents receive) 
are used to measure the importance or quality of patents (Henderson et al., 1998; Mowery 
and Ziedonis, 2002; Harhoff et al., 2003). Forward citations are defined as the number of 
citations that a university’s patent families receive within five years of the initial patent pub-
lication because forward citations typically peak within four to five years of the initial ap-
plication (Mowery and Ziedonis, 2002). Because newer patents would be right-censored, we 
only include citations received by patent applications filed until 2006. Similarly, the citation 
intensity is the number of forward citations a university received divided by the overall num-
ber of patent applications until 2006. The universities received an average of 710.6 citations, 
or 0.6 citations per application filed. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) re-
ceived the most forward citations among all of the universities in our sample (10,936). 
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics. 
Notes: N = 300 universities. 
Data sources: PATSTAT (version: October 2013), Academic Ranking of World Universities 2013 (Shanghai Jiao Tong Univer-
sity, 2014), Hinze et al. (1997), Park (2008). 
 Table 2.1 further breaks down the patent applications per patent office. On average, 
each university filed 186.3 PCT patent applications, which is approximately 18% of all ap-
plications. While the universities in our sample filed an average of 241.5 US patents, an 
average of 192.5 patents were filed at European offices, and an average of 298.1 were filed 
at Asian offices. Next to the USPTO, the EPO and the State Intellectual Property Office 
(SIPO) were the two patent offices that received the second and third most applications and 
Variable Mean SD Median Min. Max. 
University Characteristics  
US (dummy) 0.357 - 0 0 1 
EU (dummy) 0.420 - 0 0 1 
Asia (dummy) 0.097 - 0 0 1 
Others (dummy) 0.127 - 0 0 1 
R&D staff 179.13 117.96 179.00 1 556 
R&D budget 152.73 102.90 153.00 1 635 
Publication quality 21.86 15.12 17.70 0 100 
Publication quantity 43.34 12.05 40.75 13.10 100 
Technical university (dummy) 0.090 - 0.000 0 1 
Patent protection index 4.605 0.306 4.670 2.980 4.880 
 
Patenting activity (per university)  
Patent applications 1,054.64 1,635.34 588.50 0 16,339 
Patent families 487.77 1,349.19 194.00 0 16,136 
Average family size 4.295 1.577 4.324 0 9.331 
Forward citations 710.58 1,135.70 315.50 0 10,936 
Citation intensity 0.637 0.512 0.470 0 3.263 
 
Patent applications by patent office 
PCT 186.27 214.06 116.00 0 1,733 
USPTO 241.52 342.81 102.50 0 2,580 
European offices (incl. EPO) 192.51 197.50 137.00 0 1,328 
EPO 103.46 100.66 72.00 0 579 
Asian offices (incl. SIPO) 298.13 1,371.08 34.00 0 16,165 
SIPO 197.30 1,286.15 17.50 0 16,160 
 
Area of the patent applications  
Chemistry 0.591 0.197 0.628 0.000 1.000 
Consumer goods 0.019 0.028 0.011 0.000 0.250 
Electrical engineering 0.188 0.139 0.164 0.000 1.000 
Instruments 0.327 0.124 0.327 0.000 1.000 
Mechanical engineering 0.036 0.042 0.024 0.000 0.255 
Process engineering 0.105 0.070 0.093 0.000 0.444 
Others 0.018 0.019 0.013 0.000 0.147 
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accounted for a majority of the patents filed in Europe and Asia. Again, the application num-
bers at Asian patent offices, particularly the SIPO, are comparatively high. This is largely 
driven by the very high application numbers of Asian (especially Chinese) universities that 
file large numbers of patents first and foremost in their country of residence. This bias is 
further illustrated by the very low median values, which show that half of the universities in 
the sample applied for 17.5 or fewer patents at the SIPO, in contrast to the misleadingly high 
mean value of 197.3. 
 Regarding the area of application, the majority of patents in the sample are applied for 
in the field of chemistry. In detail, most universities filed more than 59.1% of their patents 
in this area. With regard to the other areas of application, on average universities filed 1.4% 
of their total number of patents in consumer goods and construction, 18.8% in electrical 
engineering, 32.7% in instruments, 3.6% in mechanical engineering, 10.5% in process engi-
neering, and 1.8% in other fields of research. Note that the sum is more than 100% because 
a patent can be filed in multiple areas. Consistent with previous research (Mowery and 
Ziedonis, 2002; Mowery and Sampat, 2005a), university patenting is concentrated in the 
broadly defined area of chemistry, including biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. 
2.5.2 Patent ranking of international universities 
Neither the ARWU nor any other ranking that we identified ranks universities based on their 
patenting activity. Consequently, Tables 2.2 (a) and 2.2 (b) present an excerpt of the top 25 
universities in terms of PCT patent applications and overall patent applications based on our 
sample of the ARWU’s top 300 universities worldwide. 
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MIT, Johns Hopkins University, and the University of Florida (all US) are the universities 
with the most PCT patent applications worldwide (Table 2.2 (a)). The first-place MIT has a 
long history of patenting activities: regulations on the usage of patents and the enhancement 
of technology date back to 1931 and make MIT one of the pioneers in university patenting 
(Etzkowitz, 1994). The earliest patent application included in our initial dataset was also 
filed by MIT in 1905. While MIT filed 1,733 PCT applications from 2001 to 2011 and is 
ranked first by a large margin, Johns Hopkins University filed 1,154 PCT applications, and 
the University of Florida filed 1,059 PCT applications. Eighteen out of the top 25 universi-
ties are US institutions. This overrepresentation is not entirely surprising given the compar-
atively long history of university patenting in the US. Furthermore, there are four Japanese 
universities and 1 university each from the Republic of Korea, Israel, and the United King-
dom. There is only 1 European university among the top 25 PCT applicants worldwide (Uni-
versity of Oxford), though most of the countries in the sample are European. The table pro-
vides further information on the number of applications and the share per patent office as 
well as details on patent families and forward citations. Overall, the applications per patent 
office underline the presence of a home bias: US universities generally filed most of their 
patents in the US, while Asian universities seem to file large proportions at Asian offices, 
particularly at the Japanese and the Chinese patent offices. 
 While PCT applications provide a greater comparability between different countries, 
descriptive statistics show that the university with the most overall patent applications 
worldwide is Chinese. Therefore, Table 2.2 (b) presents the top 25 universities ranked by 
the overall aggregated number of patent applications. The formerly first-placed MIT now 
ranks fifth, being surpassed by three Chinese universities and 1 Korean university; Zhejiang 
University, Tsinghua University, and Shanghai Jiao Tong University each filed more than 
10,000 patents from 2001 to 2011. Overall, there are 11 Asian and 14 US universities in the 
top 25, while the highest-ranked European university is the University of Oxford at rank 26. 
However, Chinese universities file most of their patents at Asian offices, especially the 
SIPO. Zhejiang University and Shanghai Jiao Tong University filed more than 95% of their 
patents in China. Moreover, the average family size and the citation intensity of Chinese 
university patents are remarkably low. These findings of a very steep and non-international 
increase in patent applications by Chinese universities are consistent with other studies on 
university patenting in China, generally describing high patenting rates but a questionable 
patent quality (e.g., Luan et al., 2010; Chapter 3). One of the reasons for the high application 
numbers is that single-claim patents are generally favored in China (Sun, 2003). Moreover, 
Wu and Zhou (2012) indicate that Chinese universities often focus on the adaption and re-
development of foreign technology. Both reasons might lead to more, but somewhat incre-
mental, patent applications. 
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2.5.3 Multivariate statistics 
Our dependent variable (patent applications per university) is a count variable with only 
non-negative integers. Therefore, we employ count data regressions to assess the relation-
ship between university characteristics and their patent applications. Furthermore, the data 
on patent applications is overdispersed, as evidenced by a comparison of the (conditional) 
variance, the mean, and the highly significant overdispersion parameter Alpha (Table 2.4). 
To account for this overdispersion, we use negative binomial regressions as our main form 
of analysis. To further account for heteroscedasticity, we estimate the regressions with ro-
bust standard errors. We estimate multiple models to account for the differences between 
patents filed in different legislations. The results are presented in Table 2.4. Corresponding 
correlations and variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the main variables are presented in 
Table 2.3. Both measures indicate that our results are not greatly biased by multicollinearity. 
 We use different variants of the dependent variable to account for the differences be-
tween patent applications in different jurisdictions. In our main model (Model 1), we use 
international patent applications filed under the PCT because PCT applications provide the 
highest degree of international comparability. The main Model 1 shows that US and Asian 
universities file significantly more PCT patent applications (p < 0.01). Other significant de-
terminants include publication quantity, whether the university has a technical focus and 
high shares of applications in the areas of chemistry, electric engineering, instruments, and 
mechanical engineering (p < 0.01). Size variables (R&D staff and R&D budget), publication 
quality, the patent protection index, and the remaining application areas do not exhibit a 
significant influence on the number of PCT applications. Our control variable for technical 
universities is highly significant, underlining the patenting activity enhancing effect of a 
clearly technological orientation. 
 In the following models, we use patent applications filed at the USPTO (Model 2), 
European patent offices including the EPO (Model 3), and Asian offices including the SIPO 
(Model 4) as dependent variables to shed further light on potential differences between these 
markets. Furthermore, we use the aggregated overall amount of universities’ patent applica-
tions as the dependent variable (Model 5) because the descriptive statistics revealed large 
differences between PCT and overall applications for several universities. Finally, we use 
the number of patent families as a last check of robustness, accounting for a potential 
overrepresentation of patents filed at multiple offices (Model 6). The results are relatively 
robust across the different dependent variables with only minor changes, such as publication 
quality revealing a significant effect when assessing USPTO patent applications (p < 0.05). 
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Table 2.4: Multivariate statistics: Negative binomial regressions on university patent ap-
plications from 2001 until 2011. 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable 
Applica-
tions: 
PCT 
Applica-
tions: 
USPTO 
Applica-
tions: 
EU 
Applica-
tions: 
Asia 
Applica-
tions: 
Total 
Families: 
Total 
US (dummy) 0.368** 1.411*** -0.902*** 0.844*** 0.636*** 0.998*** 
 (0.152) (0.170) (0.168) (0.239) (0.180) (0.167) 
Asia (dummy) 0.725*** 1.153*** -0.676*** 3.853*** 1.498*** 2.091*** 
 (0.191) (0.274) (0.209) (0.439) (0.336) (0.340) 
Others (dummy) -0.093 0.311* -1.119*** -0.158 -0.341* -0.335* 
 (0.198) (0.180) (0.211) (0.217) (0.193) (0.185) 
       
R&D staff 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.009* 0.006 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
R&D budget 0.000 -0.004 -0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
Publication quality 0.006 0.011** 0.009* 0.001 -0.003 -0.008 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 
Publication quantity 0.041*** 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.055*** 0.049*** 0.052*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) 
Technical university (dummy) 0.949*** 0.770*** 0.845*** 0.695*** 0.690*** 0.633*** 
 (0.193) (0.218) (0.225) (0.240) (0.221) (0.212) 
Patent protection index 0.557 -0.084 0.261 -0.330 -0.362 -0.698* 
 (0.348) (0.296) (0.303) (0.564) (0.458) (0.412) 
       
Area: Chemistry 4.080*** 3.662*** 4.360*** 3.111*** 4.617*** 3.482*** 
 (0.546) (0.531) (0.604) (0.598) (0.640) (0.628)   
Area: Consumer goods -3.094 -3.250* -4.905** -2.970 -3.295 -4.792** 
 (2.232) (1.787) (2.288) (2.557) (2.429) (2.359) 
Area: Electric engineering 3.725*** 4.975*** 4.008*** 4.143*** 4.477*** 3.559*** 
 (0.635) (0.721) (0.706) (0.765) (0.757) (0.738) 
Area: Instruments 3.051*** 2.934*** 3.259*** 1.471** 3.464*** 2.948*** 
 (0.598) (0.634) (0.655) (0.684) (0.677) (0.673) 
Area: Mechanical engineering 5.953*** 4.797*** 8.703*** 6.463*** 8.648*** 8.872*** 
 (1.387) (1.559) (1.784) (2.124) (1.790) (1.736) 
Area: Process engineering 1.382 1.505* 1.940** 1.761* 2.681*** 2.752*** 
 (0.848) (0.894) (0.988) (1.052) (0.929) (0.894) 
Area: Others 2.963 4.761 4.137 6.572* 4.428 3.841 
 (2.677) (3.026) (3.028) (3.846) (3.141) (3.047) 
       
N (Universities) 300 300 300 300 300 300 
Years 2001–2011 2001–2011 2001–2011 2001–2011 2001–2011 2001–2011 
Log likelihood -1721.69 -1727.44 -1777.27 -1466.60 -2225.00 -1911.141 
Chi-square 579.11*** 1080.08*** 293.28*** 643.44*** 465.26*** 543.961*** 
Alpha 0.520*** 0.554*** 0.621*** 0.824*** 0.608*** 0.595*** 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. R&D staff and R&D budget are divided by 10. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01. Reference category for regional dummies: Europe. Constant not shown. 
Data sources: See Table 2.3. 
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 H2.1 states that European universities file fewer patents compared with universities in 
the US. This hypothesis is heavily supported by the descriptive patent ranking constructed; 
though most universities in the sample are European, no European university was ranked in 
the top 25 when examining the overall number of patent applications. Our regression results 
show the same results when analyzing the overall number of patent applications. Model 5 
shows that US universities applied for significantly more patents than did European univer-
sities from 2001 to 2011. This is in line with previous results (Conti and Gaule, 2011). The 
reasons for this European gap are diverse and complex. Naturally, the shorter history of EU 
university patenting and technology transfer as a whole is one of these reasons, as European 
institutions have not yet been able to gain the same amount of experience as US institutions. 
Additionally, Crespi et al. (2006) and Baldini et al. (2006) indicate that European universi-
ties lag behind US universities in terms of university-owned patents, as the majority of pa-
tents developed with European universities involved are filed by third parties, particularly 
business companies. 
 Additionally, the results show that Asian universities filed significantly more patent 
applications than European universities did, which is also reflected by the patent ranking. 
Furthermore, this finding holds when analyzing PCT applications (Model 1), which should 
be robust against a potential home bias effect. While previous literature has suggested and 
shown large patenting activities in Asian universities (e.g., Hu and Mathews, 2008; Luan et 
al., 2010; Chapter 3), there has been little empirical evidence from a comparative perspec-
tive. We find empirical evidence for a comparatively weak performance of European uni-
versities compared with US universities, while we also find evidence for a comparatively 
strong performance of Asian universities. 
 H2.2 addresses the presence of a home advantage effect, i.e., universities filing more 
patent applications domestically. This hypothesis is addressed by the regional dummies in 
Models 2-4 and supported for all three main regions (US, Europe, and Asia). Model 2 shows 
that US universities apply for significantly more patents at the USPTO than do European 
universities (p < 0.01). The coefficients further indicate that the effect of US universities is 
higher than the effect of Asian universities, in contrast to Models 1 and 5. Analyzing appli-
cations at European patent offices, Model 3 shows that universities from all non-European 
regions file significantly fewer patents compared with European universities. This supports 
the notion of a home advantage effect for European universities. Finally, the strong effect of 
Asia (dummy) in Model 4 underlines the suggested a home advantage effect of Asian uni-
versities, which file their patents first and foremost domestically. 
 We do not find support for H2.3. The variables capturing the size of each university in 
terms of personnel and monetary resource endowment for research do not significantly in-
fluence patent applications. This non-finding is robust across all models. This finding is in 
line with Fritsch and Slavtchev (2007), who describe that neither the regular budget of a 
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university nor its personnel seem to influence the patent output of German universities. How-
ever, this contradicts the results of Van Looy et al. (2011) for European universities and 
Bulut and Moschini (2009) for the US. We suspect that the effects of both variables are at 
least partly captured by publication quantity, which is highly correlated with both variables. 
Furthermore, the rather undetailed measurement (i.e., both variables use the rank of a uni-
versity) might add to this insignificant finding. 
 H2.4 addresses the relationship between patenting and publication in terms of quantity. 
While a trade-off between both might be plausible, various studies report positive effects 
(Geuna and Nesta, 2006; Breschi et al., 2008; Van Looy et al., 2011). In line with these 
studies, our results indicate that research publication quantity is positively associated with 
the number of patent applications, thus supporting H2.4. Publication quantity is highly sig-
nificant across all models (p < 0.01). As suggested, university patenting and research per-
formance in terms of scientific publication has a complementary relationship with the po-
tential for large synergies. For example, more publications or a researcher that has higher 
prestige due to high publication output may attract industry collaborations and thus lead to 
patents. Other synergies might include the discovery of new research questions, an increased 
accessibility to new data or instruments, or financial benefits that encourage both publishing 
and patenting (Breschi et al., 2008; Fabrizio and Di Minin, 2008; Crespi et al., 2011). While 
these findings were typically limited in terms of the scope of their analysis, our results are 
in line with those of Wong and Singh (2010). We provide empirical evidence on the positive 
relationship between publishing and patenting, which is also prevalent when analyzing this 
relationship in an international, cross-country setting. 
 We expected a positive relation between publication quality and patenting (H2.5) in 
addition to publication quantity. However, we must reject this hypothesis because our results 
do not consistently support it. While the effect is significant for patents filed at the USPTO 
(p < 0.05), it is insignificant in the main Model 1. Again, this insignificance might arise 
because we include more control variables than do other studies describing a positive effect 
(Wong and Singh 2010). Other studies describing a positive effect between publication qual-
ity and technology transfer might differ because they do not use patenting measures to cap-
ture university technology transfer, such as start-up rates (Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003) or 
licensing (Lach and Schankerman, 2008). Further, Fabrizio and Di Minin (2008) describe 
that researchers who frequently patent their work tend to receive fewer citations because 
they might refocus on more applied research that is not as likely to generate citations in 
publications. Another reason that might partially explain our non-finding is that academic 
citations (publication quality) are generated through processes that are often widely inde-
pendent of the likelihood for research results to be patented (e.g., contribution to literature), 
which does not result in a causal relationship between these variables. For example, citation 
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patterns differ greatly between different fields of publication, thus biasing the quality of a 
publication as measured through citations. 
 H2.6 suggests a particularly high influence of the area of application on the number of 
patents filed. It is widely acknowledged that the importance of university research is consid-
erably strong in the area of chemistry, including biotechnology and pharmaceuticals 
(Mowery and Ziedonis, 2002; Geuna and Nesta, 2006). Our descriptive statistics (Table 2.1) 
also illustrate that universities generally file more than 50% of their patents in this area. We 
find support for H2.6, which states that a university with a greater focus in the area of chem-
istry has a higher patent output. Next to the area of chemistry, we find evidence for this 
relationship to also be true for the areas of electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, 
and instruments. This is not entirely surprising given the technical nature of these fields. 
These findings are highly significant across all models. Prior studies have often been limited 
to single areas or countries. Against this backdrop, our study provides empirical evidence 
across multiple technology fields in an international context. 
2.6 Discussion and conclusion 
This study investigates the patent activity of the top 300 universities worldwide according 
to the ARWU between 2001 and 2011. It is a first attempt to compare and study the patent 
output of universities across all fields of research on a worldwide basis. First, a descriptive 
overview by means of a university patent ranking is provided. Second, we perform an econ-
ometric analysis to analyze how different university characteristics influence the number of 
patent applications. In particular, we analyze the extent to which patenting by universities is 
linked to their location, the quantity and quality of scientific publications, the university size, 
and the area of its patent applications. Our empirical results show that European universities 
file fewer patent applications than do their US and Asian counterparts. Furthermore, the 
patent output is considerably influenced by a university’s technological focus on chemistry 
and mechanical engineering. 
 The increasing interest in commercialization at universities has led to a large body of 
literature on university technology transfer and especially on university patenting. Prior lit-
erature has assessed university patenting in various regions and countries, mainly focusing 
on the US and Europe and more recently Asia (e.g., Henderson et al., 1998; Hu and Mathews, 
2005; Geuna and Rossi, 2011). We contribute to the literature on university patenting by 
adopting an integrative international perspective that provides new and interesting insights 
on the phenomenon as a whole. In addition to this international perspective, we add to the 
previous literature by including a variety of university-specific characteristics that are shown 
to be important determinants of university patenting. Previous literature has largely focused 
on analyzing the effects of regulatory changes on university patenting (Henderson et al., 
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1998; Geuna and Rossi, 2011) while neglecting the potentially huge differences between 
universities not only between countries but also within one country. 
 Our study is not without limitations. Because university researchers are frequently in-
volved in patented research without the university being listed as patent applicant, our fig-
ures should be considered lower-bound measures. This is particularly important with regard 
to European universities (Crespi et al., 2006; Lissoni et al., 2008). Furthermore, universities 
from different countries vary with regard to their institutional and organizational structure 
and their IPR regulation (Geuna and Rossi, 2011). Although we try to control for this by 
including regional dummies, a patent protection index, and the number of applications at 
different offices, these differences might still affect university patenting. Finally, patents are 
not the only channel through which universities contribute to innovation and economic 
growth. While patenting by universities seems to be increasingly attractive, other forms of 
knowledge transfer are more commonly used (Cohen et al., 2002). 
 Future research should award more attention to how other forms of university-industry 
relationships are influenced by university characteristics. While our study underlines their 
importance for university patenting, a careful assessment of the impact of university-specific 
factors might yield interesting results concerning other forms of technology transfer. Addi-
tionally, it might be fruitful to analyze these other forms of technology transfer from an 
international perspective. As evidenced by our study, an international analysis and compar-
ison reveals interesting differences between countries, which might similarly affect licens-
ing, the generation of start-ups, and other forms of technology transfer. 
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2.7 Appendix 
Table 2.A1: Distribution of universities in the sample by region and country. 
Region 
No. of universities 
per region 
(share of total) 
Countries No. of universities Share 
United States (US) 107 (35.7%) United States 107 35.7% 
     
Europe (EU) 126 (42.0%) Austria 3 1.0% 
  Belgium 6 2.0% 
  Switzerland 7 2.3% 
  Czech Republic 1 0.3% 
  Germany 23 7.7% 
  Denmark 4 1.3% 
  Spain 4 1.3% 
  Finland 1 0.3% 
  France 17 5.7% 
  Ireland 1 0.3% 
  Italy 9 3.0% 
  Netherlands 10 3.3% 
  Norway 3 1.0% 
  Sweden 8 2.7% 
  United Kingdom 29 9.7% 
     
Asia 29 (9.7%) China 8 2.7% 
  Hong Kong 3 1.0% 
  Japan 10 3.3% 
  Republic of Korea 4 1.3% 
  Singapore 2 0.7% 
  Taiwan 2 0.7% 
     
Others 38 (12.7%) Argentina 1 0.3% 
  Australia 10 3.3% 
  Brazil 1 0.3% 
  Canada 16 5.3% 
  Israel 4 1.3% 
  Mexico 1 0.3% 
  New Zealand 1 0.3% 
  Russia 1 0.3% 
  Saudi Arabia 2 0.7% 
  South Africa 1 0.3% 
     
Total 300 (100%) 32 300 100.0% 
Data sources: Academic Ranking of World Universities 2013 (Shanghai Jiao Tong University, 2014). 
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Chinese university patents: Quantity, 
quality, and the role of subsidy programs 
 
 
Chinese university patenting has gained importance in recent years. Using a comprehensive 
dataset of university patents by 155 leading Chinese universities from 1991 to 2009, our 
study pursues two objectives: First, we analyze the quantity and quality of patents filed by 
leading Chinese universities. Second, we analyze the role of subsidy programs with regard 
to university patenting in China. With regard to the first objective, our results show that 
university patents witnessed rapid growth in terms of quantity while patent quality did not 
increase to a similar degree. Regarding the second objective, we find that a subsidy program 
to promote research excellence at selected universities is a significant driver of patent quan-
tity and quality. In contrast, a subsidy program that decreases the costs of patent applica-
tions seems to enhance patent quantity but not patent quality. We conclude that innovation 
policies which aim to stimulate patents of higher quality should focus primarily on increas-
ing university R&D, and to a lesser extent on decreasing the costs of university patenting. 
 
 
This chapter is based on Fisch et al. (2016).  
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3.1 Introduction 
Universities influence a country’s innovative potential and can thereby act as driving forces 
for economic development, technological performance, and competitiveness. There are mul-
tiple ways in which universities contribute to innovation, for example by providing educa-
tion, by generating spin-offs, or through university patenting (Acosta et al., 2012). We focus 
on the latter aspect and analyze university patenting in China.  
 To stimulate university patenting, governments frequently introduce initiatives such as 
subsidy programs or patent-friendly regulatory changes. A prominent and well-researched 
example of such a change is the Bayh-Dole Act, which was introduced in the US in 1980 to 
facilitate university patenting and licensing (e.g., Henderson et al., 1998; Sampat et al., 2003; 
Mowery and Sampat, 2005a). Subsequently, various European countries introduced similar 
regulations to promote university patenting. While these initiatives varied slightly between 
countries, they intend to imitate the conditions as established through the Bayh-Dole Act 
(Geuna and Nesta, 2006; Geuna and Rossi, 2011). Examples include France (Malva et al., 
2013), Germany (Czarnitzki et al., 2011), and Italy (Baldini et al., 2006). Even though these 
regulations are often described as stimulating university patenting, their effects are hetero-
geneous between countries and not entirely clear in their direction. For example, Henderson 
et al. (1998) find an increasing patent quantity but decreasing patent quality as a result of the 
Bayh-Dole Act. However, this finding is revised by Mowery and Ziedonis (2002) and Sam-
pat et al. (2003), who demonstrate that the effect of the Bayh-Dole Act on patent quantity 
and quality was modest. For Europe, Geuna and Nesta (2006) similarly suggest that the rise 
in university patenting is largely driven by factors unrelated to policy changes.  
 Focusing on university patenting in China, our study pursues two objectives: First, we 
assess the development of Chinese university patenting in terms of patent quantity and qual-
ity over the past 20 years. This first objective is primarily of exploratory and descriptive 
nature. Second, we investigate and compare the effects of two types of governmental subsidy 
programs with regard to university patenting. While one subsidy program aims to decrease 
the costs of university patenting, the other program focusses on promoting research excel-
lence in selected leading Chinese universities (Li, 2012; Zhang et al., 2013). 
 This study aims to contribute to the literature on the role of governmental initiatives 
regarding university patenting (e.g., Henderson et al., 1998; Mowery et al., 2002; Geuna and 
Nesta, 2006; Wong and Singh, 2010; Geuna and Rossi, 2011; Hülsbeck et al., 2013) in two 
ways. First, our study focuses on China, an emerging country that aims to transform itself 
from an imitation-based to an innovation-based economy. Thus, we extend the research on 
the role of governmental initiatives regarding university patenting, which has been focused 
on the US and Europe, to the context of emerging countries. Second, our study analyzes and 
compares the effects of two different types of governmental subsidies. So far, little research 
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exists that compares the effects of different governmental initiatives promoting university 
patenting with each other. 
 Our study also contributes to the more general literature on patenting in China (e.g., 
Hu and Mathews, 2008; Li, 2012). While several prior studies exist that emphasize the im-
portance of universities for innovation in China, we know little about Chinese university 
patenting and its determinants. University patenting is a form of (potential) technology trans-
fer and analyzing its quantity, quality, and determinants helps us to understand the role of 
universities in China’s national innovation system. By comparing patenting rates over time 
and across universities, our research helps to grasp the innovative efforts of universities in 
China in a quantitative way. To deepen our analysis, we also account for patent quality by 
investigating patent citations, which are a proxy for the economic and technological im-
portance and quality of innovations (e.g., Henderson et al., 1998; Mowery and Ziedonis, 
2002; Acosta et al., 2012). 
 The remainder of the study is organized as follows: Section 3.2 describes the research 
context of this study and explains patenting and university patenting in China. It introduces 
two important subsidy programs promoting research and patenting in Chinese universities. 
Section 3.3 explains the data employed and provides descriptive statistics and trends in pa-
tent quantity and quality (e.g., patent growth rates, grant lags, family sizes, and citations). 
Section 3.4 presents regressions on the effects of the subsidy programs with regard to uni-
versity patenting. The final section discusses the study’s contributions to the literature, its 
limitations, and avenues for further research. 
3.2 Research context: Patenting and university patenting in China 
3.2.1 Patenting in China 
As outlined in Section 1.1.1, China witnessed an explosive growth in terms of patent appli-
cations in recent years. This growth is unlikely to halt in the near future. As part of its “Na-
tional Patent Development Strategy” (SIPO, 2011), China states that it plans to further quad-
ruple patent applications from 2010 to 2020. Six universities were among the top 10 Chinese 
applicants at the SIPO in 2011, and the share of patents applied for by universities increased 
from approximately 6% in 2000 to approximately 16% in 2010 (National Bureau of Statistics 
of China, 2001–2011a). The “National Patent Development Strategy” (SIPO, 2011) refers 
specifically to the advancement of university patenting. 
 Since its introduction in 1985, China’s patent law has been amended several times with 
the goal of improving the Chinese patent system. Today, the Chinese patent system meets 
international standards, as for example established by the Agreement on Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) or the PCT, and is largely comparable with the 
patent systems of developed countries (Sun, 2003; Liegsalz and Wagner, 2013). As such, 
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the system is based on the “first-to-file” principle and the standards of patentability include 
the criteria of novelty, utility, and non-obviousness. Patent applications are published after 
18 months, and the maximum patent duration is 20 years (Yang, 2008; Sun, 2003; Tang, 
2008). The average costs of a SIPO application match those of an EPO application (Liegsalz 
and Wagner, 2013). Because patent applications must undergo an examination before being 
granted, the SIPO has expanded its capacities significantly to keep pace with the rapid in-
crease in applications. Concurrently, China established a tiered-court system to improve the 
enforceability of the patent law (Liegsalz and Wagner, 2013). Still, in spite of these efforts, 
the enforceability of patent rights in China is regarded as questionable (Bird, 2006). 
 Patenting in China and by Chinese applicants has received attention in recent research. 
Hu and Mathews (2008) analyze the innovative capacity of China via patenting at the 
USPTO. The authors identify a number of factors that influence the quantity of Chinese 
patents, such as R&D expenditures, R&D personnel, and gross domestic product (GDP), and 
note that the quality of Chinese patents has increased over time. Supporting these findings, 
Hu and Jefferson (2009) demonstrate that the surge in patenting by large and medium-sized 
Chinese enterprises can partly be explained through higher R&D expenditures. The authors 
further identify an increase in foreign direct investment and various pro-patent changes in 
the legal environment, in particular an amendment to the patent law in 2000, as determinants 
of the surge in patenting. A number of studies have examined particular aspects of patenting 
in China such as the strong increase in foreign patent applications (Hu, 2010; Keupp et al., 
2012). 
3.2.2 University patenting in China 
Prior to 1994, patents resulting from publicly funded research in universities formally be-
longed to the Chinese state. However, Guo (2007) notes that these patents were de facto 
owned by the respective university. The ownership rights of universities have since been 
clarified and extended in 1994 and 2002, with the latter often being referred to as the “Chi-
nese Bayh-Dole Act” (e.g., Guo, 2007; Graff, 2007, Tang, 2008). 
 A number of studies address university patenting in China. Hu and Mathews (2008) 
describe universities as a critical part of the Chinese innovation system and emphasize an 
indirect contribution of Chinese universities to the patent surge by educating a skilled labor 
force and by creating a substantial number of spin-offs. They emphasize that universities 
play a more prominent role in the Chinese technological catch-up process compared to other 
East Asian latecomers, such as Taiwan or Korea. Similarly, Huang and Wu (2012) identify 
R&D expenditures and the R&D personnel of universities and research institutions as im-
portant drivers of patenting in the nanotechnology sector. Other industry and market forces, 
such as FDI, are described as less important. Hong (2008) also underlines the importance of 
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universities in the Chinese innovation system and describes a heavy dependence of the in-
dustry on university research by analyzing regional differences in the knowledge transfer 
from university to industry. Li (2009) explains patenting disparities between Chinese re-
gions. Among other findings, the study reports that universities and research institutes play 
an important role with respect to invention patents, whereas firms tend to apply for utility 
model patents connected with marginal innovations. Li (2012) demonstrates that the increase 
in the number of patent applications by universities at an aggregated regional level is stim-
ulated by regional patent subsidy programs, increasing R&D expenditures, and an increas-
ingly patent-friendly legal environment. Finally, Luan et al. (2010) as well as Chapter 2 of 
this thesis examine the quantity of university patenting worldwide and highlight the strong 
role of Chinese universities. The authors raise concerns about the quality of patents from 
Chinese universities but do not examine this particular aspect in great detail.  
3.2.3 Two subsidy programs to promote research and patenting at Chi-
nese universities 
The Chinese government has issued various initiatives to stimulate university patenting. Pre-
vious literature on the effects of governmental initiatives on university patenting has mostly 
analyzed changes in the legal framework (e.g., the Bayh-Dole Act). However, subsidy pro-
grams are a comparable and similar, yet more direct way for governments to try to stimulate 
university patenting. In this study, we focus on two particular types of Chinese subsidy pro-
grams which play an important role for university patenting in China: (1) cost reimbursement 
subsidy programs (cost reimbursement subsidy) and (2) a subsidy program aimed at promot-
ing research excellence in selected leading universities (research excellence subsidy). 
 Li (2012) describes and demonstrates that cost reimbursement patent subsidy programs 
introduced at the regional level contribute to explaining the overall patent surge in China as 
well as the increase in university patenting. In 1999, the municipal government of Shanghai 
was the first to introduce a policy initiative to stimulate patenting that established a special 
fund for applicants who reside in Shanghai (i.e., individuals, firms, universities, and research 
institutes). In the following years, most regional governments in China introduced similar 
patent subsidy programs. Although the subsidy programs differ slightly between regions, the 
overall similar primary benefit is the reimbursement of the costs of patent applications and 
their maintenance through the established special fund (Li, 2012). The amount that is reim-
bursed is not fixed and varies between provinces and patent applications. This subsidy sup-
ports patent applications irrespective of the technological or economic value of the underly-
ing invention. As such, the subsidies are presumed to be attractive for firms patenting 
strategically or universities and research institutes that are less interested in commercializing 
their inventions (Li, 2012). As the cost of patent applications decreases, the number of ap-
plications can be expected to increase. However, because the program does not account for 
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the quality of the patent application (with regard to the economic and technological value of 
the underlying invention), the share of low-quality patent applications is also expected to 
increase. This would result in a primarily quantitative effect of the cost reimbursement sub-
sidy with regard to university patenting. 
 The Chinese government has also introduced a subsidy program to promote research 
productivity and research excellence at selected leading Chinese universities (“Project 
985”). The program aims to establish world-class universities in China, for example by in-
creasing their research performance (Zhang et al., 2013). In 1999, Peking University and 
Tsinghua University were among the first to receive funds from Project 985. Both universi-
ties received an initial funding of approximately 225 million USD over five years. All of the 
participating universities were assigned substantial funding. In total, 39 universities have 
been included in this research excellence subsidy and received approximately 32 billion 
RMB (approximately 5 billion USD) in total funding (Zhang et al., 2013). Project 985 has 
been described as “a critical component of one of the largest sustained increases of invest-
ment in university research in human history” (Zhang et al., 2013). In contrast to the cost 
reimbursement subsidy, this subsidy program was not primarily intended to stimulate pa-
tenting by offering cost savings but to increase research productivity and excellence at se-
lected universities through large investments. The program aimed to not only increase the 
research capacity and size of universities, but also to increase research quality (Zhang et al., 
2013). While Zhang et al. (2013) demonstrate the impact of Project 985 on scientific publi-
cations, the subsidy program has not yet been assessed with regard to its impact on university 
patenting. Given the program’s aims and structure, we expect a positive effect of the pro-
gram on both patent quantity and patent quality. 
3.3 Data 
3.3.1 Dataset 
Patent data: Our patent data is obtained from the worldwide patent database PATSTAT 
(version of October 2012), which is provided by the EPO. PATSTAT is one of the most 
comprehensive databases and contains data on more than 90 million patent applications and 
grants in more than 100 countries. Liegsalz and Wagner (2013) refer to PATSTAT as the 
most comprehensive database on Chinese patents because it contains approximately 7 mil-
lion Chinese documents. 
 Universities: In 2010, there were 2,358 regular institutions of higher education in 
China (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011b). These institutions include universities 
and colleges offering specialized courses. Of these 2,358 institutions, we identify 155 “lead-
ing” universities from various sources. These sources include multiple rankings that assess 
and compare universities with regard to different dimensions, such as teaching, research 
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performance, and global influence. We analyze the Chinese entries in university rankings 
such as the Times Higher Education World (THE) University Rankings (2004–2012) (THE, 
2013), the Academic Ranking of World Universities (2003–2012) (Shanghai Jiao Tong Uni-
versity, 2013) and various other rankings. Note that patenting output is not a specific crite-
rion for inclusion in any of the rankings included. 
 Matching: To obtain data on university patenting, we identified patent documents in 
which one of the 155 universities served as applicant or assignee. Because PATSTAT is 
organized on a patent document level, the identification and matching of patents and appli-
cants results in various problems. A particular problem refers to the often flawed and incon-
sistent depiction of the names of the applicants and their translation from Chinese into Eng-
lish, which can produce varying and inconsistent university names in the patent documents. 
As described in Chapter 2, we thus generated search patterns that included variant spellings, 
abbreviations, and applicant names. Additionally, the search patterns accounted for the mer-
gers of different institutions and changes in university names. Moreover, we include the 
universities names in pinyin. The search patterns were refined in several iterations to im-
prove the identification and matching of relevant patents. A comparison of the obtained data 
with official data and further details on the search patterns can be found in Tables 3.A1 and 
3.A2 (Appendix). 
 We obtained an initial dataset of 278,477 university-owned (not necessarily university-
invented) patents applied for by the universities in our sample. Next, we excluded 34,895 
patent documents that do not refer to invention patents but to utility model patents (approx-
imately 13% of all documents) and entries that contain missing values. The high share of 
invention patents in our sample is noteworthy because usually the number of utility model 
patent applications exceeds the number of invention patent applications in China (WIPO, 
2016a). To avoid an overrepresentation of patents filed at multiple offices, we examine pa-
tent families. The final dataset covers the period from 1991 to December 2009. Although we 
only include 155 universities (i.e., 7% of all institutions of higher education), our final da-
taset contains 121,184 patent families. Compared with official data on total patent applica-
tions by institutions of higher education in China (available at the national level), the uni-
versities in our sample account for approximately 75% of the patent applications of the more 
than 2,350 institutions of higher education from 2000 to 2009 (National Bureau of Statistics 
of China, 2001–2010a). 
3.3.2 Variables 
Dependent variables: To measure patent quantity, we use the number of patent applications 
per university per year (applications). To measure patent quality, we use the number of for-
ward citations that the patents of a university received per year (citations). 
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 Independent variables: We add two variables to capture the impact of the subsidy 
programs described in Section 3.2. First, we include a dummy variable that indicates the 
existence of the cost reimbursement subsidy (cost reimbursement subsidy). The variable 
takes a value of 1 for years in which this subsidy program was available in the region of the 
university and a value of 0 otherwise. Data on this program was obtained from Li (2012). 
Second, we include a variable for the participation of the respective university in Project 985 
(research excellence subsidy). The program is included as a dummy variable that assumes a 
value of 1 in years in which the university benefitted from this subsidy program and a value 
of 0 otherwise (Ministry of Education of the P.R. of China, 2006). 
 Control variables: As controls, we include a variety of explanatory variables based on 
prior research on patenting in China (e.g., Hu and Mathews, 2008; Hu and Jefferson, 2009; 
Li, 2012). We control for the gross regional product per capita and capture the overall eco-
nomic development at the regional level (GRPPC). Additionally, we account for the number 
of R&D personnel employed in institutions of higher education (IHE) in China, measured 
in man-hours (IHE R&D personnel). We account for the intensity of investments in R&D 
by including the ratio R&D expenditures by institutions of higher education in China in the 
gross regional product (GRP) (IHE R&D exp./GRP) The control variables are recorded at 
the regional level and are drawn from the official China Statistical Yearbook China (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, 1992–2010b) as well as the China Statistical Yearbook on 
Science and Technology (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 1992–2010a), available 
from 1991 onwards. In addition to these variables, we capture the overall developments of 
the patenting landscape (e.g., amendments of the patent law) by including year-fixed effects 
(year dummies) and a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a university did not file any patent at 
all (no-patent dummy). Finally, we control for the differences that result from patenting in 
different technological fields by including a set of variables that capture the share of patent 
applications filed in each International Patent Classification (IPC) class per university per 
year (IPC classes). Universities that did not file patents in a specific year were assigned 
values of 0. Table 3.A3 (Appendix) provides further information on selected variables (e.g., 
number of universities per province and the different types of subsidy program). 
3.3.3 Descriptive statistics on patent quantity 
Figure 3.1 shows the development of university patenting in China over time. The figure 
illustrates the total number of patent applications (121,184) and the number of grants that 
these applications received by the year of the application (41,064) from 1991 until 2009. 
The graphs demonstrate rapid and nearly exponential growth in patent applications and 
grants beginning in 1998. Before 1998, the numbers are stable at a comparatively low level 
of under 1,000 applications or grants per year. Because applications are not immediately 
registered in PATSTAT, we were forced to exclude years later than 2009. The late decrease 
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in grants results from a right truncation of our data because there is a lag between the appli-
cation and granting of patents (Li, 2012; Liegsalz and Wagner, 2013). 
Figure 3.1: Patent applications and grants by Chinese universities from 1991 to 2009. 
 
Data source: PATSTAT (version: October 2012). 
 Table 3.1 describes the development of university patenting in greater detail. This de-
velopment exhibits a high level of volatility (from -16% to +12%) in growth rates until 1997. 
However, with approximately 400 new applications per year, the volume is small until 1997. 
After 1997, applications increased by more than 40% for six consecutive years (1998–2003), 
with a peak at 79.1% from 2002 to 2003. These years mark a period of explosive growth. 
One explanation for the spike in applications is China’s entry into the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) in 2001 (Liegsalz and Wagner, 2013). These peaks noticeably surpass the 
growth rates in the overall number of patents applied for in China, which were between 22% 
and 40% during the same period (WIPO, 2016a). 
 Table 3.1 provides further statistics, such as the mean, median, and the coefficient of 
variation of the number of annual university applications. In sum, we obtain a mean of 41 
patent applications per university per year, whereas the median is only 3. Our data is thus 
highly skewed. A large number of universities have zero applications in early years, whereas 
a few universities exhibit high numbers of patent applications, most notably the top univer-
sities listed in the appendix in Table 3.A1 (Appendix). The coefficient of variation indicates 
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an interesting trend: Although the measure is at a stable level above 2.00 in early years, it 
decreases to a value of 1.36 in 2009. The decrease in recent years indicates that universities 
have become more homogenous with respect to patenting and that the distance between the 
top universities and other universities has become smaller. While patenting by universities 
increases sharply overall, universities with fewer patent applications appear to catch up with 
top universities. To further assess the dispersion of the patent application of the universities 
in our sample, Figure 2 illustrates the cumulative distribution function of universities and 
their respective patent applications. The figure reveals large differences in the patenting be-
havior of the universities (e.g., 20% of the universities file approximately 66% of all patent 
applications). This is similar to observations in Europe and the U.S. 
 Regarding patent family size, Table 3.1 shows that each patent family has been applied 
for in 1.07 different jurisdictions on average. Of all patent families, more than 99% have 
been applied for only in China. International patents are an exception. 
Figure 3.2: Cumulative distributions of universities and patent applications. 
 
Data source: PATSTAT (version: October 2012). 
3.3.4 Descriptive statistics on patent quality 
The rapid increase in patenting numbers raises questions with regard to patent quality. A 
measure that is commonly used to assess patent quality is the number of forward citations 
(Henderson et al., 1998; Mowery and Ziedonis, 2002; Acosta et al., 2012). Forward citations 
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are the citations that a patent receives by subsequent patents (Harhoff et al., 2003). Because 
forward citations typically peak within four to five years after the publication of a patent 
(Mowery and Ziedonis, 2002), we only include citations received within the first five years 
after the publication of the patent document. Therefore, our analyses of patent quality cover 
a shorter period (1991 to 2004). Newer patents would be right truncated. 
 The distribution of forward citations is highly skewed. Table 3.1 shows the number of 
citations the patents in our sample received within the first five years after the publication 
of the patent document. For example, the 8,230 patents applied for in 2004 received a total 
of 1,052 citations. More than 80% of the cited patent families received only one citation, and 
only one patent received more than 50 citations (72). The ratio of patent citations to patent 
applications is highly volatile. It increases to a maximum of 0.25 citations per application 
for patents filed in 1998 and then, interestingly, decreases slightly. A truncation of the cita-
tion data cannot explain this development. As such, the number of forward citations, which 
we use to measure patent quality, does not appear to indicate an increase in patent quality. 
However, because we do not control for the effects of other variables in this initial univariate 
assessment, this finding should to be interpreted carefully. 
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Table 3.1: Patent applications filed by Chinese universities. 
Year 
Patent 
applica-
tions 
Growth 
rate of 
patent 
app. 
Mean of 
patent 
applica-
tions 
Median 
of patent 
applica-
tions 
CV of 
patent 
applica-
tions 
Mean 
patent 
family 
size 
Average 
grant lag 
Total 
citations 
Citations 
per appli-
cation 
1991 369 - 2.38 0 2.74 1.02 4.01 22 0.06 
1992 413 11.92% 2.66 0 2.35 1.05 4.10 28 0.07 
1993 395 -4.36% 2.55 0 2.68 1.07 4.62 27 0.07 
1994 424 7.34% 2.74 0 2.30 1.06 4.83 31 0.07 
1995 355 -16.27% 2.29 0 2.19 1.07 4.78 25 0.07 
1996 377 6.20% 2.43 0 2.23 1.12 4.43 33 0.09 
1997 382 1.33% 2.46 0 2.83 1.11 3.95 83 0.22 
1998 565 47.91% 3.65 0 2.79 1.08 3.81 140 0.25 
1999 788 39.47% 5.08 1 3.12 1.22 3.68 149 0.19 
2000 1,336 69.54% 8.62 1 3.09 1.15 3.41 293 0.22 
2001 2,004 50.00% 12.93 2 2.74 1.09 3.02 355 0.18 
2002 3,545 76.90% 22.87 6 2.52 1.07 2.78 672 0.19 
2003 6,348 79.07% 40.95 12 2.27 1.04 2.74 852 0.13 
2004 8,230 29.65% 53.10 16 2.11 1.04 2.72 1,052 0.13 
2005 11,144 35.41% 71.90 28 1.93 1.05 2.58 - - 
2006 13,715 23.07% 88.48 38 1.71 1.04 2.40 - - 
2007 17,883 30.39% 115.37 53 1.54 1.03 2.04 - - 
2008 24,434 36.63% 157.64 75 1.46 1.03 1.55 - - 
2009 28,477 16.55% 183.72 97 1.36 1.02 0.82 - - 
          
Total 121,184 27.3%a 41.15 3 2.76 1.07 3.28 3,762 0.14 
Notes: a = Geometric mean. CV = Coefficient of variation. 
Data source: PATSTAT (version: October 2012). 
3.4 Analysis 
3.4.1 Determinants of patent quantity over time 
We use the annual number of patent applications per university as the dependent variable to 
analyze the determinants of patent quantity. Because this variable is a count variable with 
only non-negative integers, we employ count data regressions. While Poisson models require 
the dependent variable to be equidispersed, negative binomial models are more efficient 
when the data is overdispersed. Our data on patent applications exhibits severe signs of over-
dispersion, as the (conditional) variance is significantly greater than the mean. The presence 
of overdispersion is further supported by the overdispersion parameter alpha, which is highly 
significant for every model estimated (Table 3.3). Finally, we performed a regression-based 
test for overdispersion following Cameron and Trivedi (1990), which also indicated high 
overdispersion. 
 Table 3.2 presents summary statistics, correlations, and variance inflation factors. Be-
cause several variables (i.e., research excellence subsidy, GRPPC, IHE R&D personnel, IHE 
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R&D exp./GRP) are not likely to affect patent applications and citations immediately, we 
include them with a lag of three years. Therefore, we are forced to exclude years prior to 
1994 in our multivariate analyses. Regarding patent quantity (panel (a)), we analyze a total 
of 2,480 observations and 120,007 patent applications (1994 until 2009). 
 The results of the negative binomial regressions with standard errors clustered at uni-
versity level are presented in Table 3.3. To assess patent quantity, we estimate three models. 
The number of patent applications per university per year is estimated as a function of the 
control variables GRPPCt-3, IHE R&D personnelt-3, IHE R&D expenditures/GRPt-3 and the 
independent variables cost reimbursement subsidy and research excellence subsidyt-3. Fur-
thermore, the models include year dummies, IPC classes, and a dummy for non-patenting 
universities. The independent variables are included alternatively in Models 1 and 2 and 
simultaneously in Model 3. The results indicate that both programs appear to influence the 
number of patent applications independently and positively, as expected. Thus, the introduc-
tion of a cost reimbursement subsidy resulted in a significant increase in the number of patent 
applications filed by a university. A similar finding results for the inclusion of a university 
in the research excellence subsidy. However, while the effect of the research excellence 
subsidy is highly significant (p < 0.01), the effect of the cost reimbursement subsidy is not 
as clear (p < 0.05). With regard to the control variables, the results show that a higher GRPPC 
as well as more R&D personnel lead to a significant increase in patent applications. Further, 
a higher share of applications in each IPC class except for class E (“fixed constructions”) is 
associated with a higher number of patent applications. 
3.4.2 Determinants of patent quality over time 
To analyze the development of patent quality, we use the annual number of patent citations 
received per university as the dependent variable. To account for a possible truncation effect, 
our patent citations measure is based on the citations received within five years after the 
publication of the patent application (Mowery and Ziedonis, 2002). Similar to the number 
of patent applications, the number of patent citations is a severely overdispersed count vari-
able, which suggests the use of negative binomial regression models. Additionally, the de-
pendent variable also shows a comparatively large number of zeros (75% of the data). A 
university can either receive zero citations in a given year because its patents did not receive 
any citations or because it did not file any applications at all (excess zeros). In the presence 
of these excess zeros it is more appropriate to estimate zero-inflated than standard negative 
binomial regressions, which account for the differences in zeros and thus yield more appro-
priate estimates. In support of this approach, the highly significant Vuong statistic in Table 
3.3 indicates an excess of zeros and suggests the use of zero-inflated models. 
 Thus, we estimate three zero-inflated negative binomial regressions with standard er-
rors clustered at university level. The patent quality regressions are constructed in the same 
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manner as the patent quantity regressions and reported in Table 3.4 (Models 4–6). The anal-
yses contain 1,705 observations with a total of 3,685 citations and cover the period from 
1994 until 2004. Summary statistics and correlations are presented in Table 3.2 (panel (b)). 
Again, research excellence subsidy, GRPPC, IHE R&D personnel, IHE R&D exp./GRP are 
included with a lag of three years.  
 The final model (Model 6) includes all of the independent variables simultaneously 
and shows a highly significant effect of the variable research excellence subsidy (p < 0.01), 
whereas the variable cost reimbursement subsidy is insignificant. Consequently, we find a 
quality-enhancing effect of the research excellence subsidy, while the cost reimbursement 
subsidy has not influenced patent quality. This outcome agrees with the expectation of a 
mere quantity-enhancing effect of the cost reimbursement subsidy because this type of sub-
sidy did not target or address patent quality. Additionally, a higher GRPPC, higher number 
of R&D personnel, a smaller share of applications in IPC class E, and a larger share of ap-
plications in IPC class H (“electricity”) lead to a higher number of patent citations. 
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Table 3.3: Determinants of patent quantity (Model 1–3) and quality (Models 4–6). 
 Standard negative binomial regression Zero-inflated neg. binomial regression 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable Applications Applications Applications Citations Citations Citations 
GRPPCt-3 0.029** 0.026*** 0.023** 0.079*** 0.058*** 0.061*** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.018) (0.013) (0.014) 
IHE R&D personnelt-
3 
0.028 0.042** 0.042** 0.040 0.061** 0.060** 
 (0.023) (0.020) (0.020) (0.032) (0.029) (0.029) 
IHE R&D exp./GRPt-
3 
-0.055 -0.064 -0.076 0.169 0.101 0.103 
 (0.077) (0.065) (0.064) (0.133) (0.101) (0.101) 
Cost reimbursement 
sub. 
0.509***  0.450** -0.073  -0.138 
(0.193)  (0.185) (0.233)  (0.219) 
Research excellence 
sub.t-3 
 1.450*** 1.442***  2.022*** 2.025*** 
 (0.140) (0.136)  (0.196) (0.195) 
       
IPC class B 2.216*** 2.098*** 2.153*** 0.673 0.517 0.486 
 (0.315) (0.283) (0.283) (0.602) (0.553) (0.563) 
IPC class C 3.386*** 3.334*** 3.336*** 0.724 0.547 0.532 
 (0.370) (0.353) (0.345) (0.539) (0.511) (0.517) 
IPC class D 1.754*** 2.260*** 2.230*** -1.906** -1.180 -1.173 
 (0.526) (0.628) (0.613) (0.852) (0.731) (0.746) 
IPC class E 0.195 0.379 0.366 -4.662*** -3.389** -3.400** 
 (0.504) (0.381) (0.394) (1.534) (1.396) (1.385) 
IPC class F 3.953*** 2.964*** 2.964*** 3.607* 2.048 2.058 
 (1.396) (0.874) (0.851) (2.070) (1.350) (1.360) 
IPC class G 3.533*** 2.677*** 2.701*** 1.655** 0.700 0.683 
 (0.686) (0.488) (0.489) (0.817) (0.703) (0.707) 
IPC class H 3.262*** 2.469*** 2.438*** 2.013** 1.147* 1.170* 
 (0.833) (0.421) (0.422) (0.833) (0.625) (0.626) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No-patent dummy Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Constant -1.217*** -1.117*** -1.102*** -1.753*** -1.379** -1.377** 
 (0.236) (0.214) (0.210) (0.616) (0.597) (0.599) 
       
Universities 155 155 155 155 155 155 
Years 1994–2009 1994–2009 1994–2009 1994–2004 1994–2004 1994–2004 
Observations 2,480 2,480 2,480 1,705 1,705 1,705 
Log likelihood -8290.86 -8153.76 -8142.652 -1588.611 -1542.583 -1542.245 
Chi-square 7508.72*** 8414.45*** 7925.34*** 197.93*** 321.23*** 319.22*** 
Alpha 1.47*** 1.26*** 1.24*** 1.97*** 1.51*** 1.50*** 
Vuong statistic - - - 9.86*** 10.14*** 10.12*** 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at university level in parentheses. IPC class A was omitted because of high multicollinearity. 
The Vuong statistic is estimated for models without clustered standard errors. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Data sources: PATSTAT (version: October 2012), National Bureau of Statistics of China (1992–2010a), National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (1992–2010b), Ministry of Education of the P.R. of China (2006), Li (2012). 
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3.4.3 Robustness checks and further analyses 
Several robustness checks and further analyses are reported in Table 3.4. To further assess 
the interaction between the two subsidy programs, we run sub-sample regressions. We di-
vide our sample into two sub-samples according to whether a university received a research 
excellence subsidy (Project 985) (Models 1 and 2) or not (Models 3 and 4). The sub-sample 
regressions allow us to analyze whether the cost reimbursement subsidy has a different effect 
on university patenting depending on whether the university is included in Project 985. One 
could argue that the two types of subsidy complement or reinforce each other’s effects. Yet 
our results do not support this notion. We do not find substantial differences regarding the 
determinants of patent quantity and quality between both subgroups. Similar to Table 3 (our 
main model), the cost reimbursement subsidy is associated with an increase in patent quan-
tity in both subgroups, while patent quality remains unaffected. 
 To gain further insights, we also divided our sample according to whether the univer-
sity was located in a region with a high or low value of IHE R&D personnel (i.e., greater or 
lower than the median). While the results (Models 5–8) confirm the quantity and quality 
enhancing effect of the research excellence subsidy, the quantity-enhancing effect of the cost 
reimbursement subsidy is significant only for universities with lower values of IHE R&D 
personnel. Thus, universities with an already high endowment of R&D personnel seem to 
not benefit from the cost reimbursement subsidy introduced at regional level. This finding 
indicates an increasing utility of cost reimbursement subsidy with decreasing R&D inputs. 
 Finally, we include an interaction term between both subsidy programs in Models 9 
and 10. The interaction term is insignificant, underlining the robustness of our main models. 
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3.4.4 Trends in patent quantity and patent quality 
To further assess the developments in patent quality and quantity over time, Figure 3 shows 
coefficients of year dummies as estimated in an OLS regression. We use a fixed effects 
regression based on Model 3 of Table 3.3 for patent quantity and a regression based on 
Model 6 of Table 3.3 for patent quality. To account for the skewed nature of the dependent 
variable, we include patent applications and citations in logged form. These coefficients rep-
resent growth estimates for the entire period considered and estimate the growth in a flexible 
way because they do not assume the growth to be constant over time. Moreover, in contrast 
to the descriptive statistics describing an increase in patent quantity and quality, these coef-
ficients describe the growth after controlling for important determinants such as GRPPC, 
R&D personnel, and subsidy programs. Following Hall and Ziedonis (2001), we display the 
normalized coefficients of the year dummies. That is, the difference between the respective 
year coefficient and the coefficient of 1994 is reported. 
 The results for patent quantity are similar to the descriptive statistics. The time dum-
mies indicate increasing growth from 1999 onward. Compared with 1994, the number of 
annual patent applications per university increased by 30.8% in 1999 and by 172.6% in 2003. 
Prior to 1998, the coefficients are insignificant and volatile at a low level. However, Figure 
3 does not display a similar and significant increase in patent quality, which indicates that 
patent quality did not increase over time when accounting for control variables. Rather, the 
increase in citations over time can be explained to a substantial degree by the university 
subsidy program and the other variables. The gap between patent applications and citations 
widens, which indicates an increasing divergence between patent quantity and quality. 
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Figure 3.3: Estimated year effects of patent applications (patent quantity, 1994–2009) and 
patent citations (patent quality, 1994–2004). 
 
Data source: PATSTAT (version: October 2012). 
3.5 Discussion and conclusion 
This study assesses Chinese university patenting by analyzing the quantity, quality, and de-
terminants of patents filed by 155 leading Chinese universities in the years 1991 to 2009. 
Our results reveal a strong increase in patent applications by Chinese universities. Using 
regression analysis, we identify two types of subsidy program (cost reimbursement subsidy 
and research excellence subsidy) as significant determinants of the growth in patent appli-
cations. Regarding the evolution of patent quality we do not observe a similarly strong in-
crease. Analyzing patent citation data, we find that the subsidy aimed at promoting research 
excellence is an important determinant of patent quality, whereas the cost-reimbursing sub-
sidy program does not influence patent quality. 
 The increasing divergence between patent quantity and quality may reflect a problem-
atic incentive structure for patentees. Given the strong quantitative increase, submitting pa-
tent applications appears to be of greater importance than producing high-quality patents. 
As such, while it is explicitly stated that the Chinese government wants to quadruple patent 
applications by 2020, it is mentioned only parenthetically that this growth should be accom-
panied by increasing quality. This quantitative orientation is not only evident in the formu-
lated goals of the government (SIPO, 2011), but also seems to be present at individual level: 
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Shapira and Wang (2009) indicate that scholars in universities are incentivized to apply for 
patents because they can be important for career development and promotion. Similarly, 
Huang and Wu (2012) describe a general interest in obtaining a patent, not its usage or value. 
Thus, scholars in universities that are under the pressure to produce measureable outcome 
in the form of patents might prioritize the application of patents and disregard the quality of 
the underlying inventions. This notion is also supported by our findings regarding the cost 
reimbursement subsidy, which primarily aims to reduce application costs and does not con-
sider the quality of the patent application (Li, 2012). In line with this argument, our empirical 
results show that this type of subsidy program succeeded in stimulating patent applications 
but did not have a sizeable effect on patent quality.  
 Although the primary interest in China seems to be a quantitative increase of patent 
applications, our results indicate that the research excellence subsidy (Project 985) also re-
sults in higher patent quality. The program aims to strengthen the overall research perfor-
mance of selected universities and seems to produce an increase in both patent quantity and 
quality. From a policy perspective, we conclude that subsidy programs promoting research 
excellence through general investments in universities can achieve an increase in both the 
quantity and quality of innovative efforts and thus can play an important role in developing 
a functioning national system of innovation. Therefore, innovation policies which aim to 
stimulate patents of higher quality should focus on subsidy programs increasing university 
R&D and less on decreasing the cost of university patenting. 
 Our study is not without limitations. We would have liked to include more university-
specific variables in our regressions in addition to the subsidy program at university level, 
particularly variables concerning R&D expenditures, R&D personnel, or other variables, 
such as scientific publications. However, data on these university-level variables is not (pub-
licly) available. Second, we include only patents that explicitly name a university as an ap-
plicant. This approach excludes patents that list the inventor as the applicant or those that 
have been created in collaboration with companies in joint research projects or in spin-offs. 
University spin-offs are another increasingly important way in which universities contribute 
to innovation (e.g., Fryges and Wright, 2014; Heblich and Slavtchev, 2014; Stephan, 2014). 
However, although spin-offs or joint ventures are affiliated with a university, their patents 
typically do not list the respective university as an applicant. Further, this shortcoming limits 
us to analyzing university-owned patents. While university-owned patents have been utilized 
frequently to analyze university patenting (e.g., Baldini, 2009; Acosta et al., 2012) several 
authors indicate that they only capture a fraction of all academic patents (e.g., Geuna and 
Nesta, 2006; Lissoni et al., 2008). While university-invented patents are better suited to an-
alyze innovative activities (e.g., Lissoni et al., 2008; Azagra-Caro, 2014), they are difficult 
to obtain because they usually require knowledge on the affiliation of the inventors listed in 
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the patents. This information was not available to us, partly because of the simplified trans-
lation of inventor names from Chinese in PATSTAT. Third, we rely on patent citations as a 
measure of patent quality. This proxy has caveats, particularly with respect to distinguishing 
inventor and examiner citations (e.g., Criscuolo and Verspagen, 2008; Azagra-Caro et al., 
2011) or distinguishing self-citations from other citations. 
 This study offers a number of avenues for further research. Because the Chinese pa-
tenting surge has not ceased, it will be interesting to continue the analysis of this develop-
ment. In this vein, Leydesdorff and Meyer (2010) note a decrease in university patenting in 
the U.S., which experienced a similar overall patent surge until 2005 (Hall, 2005). The au-
thors primarily attribute this decrease in university patenting to an increasing orientation 
toward university rankings that often do not consider patents. Furthermore, China will con-
tinue its policy of expanding the role of universities as a key component of its official pa-
tenting strategy through 2020 (SIPO, 2011). Thus, there will most likely be further regula-
tory changes or subsidy programs that warrant investigation, particularly in comparison with 
the programs analyzed in this study. Similarly, future research could focus on the territorial 
level of governance of these programs and, for example, analyze whether subsidies at re-
gional or national level differ in their effects. Finally, it would be interesting to similarly 
assess the quality of non-university patents because such an approach would enable an intra-
Chinese comparison to examine whether universities or companies provide patents of higher 
quality. Thus, our study could be easily extended to public research institutes and university 
spin-offs, which previous studies have demonstrated to play a prominent role in China (e.g., 
Hu and Mathews, 2008; Li, 2012). 
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3.6 Appendix 
Table 3.A1: Comparison of our data with SIPO data. 
 2002   2004   2008   
Rank University SIPO Our data University SIPO 
Our 
data University SIPO 
Our 
data 
1 Tsinghua U 497 495 Shang. Jiaotong U 791 826 Zhejiang U 1,641 1,687 
2 Shanghai Trans U 311 345 Tsinghua U 676 711 Tsinghua U 1,229 1,210 
3 Zhejiang U 283 283 Zhejiang U  642 660 Shang. Jiao Tong U 1,061 1,126 
4 Tianjin U 180 169 Fudan U 335 330 Harbin Inst. of T 821 824 
5 Fudan U 133 128 Tianjin U 257 281 Beihang U 799 741 
6 Wuhan U 106 117 Haerbin Industial U 255 271 Donghua U 647 591 
7 Sichuan U 97 110 Nanjing U 211 220 Southeast U 528 539 
8 Xi'an Jiaotong U 97 90 Sichuan U 186 171 Tianjin U 522 494 
9 Zhongshan U 89 97 South Chin. S&E U 165 159 Shanghai U 484 438 
10 South Chin. S&E U 81 61 Tongji U 161 144 South China U of T 473 420 
          
  r = 0.994 ***  r = 0.999 ***  r = 0.997 *** 
Notes: U = University, T = Technology, S = Science, E = Engineering, Trans = Transportation. r = Pearson’s correlation coeffi-
cient, *** = significant at 1%-level. 
Data sources: SIPO (2003–2009), PATSTAT (version: October 2012). 
 
Table 3.A2: Sample of applicant names in PATSTAT matched to universities. 
Univer-
sity: 
Beihang University Harbin Institute of 
Technology 
Tsinghua University Shanghai Jiao Tong 
University 
Applicant 
names: 
Beihang University Harbin Institute of 
Technology 
Tsinghua University Shanghai Jiao Tong 
University 
 Bei Hang University Harbin Polytechnic 
Univ. 
Tsinghua Univ. Shanghai Jiaotong Uni-
versity 
 Beijing University of Aero-
nautics & Astronautics 
Harbin Polytechnical 
Univ. 
Qinghua Univ Shanghai Communica-
tion University 
 Beijing University of Aero-
nautics and Astronautics 
Harbin Univ. of Tech-
nology 
Qinghua Univ. Shanghai Second Me-
dical University 
 Beijing Aerospace 
University 
Harbin Univ. of  
Tech. 
Tsing Hua 
University 
Shanghai Jiatong 
Univ. 
Data source: PATSTAT (version: October 2012) . 
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Table 3.A3: Detailed information on the subsidy programs. 
Region 
Start: Cost 
reimbursement 
subsidy 
No. of universities  
No. of universities 
receiving research 
excellence subsidy 
Start: research 
excellence subsidy 
Anhui 2003 3 1 1999 
Beijing 2000 31 8 1999 
Chongqing 2000 3 1 2001 
Fujian 2002 5 1 2001 
Gansu - 2 1 2001 
Guangdong 2000 9 2 2001 
Guangxi 2001 1 - - 
Guizhou 2002 1 - - 
Hainan 2001 1 - - 
Hebei 2005 3 - - 
Heilongjiang 2001 5 1 1999 
Henan 2002 2 - - 
Hubei 2005 7 2 2001 
Hunan 2004 6 3 2001 
Inner Mongolia - 1 - - 
Jiangsu 2000 17 2 1999 
Jiangxi 2002 1 - - 
Jilin 2004 3 1 2001 
Liaoning 2006 4 2 2001 
Ningxia 2007 1 - - 
Qinghai 2005 1 - - 
Shaanxi 2001 9 3 1999 
Shandong 2003 8 2 2001 
Shanghai 1999 11 4 1999 
Shanxi 2003 3 2 2001 
Sichuan 2001 6 - - 
Tianjin 2000 4 2 2000 
Xinjiang 2002 2 - - 
Yunnan 2003 2 - - 
Zhejiang 2001 6 1 1999 
Data sources: Li (2012), Ministry of Education of the P.R. of China (2006). 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
The value of Chinese patents: 
An empirical investigation of citation lags 
 
 
China has been experiencing a substantial growth in patent applications. But is this increase 
accompanied by a similar increase in patent value? To assess this question, we examine the 
citation lag of Chinese patents as a proxy of patent value in comparison with patents from 
the US, Europe, Japan, and Korea. Our empirical analysis comprises a unique data set of 
60,000 patents with priority years between 2000 and 2010. Utilizing Cox regressions, our 
results show that Chinese patents suffer from a large citation lag in comparison to interna-
tional patents, indicating a lower value. This is especially true for patents filed domestically. 
However, we find empirical support for a positive moderation of this effect by the number 
of patent references, the number of patent claims, and for more recent patents. China shows 
a strong dynamic in the field of patenting and our results suggest that the gap between Chi-
nese patents and international patents might narrow down in the near future. 
 
 
This chapter is currently submitted to a journal.  
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4.1 Introduction 
Formerly labeled as the “world’s factory” (Ma et al., 2009), China has shifted its economic 
model from a production-oriented to a knowledge-based economy (Hu and Mathews, 2008). 
China’s objective of becoming a leading nation in terms of innovation is reflected in the 
number of Chinese patent applications, which have exploded in recent years: In 2014, Chi-
nese applicants filed 837,897 patent applications; 64.4% more than US applicants and 79.8% 
more than Japanese applicants. Only 15 years ago, Chinese applicants filed 1.9% of the pa-
tents they filed in 2014. While applications by Chinese applicants have grown 52-fold since 
then, applications by US applicants doubled while applications by Japanese applicants actu-
ally decreased by 3.3% (WIPO, 2016a). These numbers illustrate the remarkable and explo-
sive growth in Chinese patenting.  
 Naturally, an increase in patent quantity raises questions regarding patent quality and 
patent value. Both constructs are important when evaluating the development of innovation 
in China, in particular its meaningfulness (e.g., Li, 2012; Chapter 3). For example, a mere 
quantitative increase in patent applications may raise concerns about whether China is actu-
ally catching up with other developed economies in terms of innovation, or whether impres-
sive application numbers hide the fact that China’s catch-up is rather superficial. 
 Patent citations are the most frequently used proxy to measure patent value (e.g., Har-
hoff et al., 2003; Gambardella et al., 2008). Forward citations are typically measured within 
5 years of the initial publication of the application. The first publication of a patent occurs 
18 months after patent filing. Thus, a patent’s quality can only be assessed 6.5 years after 
the patent was initially filed: If data is sampled in the year 2015, patents can only be included 
if they have been filed in 2008 or earlier – otherwise they lack comparability. This leads to 
a potential loss of data, as the observations in recent years have to be excluded to establish 
comparability. This is a particularly important limitation when examining highly dynamic 
economies such as China, in which patenting numbers have exploded in recent years. 
Against this background, we use the closely related measure of the citation lag, which is the 
time elapsed between the publication of the application and the first forward citation it re-
ceives (Gay et al., 2005; Marco, 2007). Thus, we use the citation lag as a proxy of patent 
value and use survival time analysis to explicitly deal with truncated data. Applying this 
approach, we assess the following research question: How does the value of Chinese patents 
compare to the value of international patents? 
 Our empirical analysis is based on an international dataset of 60,000 patent applica-
tions. We use survival time analysis (Cox regressions) to analyze the hazard ratio of a patent 
receiving forward citations. A longer period of time until the first forward citation establishes 
a longer citation lag. Our results show that Chinese patents have the longest citation lag by 
far, indicating that the overall value of Chinese patents is low in comparison with other 
countries. This is particularly true for patents filed domestically (i.e., patents filed in China 
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by Chinese applicants). However, the longer citation lag is shortened by a higher number of 
patent references and patent claims. Also, our results indicate that patent value has been 
increasing in recent years. 
 Our results contribute to the increasing and current literature on innovation in China. 
Previous studies have empirically analyzed the explosive increase in patenting by Chinese 
entities and its antecedents (e.g., Hu and Mathews, 2008; Li, 2012; Chapter 3). Overall, these 
studies identify stark increases in China’s national innovative capacity, for example through 
increases in technology transfer, subsidies, and strategic alliances (e.g., Chen and Kenney, 
2007; Hu and Mathews, 2008; Fang, 2011; Li, 2012). In spite of this, little attention has been 
drawn to the value of Chinese patents, which is often assumed to be comparatively low. By 
extending the research on innovation in China by an analysis of citation lags in recent years, 
we hope to add a further layer of discussion to China’s endeavor of becoming a leading 
innovative nation. 
 This study is structured as follows: In Section 4.2 we describe our conceptual frame-
work. This includes a review of related literature and the development of hypotheses. Section 
4.3 details our data and empirical model. Section 4.4 presents the empirical results, which 
are discussed in Section 4.5. 
4.2 Conceptual framework: China’s patent system and patent value 
4.2.1 China’s patent system 
China’s innovation system was restructured in the last three decades as a part of China’s 
intent to become a leading innovative nation. China joined the WIPO in 1980, providing a 
basis for a patent system complying with international standards (Bosworth and Yang, 
2000). The first formal patent law in China was adopted in 1985. In 1993, the first major 
amendments of China’s patent law took place. Among other modifications, these amend-
ments extended patent protection to new categories of inventions and replaced a pre-grant 
opposition process for patent disputes with a post-grant revocation procedure. As a conse-
quence, the examination process became faster by an average of six to ten months (Hu and 
Jefferson, 2009). In 2001, China became a member of the WTO and agreed to follow the 
TRIPS agreement (Yang and Clarke, 2005). 
As part of these restructuring measures, the Chinese patent system has become similar to 
those of Europe and the US. According to Liegsalz and Wagner (2013), the basic application 
fee is 950 RMB, which is similar to filing fees at the EPO. After the fulfillment of the formal 
requirements, the patent is classified according to the IPC. Further, the SIPO issues a patent 
certificate and carries out a registration, which follows the publication of the patent 18 
months after filing. Renewal fees have to be paid annually and increase over time. The time 
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required to examine patent filings decreased from around 56 months during the 1990s (Lieg-
salz and Wagner, 2013) to an average of 25 months in 2010. By contrast, the pendency time 
at the USPTO was 33 to 35 months. 
 China also introduced several subsidy programs as part of its plan to become a leading 
innovative nation. For example, the Chinese government announced its “Guideline for the 
National Medium- and Long-term Science and Technology Development Programs” in 
2006. This 15-year plan comprised policies and standards to increase domestic IP. Further, 
the government identified 16 megaprojects to develop key technological fields. In 2008, the 
Chinese government introduced the “National Intellectual Property Strategy”. According to 
this policy, companies were to incorporate IP into their technical standards, and universities 
were allowed and encouraged to commercialize their IP. It also set objectives for the near 
future, for example, quadrupling the number of inventions and patents filed abroad by 2020, 
two million patent filings at the SIPO by 2015, reducing the pendency time to 22 months for 
invention patent filings, and increasing the number of examiners at the SIPO to 9,000 (Liang, 
2012). Other important subsidy programs to promote patenting comprise cost reimbursement 
subsidies as well as large-scale investments in universities (e.g., Li, 2012; Chapter 3). 
4.2.2 Patent value and citation lag 
There is no universally accepted definition of patent value (e.g., Trajtenberg, 1990; Graf, 
2007; Valentini, 2012; Squicciarini et al., 2013). In addition to the multitude of definitions 
of patent value, there is a large body of research on how to measure it. For example, Tong 
and Frame (1994) find patent claims, which define the extent of rights claimed by the patent, 
to be a possible indicator of patent value. Alternatively, Harhoff et al. (2003) measure the 
value of a patent by using the size of the patent family, among other proxies (i.e., the number 
of national or regional patent offices in which a patent is filed). Another possible measure-
ment of patent value is patent renewal data (Lanjouw et al., 1998; Bessen, 2008) or grant 
lags (i.e., the time elapsed between the filing date of the application and the date of the grant 
of the patent). Also, Harhoff and Wagner (2009) argue that if applicants document their 
patent applications well, formulate the patent claims clearly, and work closely with the pa-
tent office, it is an indication that they themselves consider their patents valuable. Similar 
conclusions were reached by Règibeau and Rockett (2010). Trajtenberg et al. (1997) created 
a generality index, which is based on forward citations and has been used frequently since 
(e.g., Henderson et al., 1998; Galasso et al., 2011). Trajtenberg et al. (1997) also proposed 
an originality index that relates to the breadth of technological fields of a patent. A third 
index of patent value is the index of patent radicalness proposed by Shane (2001). This index 
counts the number of IPC classes in which the patents cited by the respective patent are 
classified. 
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 However, forward citations are the most frequently used indicator of patent value. For-
ward citations refer to the number of times a patent has been cited by subsequent patents, 
indicating that these newer patents are technologically built upon the cited (previously filed) 
patent. Hence, a larger number of citations indicate a more valuable patent. Trajtenberg 
(1990) found that forward citations outperform simple patent counts as a proxy for the value 
of a patent; citations have since been used and validated frequently (e.g., Albert et al., 1991; 
Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003; Harhoff et al., 2003; Gambardella et al., 2008). However, 
using forward citations has drawbacks. For example, the patent examiner ultimately decides 
which and how many citations are included in a patent. More importantly, forward citations 
suffer from right truncation (i.e., newer patents have a lower propensity to receive numerous 
citations) (Mowery and Ziedonis, 2002). To avoid this problem, most studies use the forward 
citations a patent received within 5 years after the publication of the application. Recall that 
the patent application is published 18 months after filing. Thus, researchers typically award 
6.5 years to a patent application to collect citations. This leads to a potential loss of data, as 
the observations in the last 6.5 years have to be excluded to establish comparability. This is 
a particularly important limitation when examining highly dynamic economies such as 
China, in which patent filing activity has exploded in recent years. Leaving out the last 6.5 
years of development might lead to biased conclusions or a lack of identifying interesting 
results. 
 Against this background, we use the closely related measure of the citation lag, which 
is the time elapsed between the publication of the application and the first forward citation 
it receives (Gay et al., 2005; Marco, 2007). Thus, the citation lag is very similar to forward 
citations but circumvents the loss of the most recent data points. One reason for this is that 
Cox regressions can be employed that are explicitly able to deal with right truncation. For 
example, Gay et al. (2005) identified a link between number of forward citations and the 
citation lag. The authors noted that a technologically important patent is cited more quickly. 
Furthermore, a patent that received its first citation during the first year after being granted 
receives a higher number of forward citations overall. Put differently, the advent of the first 
citation is a good predictor for all citations accumulated in a 5-year window. In contrast, a 
patent that received its first forward citation a long time after being granted receives a lower 
total number of forward citations. Thus, a short citation lag can be associated with a higher 
patent value, while a longer citation lag can be associated with a lower patent value. Of 
course, using citation lag as a proxy of patent value also has several drawbacks, which we 
outline at the end of the study. 
4.2.3 Hypotheses 
The Chinese government has committed to transform China into a leading innovative nation. 
However, it is doubtful whether its policies have led to meaningful innovations that will help 
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the Chinese economy to develop or whether the increase in patenting is merely of a quanti-
tative nature. These doubts have been supplemented in previous studies: Liang (2012) points 
out that a low share of invention patents in China raises questions on the meaningfulness of 
Chinese patents. Liang (2012) identified that in 2010 only one quarter of all patent filings 
were invention patents, which undergo a more thorough examination process (as opposed to 
utility models and design patents). Further concerns are described in Chapter 3 of this thesis, 
which shows that the increase in Chinese university patenting is driven by subsidy programs 
designed to stimulate patenting, but is not accompanied by a similar increase in patent qual-
ity. Chinese subsidy programs to promote patenting often do not take into account patent 
quality, but are rather only interested in patent quantity increases. 
 Finally, in spite of the enormous increase of the number of patents filed at the SIPO, 
the number of patent examiners has not increased in a similar magnitude: Between 2002 and 
2010, the filing of invention patents in China rose by 500%. However, the number of patent 
examiners only increased by 300% (Liang, 2012). This indicates that the average workload 
per patent examiner increased by 60%, while the total number of patent examiners at the 
SIPO was only a third of that at the USPTO. The resulting increase in the examiners’ work-
loads suggests that the examination process might not be as thorough as in other countries, 
which might lead to patents of lower quality being granted or at least not being declined. 
 Taken together, we expect Chinese patents (i.e., patents by Chinese applicants) to have 
a lower patent value than patents from other regions. A lower patent value is represented by 
a longer duration between the application and first citation of the patent. Thus, we propose 
the following hypothesis: 
H4.1: Patents filed by Chinese applicants have a larger citation lag than patents 
from the US, Europe, Japan, and Korea. 
 Petruzzelli et al. (2015) examine six factors that influence forward citations: (a) the use 
of scientific knowledge, (b) the breadth of the technological base, (c) the novelty, (d) the 
scope of the patent, (e) the number of claims, and (f) the existence of collaboration in patent 
development. We include most of these factors in our empirical analysis. However, we are 
interested in the specific impact of these factors on the value of Chinese patents (in compar-
ison with other regions). Therefore, we propose that the relationship between the applicant’s 
origin and the patent’s value is moderated by most of these factors. 
 The technological scope of a patent is frequently used to determine a patent’s value. 
Following Lerner (1994), we measure the technological scope of a patent as the total number 
of IPC4 classes in which a patent is categorized. Lerner (1994), as well as Merges and Nelson 
(1990), identified a positive relation between the number of IPC4 classes a patent is catego-
rized in and patent value. In addition, Petruzzelli et al. (2015) demonstrate a positive relation 
between the patent scope and forward citations. Therefore, we expect the number of IPC4 
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classes to increase the patent’s value and have a positive impact on the citation lag (i.e., 
lowering the citation lag). We expect this positive moderation to be similar across regions 
and also apply to China. Therefore, we suggest: 
H4.2: The more IPC4 classes a patent from China has, the shorter the citation lag. 
 The breadth of the technological base reflects the ability of an innovator to discover 
new and valuable knowledge (Fleming, 2001). The broader this search for new knowledge, 
the higher is the likelihood of discovering new and valuable knowledge (Fleming, 2001). 
Thus, patents that involve a larger technological scope should be of higher value (Singh, 
2008). The breadth of the technological base is indicated by the number of backward cita-
tions a patent contains. In contrast to a forward citation, a backward citation is a reference 
of a patent to another patent, which it builds upon (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002; Petruzzelli 
et al., 2015). Closely related, it is crucial to examine the novelty of a patent when researching 
an innovation. Squicciarini et al. (2013) employed backward citations to evaluate the novelty 
of innovations, and we follow their approach. Therefore, backward citations can be seen as 
an indicator of both the breadth of the technological base and the novelty of a patent. Both 
constructs should impact patent value positively. Assuming a lower value of Chinese pa-
tents, we expect that the number of backward citations positively moderates patent value, 
resulting in a shorter citation lag. Thus, we expect: 
H4.3: The more backward citations a Chinese patent has, the shorter the citation 
lag. 
 Patent claims determine the volume of the rights assigned by a patent and have been 
shown to correlate with patent value. Patent claims measure the volume of the rights as-
signed to a patent (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004). In order to assess the volume of rights 
assigned by a patent, we follow Petruzzelli et al. (2015) and count the number of exclusive 
rights a patent has as indicated by the number of claims. Tong and Frame (1994) introduced 
patent claims within an application as a possible indicator of patent value. However, we do 
not employ the variable patent claims as a proxy for patent quality, but rather as a determi-
nant of patent value. Therefore, we expect that the number of patent claims a patent from 
China possesses will have a positive influence on the citation lag. We thus hypothesize: 
H4.4: The more patent claims a Chinese patent has, the shorter the citation lag. 
 Patent applicants tend to file patent applications domestically, first and foremost (see 
Chapter 2). This “home advantage effect” affects patenting rates at most patent offices 
worldwide (Criscuolo, 2006). The home advantage effect can be explained by a greater fa-
miliarity with the domestic patent system, for example with regard to language requirements 
or other administrative requirements (Criscuolo, 2006; Liegsalz and Wagner, 2013). Also, 
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previous research has frequently investigated whether domestic applicants are treated with 
preference at the respective patent office. With particular regard to China, studies have 
shown that there seems to be a slight preference for Chinese applications at the SIPO, in that 
Chinese applicants achieve comparably faster patent grants (Yang, 2008; Liegsalz and Wag-
ner, 2013). Hence, patent applicants might prefer to apply for a domestic patent, as it is more 
likely to be granted. While the home advantage effect has been shown with regard to the 
quantitative share of domestic patent applications, it also has implications for the value of 
the patents. Van Zeebroek (2011) describes how companies might be inclined to file a lot of 
domestic patents in their home country to achieve faster patents grants or establish a priority. 
Also, this might lead to a higher share of low quality patents as these patents are often not 
intended to be extended worldwide, hence resulting in a lower average patent value. In the 
same vein, Harhoff et al. (2003) show that patents of a higher value are more likely to be 
extended worldwide, as indicated by a larger patent family size. Therefore, we suggest: 
H4.5: Chinese patents filed at the domestic patent office have a larger citation lag 
than patents filed at foreign patent offices. 
 The Chinese patent office (SIPO) was established in 1980, the same year in which 
China also joined the WIPO (Bosworth and Yang, 2000; Liegsalz and Wagner, 2013). The 
first patent law was introduced in 1985, in which China also signed the Paris convention for 
the protection of intellectual property and established priority rights (Yang, 2008, EPO, 
2016). Hence, the Chinese intellectual property system is still relatively young compared to 
the patent systems of the US and some European countries that were established at the end 
of the 19th century (USPTO, 2016b). Even though there is still some dispute over whether 
the Chinese patent system fully adheres to all required standards, the Chinese patent system 
in its current form can be described as meeting international standards and is largely com-
parable with the patent systems of the US or Europe (Sun, 2003; Liegsalz and Wagner, 2013) 
 As described in Section 2.1, China is actively trying to increase the patent quantity, but 
also patent quality, albeit not as prominently. For example, China has recently introduced a 
subsidy program to establish world-class universities (“Project 985”), significantly increas-
ing the quality of their patent output (Chapter 2). The efforts China is undertaking in this 
realm are rather recent. Therefore, a resulting value-enhancing effect should also be com-
paratively stronger in recent years. Therefore, we assume that patents filed more recently 
have a higher patent value than previously filed patents. Also, we suggest that this effect 
could be stronger for Chinese firms. Hence, we suppose: 
H4.6: The more recent a Chinese patent has been filed, the shorter the citation lag. 
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4.3 Data 
4.3.1 Data sources and sample 
Our sample consists of patent data obtained from PATSTAT (November 2013 version). Be-
cause we are not only interested in Chinese patents, we draw a stratified probability sample 
of patents with priority years between 2000 and 2010 that were published by a patent office 
in one of five regions: China, the US, Europe, Japan, and Korea. We further include publi-
cations by the WIPO, representing PCT publications. With regard to Europe, we aggregate 
all patents that have their origin in one of the 38 member states. In order to establish inter-
national comparability between the patents, we exclude utility models and limit our analysis 
to invention patents. To avoid an overrepresentation of patents applied for in multiple juris-
dictions, we aggregate all patent applications and publications on the patent family level, as 
documented in PATSTAT, and exclusively consider the first forward citation within a patent 
family to calculate the citation lag. We exclude self-citations within the same patent family, 
since self-citations can create bias in statistical analysis by over-evaluating the citations a 
patent receives (Gay et al., 2005). Finally, we excluded patents that contained missing val-
ues. Our final data set contains 10,000 patent families applied for by applicants from each 
of the five regions: US, Europe, Japan, China, and Korea, as well as 10,000 PCT applica-
tions, resulting in a total sample of 60,000 patent families. Because not all patent applicants 
could be classified atomically with regard to their country of origin or type, we manually 
filled in gaps in the sample by looking up missing entries on the internet and assigning the 
correct classification where possible. 
4.3.2 Variables 
Dependent variable: We use the citation lag as our dependent variable. We define the ci-
tation lag as the time elapsed from the earliest priority date until a patent receives its first 
citation, measured in months. We use the application date as the data point from which to 
measure citation lag. Because we base our empirical analysis on a patent family level, the 
effective application date is defined as the earliest priority date. 
 Independent variables: Our main independent variable represents the applicant’s 
country of origin (origin of applicant). The variable indicates whether the applicant is from 
the US (US), Europe (EP), Japan (JP), China (CN), or South Korea (KR). 
 The scope of a patent is measured by using the variable number of IPC4 classes in 
which a patent is categorized (Lerner, 1994). As noted earlier, backward citations to both 
patent and non-patent literature are positively correlated with patent value, which is counted 
by the variable patent references. Additionally, patent claims determine the volume of the 
rights assigned by a patent. The exclusive rights claimed by a patent are legally protected 
and enforceable (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004). The variable patent claims counts the 
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number of exclusive rights a patent has. We further include an interaction effect that 
measures whether a patent was applied for in the applicant’s area of residence in order to 
assess a possible home advantage effect. Finally, we include a time trend that accounts for 
increasing patent value over time. 
 Control variables: We include the variable patent family size in our analysis that de-
scribes the number of different jurisdictions in which a patent family is applied. The number 
of inventors who are involved in a patent reflects the degree of specialization and the pool 
of knowledge on which a patent is based (Singh, 2008). Therefore, we include the variables 
number of inventors as well as number of applicants that count (respectively) the number of 
inventors who are involved in a patent and how many applicants are stated in the patent 
specification. Finally, the variable applicant type represents the type of the applicant of a 
patent. It is a dummy variable categorized into company, university, institute, individual and 
other (Gay et al., 2005). For example, Cassiman et al. (2008) and Branstetter (2005) show 
that patents related or referring to scientific research are of significantly higher value. Simi-
larly, Henderson et al. (1998) demonstrate that patents filed by universities and research 
institutes receive more citations than patents outside the academic field. 
 We include the earliest priority year, which indicates the year of the first patent appli-
cation within the patent family. The control variable main area indicates the technological 
field to which a patent is assigned. It is possible that a patent is classed into several main 
areas. The variable consists of multiple dummy variables comprising six classes: Chemistry, 
electrical engineering, instruments, process engineering, mechanical engineering, and con-
sumer goods and construction. Finally, we include the patent authority as a control variable, 
which measures in which jurisdiction the respective patent family was filed. This also in-
cludes patent applications filed through the WIPO (PCT applications). 
An overview of the variables and their measurement is displayed in Table 4.A1 (Appendix). 
Table 4.A2 (Appendix) details the correlations between the variables and shows that multi-
collinearity should not be an issue in our analyses. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics on the 60,000 patent families analyzed. Almost half 
of the patent families (45.0%) received at least one citation. The mean citation lag is 26.8 
months (approx. 817 days). About 15.9% (9,569) of patent families have been applied for 
by Chinese applicants, 12.5% (7,519) by US applicants, 14.8% (8,856) by European appli-
cants, 35.6% (21,366) by Japanese applicants, and 19.2% (11,541) by applicants from South 
Korea. The remaining 1.9% (1,149) of patents are from other countries. The minimum cita-
tion lag is 1 day, while the maximum citation lag is 141.5 months. On average, the patent 
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families are categorized in 2.8 IPC4 classes with a standard deviation of 2.3. The mean of 
patent references is 7.5, whereas the maximum is 241. The mean patent family size is 2.9; 
however, the maximum family size is 108. The patent families typically comprise 2.4 patent 
claims; the maximum is 143. The average number of inventors is 1.9. The relatively low 
standard deviation of 1.4 suggests that there is usually a small number of inventors involved 
in a patent, while the maximum number is 23. The same is true for the number of applicants: 
the average is 1.4 applicants with a standard deviation of 0.5. The maximum number of 
applicants is 5, which shows collaboration in patenting is only small scale. Regarding the 
applicant type, companies have the biggest share with 74.6%, followed by individuals 
(17.3%), universities (4.7%), and institutes (2.5%). 
 Table 4.2 illustrates the distribution of different applicant types across regions as well 
as further descriptive statistics. The results show that companies have the lowest share of 
patent families in China by far (45.9%). Individual applicants, however, are comparatively 
common in China (26.0%). An enormous discrepancy between China and the other countries 
emerges when examining the applicant type university. China has by far the highest share of 
applicants within this category (19.3%), while the other countries range between 0.6% and 
3.0%. This demonstrates that universities contribute enormously to the recent patent surge 
in China (Chapter 3). 
 Descriptive results on patent citations are also summarized in Table 4.2. Comparing 
the citation lags of the countries, it can be noted that Chinese applicants experience the larg-
est citation lag (31.9 months). Korean applicants perform significantly better with 27.8 
months in our sample, which is only 6 months longer than the citation lag of European pa-
tents. Patents from the US have the shortest citation lag with 21.7 months on average. Table 
4.2 also shows that China has the lowest share (11.9%) of patents that received a citation. In 
Korea, that share is considerably higher (36.9%) but still far behind the shares of the other 
countries. In contrast, US patents received a citation in 67.1% of the cases. These descriptive 
results indicate a lower patent value of Chinese patents. 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics. 
Variable Mean SD Min. Max. 
Citation received 0.450 - 0 1 
Citation lag (months)a 26.75 19.72 0.033 141.51 
     
Origin of applicant     
CN 0.159 - 0 1 
US 0.125 - 0 1 
EP 0.148 - 0 1 
JP 0.356 - 0 1 
KR 0.192 - 0 1 
Rest of the world 0.019 - 0 1 
     
Number of IPC4 classes 2.771 2.317 1 92 
Patent references 7.490 11.58 0 241 
Patent family size 2.928 3.237 1 108 
Patent claims 2.445 6.483 0 143 
Number of inventors 1.869 1.422 1 23 
Number of applicants 1.371 0.498 1 5 
     
Applicant type     
Company 0.746 - 0 1 
Individual 0.173 - 0 1 
Institute 0.025 - 0 1 
University 0.047 - 0 1 
Others 0.009 - 0 1 
     
Main area     
Chemistry 0.219 0.414 0 1 
Electrical engineering 0.435 0.496 0 1 
Instrument 0.204 0.403 0 1 
Process engineering 0.136 0.342 0 1 
Mechanical engineering 0.147 0.354 0 1 
Consumer goods, construction 0.075 0.264 0 1 
Notes: N = 60,000 patent families. a = only for 27,041 observations that received at least one citation. 
Data source: PATSTAT (version: November 2013). 
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Table 4.2: Distribution of applicant types and further descriptive statistics. 
Variable Patent families Company Individual Institute University Others 
Citation 
received 
Citation 
lag 
Origin of applicant 
CN 9,569 45.9% 26.0% 6.2% 19.3% 2.5% 11.9% 31.9 
US 7,519 85.3% 11.0% 0.5% 2.5% 0.6% 67.1% 21.7 
EP 8,856 78.3% 15.4% 1.8% 2.8% 1.7% 56.0% 27.2 
JP 21,366 81.3% 17.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.3% 51.8% 28.1 
KR 11,541 76.7% 14.7% 5.1% 3.0% 0.4% 36.9% 27.8 
Other 1,149 68.3% 28.5% 1.0% 2.3% 0.0% 48.7% 23.4 
          
Patent authority 
CN 10,000 49.5% 23.5% 5.9% 18.6% 2.5% 13.7% 31.7 
US 10,000 89.7% 7.6% 0.6% 1.6% 0.6% 70.2% 20.8 
EP 10,000 86.8% 7.6% 1.8% 2.4% 1.5% 58.3% 26.4 
JP 10,000 97.0% 2.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.5% 43.2% 35.3 
KR 10,000 81.2% 9.5% 5.7% 3.3% 0.4% 32.7% 29.0 
WO 10,000 43.5% 53.6% 0.7% 1.9% 0.3% 52.2% 25.3 
          
N 60000 44,704 7,072 815 2,401 5,008 27,021 in months 
Notes: WO = PCT Patent application. Citation lag = mean citation lag in months. 
Data source: PATSTAT (version: November 2013). 
4.4.2 Multivariate analysis 
We use a Cox regression (Cox, 1972) as our main analysis because it enables us to consider 
the specifics of the temporal distribution of forward citations (Marco, 2007). It allows an 
estimation of the hazard of a particular occurrence within a given time interval (Cox and 
Oakes, 1984). We use the initial forward citation of a patent as the particular occurrence. 
Therefore, the survival time is the time between the filing of a patent and the first citation of 
the patent in question. The Cox regression model is defined as follows: 
h(t|xi) = h0(t)*exp(βnxi) 
 Index i describes an individual patent within the sample. The Cox model comprises no 
intercept as it is integrated in the baseline hazard h0(t). The coefficients ß1–ßn represent the 
estimated coefficients of the respective variables. Formulated with regards to our empirical 
analysis the Cox regression model becomes: 
h(t|xi) = h0(t)*exp(β1xi+β2xi+β3xi+…+βnxm) 
 The results of the hazard regression used to estimate the probability of a patent citation 
based on the citation lag are illustrated in Table 4.3. To assess our hypotheses, we estimate 
six regression models. All models include citation lag as the dependent variable. Model 1 
tests Hypothesis H4.1. Models 2 through 6 examine how particular determinants influence 
the value of patents in different regions via the respective interaction effects. 
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 Model 1 includes all control variables and focuses on assessing whether applicants of 
a different origin achieve different patent values. Indeed, the results indicate that patent fam-
ilies from China have a low hazard rate. Hazard rates below the baseline of 1 indicate that 
the hazard of the occurrence of a forward citation is less likely when the respective variable 
increases. The effect is highly significant (p < 0.01). Thus, patents by Chinese applicants 
(CN) take far longer (56.1% longer) to receive a citation than patents from other countries. 
In contrast, patents by US, Japanese, and Korean applicants have a significantly shorter ci-
tation lag, while the results from European applicants are insignificant. The effect of Chinese 
applicants experiencing a longer citation lag is robust across all models. Thus, Chinese pa-
tents suffer from larger citation lags, indicating an overall lower quality, supporting Hypoth-
esis H4.1. 
 With regard to Hypothesis H4.2, our results show that a greater number of IPC4 classes 
have positive and highly significant impacts on the hazard ratio (i.e., the citation lag is short-
ened). When the number of IPC4 classes is interacted with the origin of the applicant to 
uncover differences across regions (Model 2), the results indicate that more IPC4 classes 
lead to a longer citation lag across most regions: The hazard ratios are reduced for patents 
by Chinese (2.8%), European (6.0%), and US applicants (6.2%). Thus, we find no support 
for H4.2. 
 Patent references exhibit a slight positive impact on the hazard ratios, as hypothesized 
in H4.3. As shown in Model 3, an increase in backward citations increases the hazard ratio 
significantly. When investigating the interaction effects, the results indicate that Chinese 
patents profit most from patent references and therefore have a ratio that is 8.0% higher than 
the baseline and highly significant (p < 0.01). Korea follows with 4.2%. Hence, the results 
support Hypothesis H4.3. 
 Model 4 examines the impact of patent claims on the hazard ratio (H4.4). A positive 
but fairly small effect can be observed. The interaction in Model 4 shows that the highest 
positive moderation is achieved at patents by Chinese applicants with a ratio of 4.6%, fol-
lowed by Japan (1.8%), Korea (1.3%), and the US (1.2%). Thus, the results also support 
Hypothesis H4.4. 
 Hypothesis H4.5 assumed that there is a so called “home advantage effect”. With par-
ticular regard to China, we assume that Chinese applicants file patents domestically that are 
of lower quality. Patents of higher quality, in comparison, are more likely to be filed at a 
foreign, international patent office. The results (Model 5) support this argumentation: Pa-
tents filed in China by Chinese applicants have a much longer citation lag (increased by 
45.8%). This effect is highly significant. However, we find that the same is true for US that 
file patents domestically, albeit to a much lesser extent. Hence, the results also support Hy-
pothesis H4.5. 
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 Finally, Model 6 investigates whether a trend of an increasing patent value can be ob-
served in recent years. While the baseline effect (time trend) indicates that patent values are 
not increasing overall, the positive and highly significant interaction effect for patents by 
Chinese applicants indicates that their patent value is increasing (7.7%), supporting Hypoth-
esis H4.6. Chinese applicants increased their patent value the most. 
 Regarding the control variables, patent family size, the number of inventors, and the 
number of applicants have an above-baseline effect, indicating that higher values lead to a 
shorter citation lag. The results on the different applicant types reveal only small differences 
between applicant types. 
4.5 Discussion and conclusion 
The rapid increase in Chinese patent applications naturally raises questions with regard to 
the value of these patents, which we proxy for by using a patent’s citation lag. So far, there 
is little empirical research about the value of Chinese patents. Our results show that patents 
by Chinese applicants experience the longest citation lag by far, indicating that the overall 
value of Chinese patents is low in comparison with other countries, particularly for patents 
filed by Chinese applicants in China. For Chinese applicants, the longer citation lag is short-
ened by a higher number of patent references and patent claims, and significantly decreased 
in recent years. This suggests that the overall value of Chinese patents might be increasing. 
 Although Chinese patents have the lowest probability to receive a citation, their citation 
lag is considerably shortened when other moderating variables are taken into account (e.g., 
number of patent references, number of patent claims). However, the comparatively strong 
moderation effect should be interpreted cautiously, as it might have a partial institutional 
background: Patent references and patent claims are added by the patent examiner of the 
patent office. Ascribing political motivations, one could assume that the examiners at the 
SIPO are instructed to treat patents from Chinese applicants more favorably, for example by 
assigning them more patent references and patent claims. 
 Our empirical analysis offers several implications for theory and practice. Our findings 
show how the value of patents by Chinese applicants compares to applicants from other 
regions, thus providing an important contribution to research about the competitiveness of 
national economies. The results of our study also contribute to research about the determi-
nants of patent value. Further, we are able to evaluate in which direction and to what extent 
each determinant influences the value of patents. In line with other studies, we can confirm 
that the scope of a patent (patent claims, patent family size, and backward citations) has a 
positive moderating effect (Squicciarini et al., 2013; Petruzzelli et al., 2014). 
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 Our results also offer practical implications. This study provides policy makers and 
practitioners with a better understanding of the economic value of patents filed by Chinese 
applicants, which is crucial for a more specific evaluation of the sustainability and meaning-
fulness of Chinese innovations (e.g., Li, 2012). Our finding that Chinese patents filed more 
recently have a higher probability of receiving citations supports the view that the govern-
ment’s efforts to develop China into an innovation leader (Liang, 2012) are bearing fruit. 
This implies that in the midst of the artificially created explosion in the number of Chinese 
patents there are also valuable innovations in China, indicating that China might successfully 
be transitioning from an imitation- to an innovation-based economy. This study therefore 
provides a signaling function for actors who plan to engage on the Chinese patent market as 
well as for investors willing to invest in Chinese companies. Furthermore, this study pro-
vides insights about China’s future technological capability, which might be catching-up to 
further developed countries in the near future. This is especially important for European 
policy makers who hope to maintain their countries’ positions as the leading innovative 
economies in the world. 
 Our analysis is not without limitations. Forward citations involve the problems of trun-
cation. Using the citation lag as dependent variable cannot completely avoid this problem. 
Further problems arise from the impact of the patent examiner on whether a patent gets a 
citation (Alcácer et al., 2009), from unobserved heterogeneity when comparing different in-
dustries (Gittelman, 2008), and the problem of citation inflation (Marco, 2007). Addition-
ally, while our study uses the IPC classification, a new patent classification (the Cooperative 
Patent Classification, CPC) has recently been introduced. Major patent offices have already 
announced the decision to adopt the CPC, which means that it will become the internation-
ally accepted standard. This will have a positive impact on innovation research in fields such 
as energy storage technologies (Mueller et al., 2015). Also note that the citation lag, like 
most other proxies of patent value, should only be understood as a limited and rather general 
indicator of a patent’s real value. Finally, the indication of catching-up in terms of patent 
value has to be interpreted very cautiously. Because of the overall low patent value, it is not 
surprising that we find the positive moderators to be comparatively strong. 
 Further research might find it interesting to examine other determinants of patent value 
across regions, such as number of applicants, or other factors that we have not considered. 
Likewise, differences between technological fields are not considered in our study, and the 
problem of unobserved heterogeneity in citation behavior between different industries is an-
other issue for future research. As initiated by Marco (2007) and Gay et al. (2005), finding 
methods that are an improvement compared to the use of pure forward citations would also 
be a useful contribution to research in the field of innovation and patent value. Using hazard 
estimation can be a first step in the right direction. Finally, the differences between different 
types of applicants warrants further research. Even though the share of university patents 
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has increased sharply, our results show that their value seems to be comparatively low, in-
dicating that universities in particular fail to develop meaningful inventions. 
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The impact of acquisitions on Chinese 
acquirers’ patent output 
 
 
Acquisitions by Chinese firms have increased markedly in recent years. So far, we know 
little about the effects of these acquisitions on the acquirer’s innovation performance. In this 
regard, we study two related research questions. First, to what extent can Chinese firms 
increase their patent output following an acquisition? Second, which factors influence the 
post-acquisition patent output? Using a comprehensive data set of Chinese manufacturing 
firms, we find no significant overall effect of acquisitions on patent output. However, we find 
that several acquisition-specific factors have a positive effect on post-acquisition patent out-
put (e.g., characteristics of the acquired knowledge base, cross-border acquisitions), while 
other factors (e.g., state-ownership) have a negative effect. Our study extends prior research 
on post-acquisition innovation performance to the context of China. 
 
 
This chapter is currently submitted to a journal.  
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5.1 Introduction 
Acquisitions by Chinese firms have surged in recent years. In 2014, Chinese companies an-
nounced 4,502 acquisitions, an increase of 33% over the previous year. Access to technology 
is cited as an important reason for Chinese acquisitions (e.g., Deng, 2004; Morck et al., 2008; 
Buckley et al., 2014) and is frequently portrayed in the media. Chinese acquisitions, partic-
ularly those where the target is located in a developed country, are often associated with the 
fear of knowledge drains and a focus on a potential negative effect for the acquired compa-
nies. 
 So far, however, we know little about the effects of acquisitions on the Chinese ac-
quirer’s innovation performance. Although prior research has investigated these effects in 
developed countries, it is unclear whether the results obtained in the context of a Western 
country also apply to an emerging market context such as China (Zhao et al., 2011; Rama-
samy et al., 2012; Barkema et al., 2015). In this regard, prior research has questioned the 
ability of Chinese firms to successfully integrate the acquired knowledge because they lack 
absorptive capacity (Rugman and Li, 2007; Anderson et al., 2015). Thus, we investigate the 
post-acquisition patent output of Chinese acquirers drawing on absorptive capacity theory. 
We study two research questions. First, to what extent can Chinese firms increase their pa-
tent output following an acquisition? Second, which acquisition-specific factors influence 
the post-acquisition patent output? Our study uses a comprehensive dataset of 1,545 acqui-
sitions by publicly listed Chinese manufacturing firms from 2000 to 2013. Overall, we find 
no significant effect of acquisitions on patent output of Chinese acquirers. Assessing deal-
specific variables, we find that a larger absolute size of the acquired knowledge base, tech-
nological relatedness, and cross-border acquisitions have a positive effect on post-acquisi-
tion patent output. In contrast, a larger relative size of the acquired knowledge base and 
acquisitions by state-owned enterprises have a negative effect. 
 The contribution of our study is twofold. First, we extend the previous literature on the 
effect of acquisitions on post-acquisition innovation performance (e.g., Ahuja and Katila, 
2001; Cloodt et al., 2006; Desyllas and Hughes, 2010). Most of this research draws on ab-
sorptive capacity and organizational learning frameworks to explain increases in patent out-
put, with scholars frequently stressing the need to better understand the contextual dimension 
surrounding the phenomenon (Muehlfeld et al., 2012; Argote, 2013). We contribute to this 
line of research by introducing the unique context of China. Previous research has relied on 
samples from developed countries, and it is unclear whether the post-acquisition effects in 
China are similar. Additionally, the applicability of theoretical frameworks developed in a 
Western context (i.e., absorptive capacity) to an emerging market context is unclear and has 
previously been questioned (e.g., Murray et al., 2005; Zhao et al., 2011; Barkema et al., 
2015). We show that certain previous findings apply to the Chinese context but also show 
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that characteristics unique to the Chinese environment, such as state ownership, shape ac-
quisition outcomes. 
 Second, we add to the increasing and current literature on innovation in China. Previ-
ous studies have empirically analyzed the explosive increase in patenting by Chinese entities 
and its antecedents (e.g., Hu and Mathews, 2008; Li, 2012). Although there are studies that 
analyze Chinese acquisitions with regard to financial performance (Deng, 2009; Zhao et al., 
2011; Buckley et al., 2014), an in-depth empirical investigation of the effects on innovative 
output and its antecedents is still lacking. This is particularly intriguing because access to 
technological know-how is one of the main reasons for Chinese acquisitions (e.g., Deng, 
2004; Morck et al., 2008; Anderson et al., 2015). 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 describes the theoret-
ical framework and derives hypotheses about the effect of acquisitions on the acquirer’s 
innovation performance. Section 5.3 describes the dataset, variables, and provides initial 
descriptive statistics. Section 5.4 presents the results of our multivariate analysis, while Sec-
tion 5.5 discusses the findings in light of theory and practice. 
5.2 Theory and hypotheses 
5.2.1 Effect of acquisitions on Chinese acquirers’ post-acquisition pa-
tent output 
Acquisitions constitute a very prominent way for firms to access external knowledge (Ahuja 
and Katila, 2001). Firms try to increase their innovation performance by acquiring and uti-
lizing the experiences of others (Cloodt et al., 2006). To successfully integrate outside 
knowledge, firms need absorptive capacity. Research on absorptive capacity is based on the 
assumption that a company that enhances its internal knowledge base also enhances its abil-
ity to recognize the value of external information, apply and exploit it (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990). Thus, firms can enhance their absorptive capacity by acquiring knowledge bases that 
include valuable intangible assets (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Anderson et al., 2015). The ab-
sorption of new knowledge bases leads to potential economies of scale and scope, which 
may benefit an acquirer’s capacity to produce innovation output (Henderson and Cockburn, 
1996; Ahuja and Katila, 2001). 
 The external acquisition of knowledge through acquisitions is particularly attractive for 
companies with limited capabilities that are looking to expand their absorptive capacity and 
knowledge base quickly (Hitt et al., 2000; Zhao et al., 2011). China is a prominent example 
of a transition economy that still suffers from the rigidities of a planned, closed-market econ-
omy in which innovation was often neglected and is trying to extend its innovation-related 
capabilities quickly (Peng, 2003; Zhao et al., 2011). Because acquisitions can be a particu-
larly useful vehicle for Chinese firms to increase their absorptive capacity, we expect that 
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acquisitions serve to increase a Chinese acquirer’s knowledge base and have a positive effect 
on their absorptive capacity, ultimately resulting in a higher patent output. Thus, we hypoth-
esize: 
H5.1: Acquisitions have a positive effect on a Chinese acquirer’s post-acquisition 
patent output. 
5.2.2 Deal-specific factors: Acquired knowledge base 
Based on absorptive capacity theory, we postulate that the effect of acquisitions on acquir-
ers’ patent output is influenced by several deal-specific factors. Characteristics of the infor-
mation being transferred are likely to affect the post-acquisition patent output. In particular, 
three dimensions of the acquired knowledge base have been shown to influence the post-
acquisition innovation performance: the absolute size of the acquired knowledge base, the 
relative size of the acquired knowledge base, and the relatedness of the acquired knowledge 
base (e.g., Lubatkin, 1983; Ahuja and Katila, 2001). 
 Absolute size of the acquired knowledge base: Firms can enhance their absorptive 
capacity by acquiring knowledge bases, hence enabling initially limited Chinese firms to 
increase their innovation outputs. This increase is assumed to be larger with a large size of 
the acquired knowledge base. This is because the integration of a knowledge base leads to 
potential economies of scale and scope (Henderson and Cockburn, 1996; Ahuja and Katila, 
2001). Following Schumpeterian logic, innovations are often a result of the recombination 
of existing elements of knowledge (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006). Thus, the 
number of potential recombinations increases with an increasing knowledge base. If an ac-
quired company has a very small or non-existent knowledge base, this suggests that access 
to technology was not a major motive for the acquisition and should thus not positively 
influence post-acquisition patent output (Ahuja and Katila, 2001).  
 Previous research has assumed the post-acquisition innovation performance to increase 
linearly with the acquisition of knowledge bases with a larger absolute size (e.g., Ahuja and 
Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006). However, the degree to which a company can integrate 
acquired knowledge and thereby increase its absorptive capacity is likely to suffer from di-
minishing returns. This is because the integration of very large knowledge bases demands 
considerable efforts and resources on the part of an acquirer. Indeed, previous research has 
indicated an inverted U-shaped relationship between increasing absorptive capacity and in-
novation performance (Stock et al., 2001; Nooteboom et al., 2007). Therefore, we expect the 
relation between the absolute size of the acquired knowledge base to be non-linear and rather 
follow a curvilinear form (inverted U-shape): Patent output will increase with an increasing 
absolute size of the acquired knowledge base, but will decrease beyond a certain point. 
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H5.2a: The absolute size of the acquired knowledge base will be curvilinearly related 
to a Chinese acquirer’s post-acquisition patent output. 
 Relative size of the acquired knowledge base: Before recombination benefits can be 
achieved, the acquired information needs to be processed by the acquiring company. Thus, 
successful integration of the acquired knowledge also depends on the relative size of the 
acquired knowledge base (Ahuja and Katila, 2001). For example, if the acquired knowledge 
base is relatively large (as opposed to absolutely) compared to the existing knowledge base, 
the acquiring firm will have to devote a comparatively large amount of resources to integrate 
the acquired knowledge base, leading to fewer resources being available to perform actual 
innovation activities. Additionally, disruption of existing routines is likely because the ac-
quiring company is faced with a comparatively large amount of new information and rou-
tines, which require substantial adaption on the part of the acquiring firm (Ahuja and Katila, 
2001; Cloodt et al., 2006). Thus, we suggest that post-acquisition patent output of Chinese 
acquirers is negatively affected by an increased relative size of the acquired knowledge base. 
H5.2b: The relative size of the acquired knowledge base has a negative effect on a 
Chinese acquirer’s post-acquisition patent output. 
 Technological relatedness of the acquired knowledge base: A third characteristic is 
the relatedness of the acquired knowledge base, reflecting the content of the acquired 
knowledge. Based on absorptive capacity theory, related knowledge creates synergies as it 
enables Chinese firms to more easily apply new information to new environments, thus fa-
cilitating integration of the acquired knowledge base (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Makri et 
al., 2010). With regard to innovation, relatedness leads to common skills and a shared tech-
nical language. In contrast, innovation routines tend to be different if they originate from 
unrelated technological fields, thus rendering the integration of the knowledge bases more 
difficult and resource consuming (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Cloodt et al., 2006). How-
ever, unrelated knowledge can benefit the organization by providing new approaches to 
solve old problems or by allowing it to better process external information. 
 Because both arguments are valid, previous research has shown that the combination 
of knowledge bases with a moderate degree of relatedness provides benefits of increasing 
variety, while still providing enough common ground to build upon (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; 
Cloodt et al., 2006). For example, Ahuja and Katila (2001) find evidence for a non-mono-
tonic and u-shaped relationship. The authors argue that performance will increase with in-
creasing relatedness, but will decrease beyond a certain point. This effect has been confirmed 
by Cloodt et al. (2006). Applying a more fine-grained approach to measuring technological 
relatedness and complementarity, Makri et al. (2010) show that technological complemen-
tarity is an important factor in stimulating innovation output, while they also find knowledge 
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similarities to have no effect on invention quantity or quality. The authors argue that while 
integration is facilitated, these similarities are not enough to spark innovation performance. 
Similar results are obtained by Cassiman et al. (2008). Thus, we expect a non-linear rela-
tionship that is curvilinear (inverted U-shape): Patent output will increase with increasing 
relatedness, but will decrease beyond a certain point. 
H5.2c: Technological relatedness will be curvilinearly related to a Chinese ac-
quirer’s post-acquisition patent output. 
5.2.3 Deal-specific factors: Cross-border acquisitions 
The geographic context is an important factor shaping acquisition outcomes. Previous stud-
ies have often highlighted that cross-border acquisitions pose several obstacles to the acquir-
ing firm that hinder post-acquisition performance. In contrast to domestic acquisitions, 
cross-border acquisitions often involve different legal systems, different national cultures, 
and higher transportation costs which can be major obstacles to achieving integration bene-
fits (Olie, 1994; Barkema et al., 1996; Vaara, 2003; Björkman et al., 2007; Dikova et al., 
2010). Also, differences in languages are a common source of friction (e.g., Muehlfeld et 
al., 2012). Cultural similarity, which is assumed to be greater in domestic than cross-border 
acquisitions, eliminates a common source of friction by facilitating negotiations (Adair and 
Brett, 2005) and the integrations of the acquired company (Björkmann et al., 2007). Another 
factor is the regulatory framework (Clougherty, 2005), which is also more similar in domes-
tic acquisition, thus reducing the complexity of an acquisition. 
 On the other hand, cross-border acquisitions provide opportunities. With particular re-
gard to innovation performance, Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) argue that an exposure to 
geographical diversity may lead to higher innovation levels because it exposes a firm to 
different environments, enabling it to profit from different experiences. This information 
leads to a richer knowledge structure and stronger technological capabilities (Ghoshal, 1987; 
Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998). A similar argument is put forward by Ahuja and Katila 
(2004), who find that firms expanding beyond national markets develop unique innovation 
search paths as a response to the changing environment. While a performance enhancing 
effect of domestic acquisitions is shown in some studies (e.g., Muehlfeld et al., 2012), other 
studies find negative or no effects (e.g., Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Desyllas and Hughes, 2010), 
prompting Björkmann et al. (2007) to describe the empirical evidence as inconclusive. 
 Companies from emerging markets such as China frequently lag behind companies 
from developed countries in terms of strong intangible resources (e.g., technological know-
how). Thus, Chinese firms might particularly benefit from cross-border acquisitions to ad-
dress this comparative disadvantage and access further developed knowledge. This access 
to knowledge from developed countries has frequently been described as one of the more 
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important motivations for Chinese acquisitions (e.g., Deng, 2004; Morck et al., 2008; Buck-
ley et al., 2014). Therefore, we suggest that cross-border acquisitions positively influence a 
Chinese acquirer’s patent output. 
H5.3: Cross-border acquisitions have a positive effect on a Chinese acquirer’s post-
acquisition patent output. 
5.2.4 Deal-specific factors: Acquisition in a similar industry 
Similar to the country context, the industrial context is an important factor that may influence 
an acquisition’s outcome. Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) argue that a firm operating in 
multiple industries might profit from the increased diversity. For example, the firm will be 
able to gain more experience because it has to deal with a more diverse set of demands, 
rivals, and partners than a firm only operating in one industry. Also, a firm that is active in 
multiple industries may be able to realize economies of scale and scope and may thus profit 
more from its innovations. 
 However, most prior studies show that firms pursuing related, intra-industry acquisi-
tions outperform unrelated, inter-industry ac-quisitions (e.g., Muehlfeld et al., 2012; Hale-
blian and Finkelstein, 1999). This is because of larger synergies: Firms can more likely build 
on existing practices and routines if the new industrial environment is similar to the envi-
ronment in which prior knowledge was obtained and developed. In contrast, a transfer of 
routines may be impossible if a new environment is predominantly novel and characterized 
by different dominant logics which have to be learned. Companies can thus generalize their 
experience more easily if there is a greater similarity (Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994; Barkema 
and Vermeulen, 1998; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002; 
Desyllas and Hughes, 2010). Conceptually, the argumentation follows Huff (1982), who 
argues that “shared concepts”, for example on a how firm successfully operates, are devel-
oped within an industry and are not accessible for outsiders. Empirical evidence on how the 
industrial context guides strategic thinking was initially put forward by Spender (1987). 
Also, Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) describe that a firm that high levels of diversification 
force a firm to adapt are more fragmented organizational structure that will prevent learning.  
 Even though King et al. (2004) find no significant relation between related acquisitions 
and post-acquisition performance in general, with particular regard to the post-acquisition 
innovation performance, previous research indicates that R&D synergies are harder when 
two firms operate in different industries and that more diversified firms tend to be less inno-
vative (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1988; Hitt et al., 1991; Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Hagedoorn and 
Duysters, 2002). We thus presume that Chinese acquirers tend to benefit more from related 
acquisitions in which the acquirer operates in a similar industry: 
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H5.4: Acquisitions of a firm active in a similar industry have a positive effect on a 
Chinese acquirer’s post-acquisition patent output. 
5.2.4 Deal-specific factors: State ownership 
In transition economies, the institutional environment is characterized by strong governmen-
tal interference. This is particularly true for China, where governmental constraints and in-
centives influence M&A decisions in a major way (Deng, 2009). Often, corporate strategic 
decisions are influenced by political motives (Tsui et al., 2004). For example, the Chinese 
government has been stimulating Chinese companies to become competitive MNCs by for-
mulating a series of policies for the acquisition of foreign knowledge (e.g., value-added 
taxes, favorable financing) (Deng, 2004; Deng, 2009). By this, various firms have become 
international players through aggressive international expansion. While this referred to 
strong manufacturing firms in the past, China now specifically encourages investment in 
R&D to enhance innovative capability and by focusing more on acquisition of intangible 
assets such as technology and managerial capabilities from global giants (Hitt et al., 2004; 
Deng, 2009). 
 The Chinese corporate landscape is very different from Western countries because the 
Chinese economy has been dominated by state-owned enterprises (Wang et al., 2007). In 
contrast to other former socialist countries, China never underwent a mass privatization. 
Thus, the share of enterprises directly or indirectly owned by the state is still large (albeit 
decreasing) (Wang et al., 2007). The boundaries separating these companies from the state 
are often blurred (Tsui et al., 2004). Chinese state-owned enterprises are typically large, 
resourceful, and heavily subsidized corporations. Previous research has characterized them 
as lacking dynamism, passive, less learning-, and not performance-oriented (White, 2000; 
Peng, 2003; Wang et al., 2007). Traditionally, state-owned enterprises relied on innovations 
that were administratively directed to them (White, 2000). Overall, these attributes indicate 
lower levels of absorptive capacity enabled by dynamic capabilities and a culture of learning. 
Ultimately, state ownership should thus lead to a negative effect on the acquirers’ patent 
output. In contrast, a private organization should possess a larger absorptive capacity and 
should be able to profit from acquisitions to a larger extent. 
H5.5: State-ownership of the acquiring firm has a negative effect on a Chinese ac-
quirer’s post-acquisition patent output. 
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5.3 Data and variables 
5.3.1 Data 
Studies on post-acquisition innovation performance often impose a range of restrictions on 
the sample, for example, with regard to industry, company size, deal value, or shares ac-
quired (e.g., Makri et al., 2010; Desyllas and Hughes, 2010). Because the Chinese context 
remains unexplored so far, we keep our sample as unrestricted as possible and merge three 
databases to construct our sample: Compustat (company data), SDC Platinum (acquisition 
data), and PATSTAT (patent data). Our final sample includes 1,726 acquiring companies 
that conducted 1,545 acquisitions and filed 206,217 patents from 2000 to 2013. 
 Company data: Initially, we draw a sample of potential acquiring firms from Com-
pustat international. Compustat includes all listed Chinese firms, is one of the most compre-
hensive databases on firm data, and has been used frequently used in related studies (e.g., 
Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006; Laamanen and Keil, 2008; Sears and Hoetker, 
2014). Using Compustat effectively excludes smaller firms, which is however consistent 
with previous acquisition research focusing on large and publicly listed firms (Ahuja and 
Katila, 2001; Desyllas and Hughes, 2010; Makri et al., 2010). Consistent with previous re-
search, we focus on manufacturing firms (SIC codes 20–39) (e.g., Puranam et al., 2006; 
Sears and Hoetker, 2014), which are also more prone towards formal IP protection and par-
ticularly patents (e.g., Block et al., 2015). Due to data unavailavility prior to 2000, we draw 
all data available for the period from 01.01.2000 until 31.12.2012. In total, this leads to a 
highly unbalanced panel of 1,726 companies with 13,858 company/year observations. Be-
cause of the unbalanced nature of our dataset, we perform our analyses at the deal level 
instead of the company level. However, we use the full dataset in several robustness checks. 
To exclude any sampling bias, we cross-validate our sample with the Chinese database 
CSMAR, which also covers all listed Chinese firms but lacks several financial indicators. 
 Acquisition data: Data on the acquisition activity of the sampled firms are obtained 
from SDC Platinum. SDC Platinum is one of the most comprehensive databases on acquisi-
tions and has been frequently used in previous studies (e.g., Makri et al., 2010; Valentini, 
2012; Sears and Hoetker, 2014). We draw a sample of all completed deals between January 
1, 2000 and December 31, 2012 in which the acquirer is a Chinese company. Next, we match 
the data obtained from SDC and Compustat semi-manually based on the SEDOL number. 
Entries that could not be matched based on the SEDOL number were matched manually 
after conducting an in-depth search on the respective company homepage. In total, 1,545 
acquisitions could be matched. 
 Patent data: Patent data is obtained from PATSTAT, one of the most comprehensive 
databases on patents to date that is provided by the EPO. PATSTAT comprises data from 
over 100 countries and contains more than 110 million patent documents. Furthermore, 
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PATSTAT has been described as the most comprehensive database for Chinese patents 
(Liegsalz and Wagner, 2013). We use the version of March 2015. Because not all patents 
are immediately registered in PATSTAT, we only include patent applied for before 
31.12.2013 (because we use a lag of one year, we can only include company and acquisition 
data until 31.12.2012). We identify patent documents in which one of the acquired or ac-
quiring companies is listed as applicant or assignee. A particular problem of identifying Chi-
nese patents refers to the often flawed and inconsistent depiction of the names of the appli-
cants and their translation from Chinese into English. Therefore, we generated search 
patterns that included variant spellings, abbreviations, and applicant names (Chapters 2 and 
3). The search patterns were refined in several iterations to improve the identification and 
matching of relevant patents. More specifically and in contrast to previous studies we use 
the measure of patent families to avoid an overrepresentation of patents filed at multiple 
patent offices (Li, 2012). We use the earliest application within each patent family to deter-
mine the date of the patent, as it is closest to the data of the actual innovation. 
5.3.2 Variables 
Dependent variable: Our dependent variable is the number of new patent applications per 
year, which measures a firm’s patent output. Patents are frequently used to measure innova-
tion output and are the most commonly used indicator to analyze post-acquisition innovation 
performance (e.g., Ahuja and Katila, 2001, Valentini, 2012). This is because patents are 
related to inventiveness, are an externally validated measure of technological novelty, and 
are of economic significance (Ahuja and Katila, 2001). 
 Independent variables: To measure the overall effect of an acquisition on post-acqui-
sition patent output, we include a dummy variable that captures whether a company con-
ducted an acquisition in the respective year (=1) or not (=0). 
 To analyze Hypothesis H5.2, we measure the absolute size of the acquired knowledge 
base by aggregating the patents of the acquired firm in the five years preceding its acquisi-
tion. Second, the relative size of the acquired knowledge base is calculated by dividing the 
absolute size of the acquired knowledge base by the knowledge base of the acquiring firm. 
This variable takes a value of zero if the acquiring firm did not file any patents. Third, we 
measure the technological relatedness of the acquired knowledge base by the difference 
between the proportion of patents filed in each IPC class between the acquiring and acquired 
firms patent portfolio in a given year. A large value indicates a low relatedness. To measure 
technological equality, we further include a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the 
acquired and acquiring company filed their patents in the same IPC classes, and 0 otherwise. 
The measurement of the variables follows the approach of Ahuja and Katila (2001) and 
Cloodt et al. (2006). The data is obtained from PATSTAT. 
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 To analyze Hypothesis H5.3, we include a variable that captures whether the deal is a 
cross-border (= 1) or domestic (= 0) acquisition. To account for an acquisition of a company 
in a similar industry, we construct a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the acquired 
company operates in the same superordinate industrial category (2-digit SIC code), and 0 
otherwise (H5.4). Finally, we include a dummy variable that measures whether the acquiring 
company is state-owned (H5.5). Because there is no consensual approach in the previous 
literature, we used information available in CSMAR. To validate these data, we manually 
searched two online databases that included information on state ownership (sina.com and 
cmbchina.com). If all three sources stated that the company is state owned, this variable 
takes a value of 1, and 0 otherwise. 
 Control variables: We control for several variables that might influence patent output 
(e.g., total assets (log.), total revenues (log.)). More profitable firms should be able to devote 
more resources to innovation, which we want to control for. Similarly, we control for com-
pany size by including the number of employees in logged form. Because this variable is not 
reliably obtainable from Compustat, we draw it from the Chinese database CSMAR, which 
we used to validate the firms obtained from Compustat. Larger firms tend to be able to pro-
duce higher innovation outputs. To rule out the possibility our post-acquisition results are 
solely driven by a higher pre-acquisition innovativeness, we control for firms innovativeness 
by including its patenting intensity in logged form. Patenting intensity is constructed by di-
viding a firms’ patents by its total assets per year and is a suitable replacement for the usually 
used R&D intensity, which was not available in Compustat (e.g., Sandner and Block, 2011). 
Finally, we include the volume of shares acquired in the deal. Comparatively large acquisi-
tions should facilitate knowledge transfer. To account for inter-industry differences, we in-
clude industry dummies (2-SIC). To account for time differences, we include year dummies. 
5.4 Results 
Table 5.1 shows descriptive statistics and correlations. Values are reported per company per 
year. For example, companies filed 13.78 patents per year while employing 2,465 (log = 7.8) 
employees on average. On average, the acquired firms applied for 9.4 patents in the five 
years preceding the acquisition. Interestingly, only 5%of the acquisitions were cross-border 
(78 of 1,545), whereas 47% of the acquisitions were conducted in a similar or the same 
industry. Finally, 41% of the acquisitions were carried out by state-owned enterprises. Cor-
relations and VIFs indicate that multicollinearity should not affect our results. 
Because our dependent variable patent output is a count variable with only non-nega-
tive integers, we use count data regressions as our main method of analysis. The results are 
reported in Table 5.2. Following Pollock et al. (2008) and Muehlfeld et al. (2012), we ac-
count for within-firm variation by clustering standard errors at company level. This is similar 
to a random-effects regression and addresses a potential bias caused by multiple acquisitions 
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by the same firm in the same year. Previous research has shown that an acquisition’s impact 
on the acquiring firms’ innovation performance is not immediate (e.g., Ahuja and Katila, 
2001; Cloodt et al., 2006). Thus, we use different lag-structures of our variables. While pa-
tent data are included without lags, data firm and deal data are included with a lag of 1 year. 
Different lag structures have been used in previous literature. For example, Ahuja and Katila 
(2001) as well as Cloodt et al (2006) include the independent variables with no lag, and a 
lag of 1 to 3 years simultaneously. Their results show that, while there are differences be-
tween the different lag structures, the overall effects remain similar. Also, other studies only 
incorporate a lag of one year (e.g., Desyllas and Hughes, 2010). Also, using a lag of only 1 
year enables us to keep more data points, as the most recent year would have to be excluded 
otherwise. 
To analyze H5.1, we use the full sample to assess whether a deal has an effect on the 
post-acquisition patent output. Model 1 includes the basic model. Model 2 shows that, over-
all, an acquisition does not have a statistically significant effect on patent output (deal 
dummy). The following models introduce the independent, deal-specific variables and also 
shift our analysis to the deal level. With regard to H5.2a, we find that a higher absolute size 
of the acquired knowledge base has a highly significant and positive effect on the acquirer’s 
post-acquisition innovation performance. We also find that this effect decreases at higher 
levels, as indicated by the squared term in Model 3 and the full Model 7. We also find support 
for H5.2b: A higher relative size of the acquired knowledge base leads is associated with a 
lower post-acquisition innovation output. With regard to H5.2c, we find that technological 
relatedness of the acquired knowledge base positively influences patent output. However, 
this effect decreases if the companies are too similar. These effects persist when all variables 
are entered simultaneously in Model 7. H5.3 analyzes differences between cross-border and 
domestic deals and suggests a positive effect of cross-border deals. Compared to a domestic 
deal, an international deal increases patent applications in subsequent years (p < 0.01). With 
regard to the industrial context, we assumed that intra-industry deals have a positive effect 
on post-acquisition patent output (H5.4). Our empirical analysis does not support this hy-
pothesis and shows that neither an acquisition in a similar industry nor an acquisition in the 
same industry exhibits a consistent effect. Finally, we find support for H5.5. Because large 
and traditional Chinese state-owned enterprises are often more inflexible and not as prone 
to learning, we suspected them to profit less from acquisition. The effect is negative and 
significant (p < 0.05). 
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5.5 Discussion and conclusion 
We analyze the effect of acquisitions on the acquirer’s post-acquisition patent output in the 
emerging market context of China. We draw on absorptive capacity theory and find no sig-
nificant effect of acquisitions on patent output of Chinese acquirers. Yet, several deal-spe-
cific variables, such as characteristics of the acquired knowledge base, cross-border acqui-
sitions, and state-ownership do influence post-acquisition patent output. Our findings extend 
the previous literature on the effect of acquisitions on post-acquisition innovation perfor-
mance (e.g., Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006; Desyllas and Hughes, 2010). Ad-
ditionally, we contribute to the increasing literature on innovation in China. Previous studies 
have empirically analyzed the explosive increase in patenting by Chinese entities and its 
antecedents (e.g., Hu and Mathews, 2008; Li, 2012).  
 Previous research has assumed that emerging market firms may not profit from acqui-
sitions because they lack the absorptive capacity to successfully exploit acquired knowledge 
(Narula, 2012; Anderson et al., 2015). However, we identify several deal-specific character-
istics that significantly influence the post-acquisition patent output. Unsurprisingly, we find 
that a higher absolute knowledge base of the acquired firm increases post-acquisition patent 
output. Although this linear effect has been identified in previous research, our findings sug-
gest that the effect decreases at higher levels and follows. We explain this in the acquisition 
context previously unexplored finding through the significant requirements that the integra-
tion of a very large knowledge base poses for an acquiring firm. Although potentially provid-
ing a huge potential to increase their own absorptive capacity, companies may be over-
whelmed by very large knowledge bases. This implies that the most attractive targets for 
Chinese acquirers may not necessarily be firms with the largest possible knowledge base; 
rather, it should be more beneficial to choose targets with a moderate knowledge base. 
 In line with Hypothesis H5.3, we find that Chinese companies profit from international 
acquisitions. This indicates that Chinese firms successfully draw on the often more devel-
oped knowledge in technologically and culturally distant countries. Because a successful 
integration of more distant and potentially more advanced knowledge often requires a con-
siderable amount of absorptive capacity, this finding largely contradicts the argument that 
Chinese firms lack absorptive capacity. Additionally, this finding supports the notion that 
Chinese companies use cross-border acquisitions to transition to an innovation-based econ-
omy and catch-up to developed countries (Morck et al., 2008; Anderson et al., 2015). 
 Finally, we find that state-owned firms profit less than other firms from acquisitions in 
terms of innovation. Although this is in line with Hypothesis H5.5, the literature also indi-
cates that state-owned enterprises could be more innovative (Choi et al., 2011). For example, 
the successful catch-up of Taiwan and South Korea has been partially attributed to state-
driven technological development aimed at fostering innovation capabilities. A similar ef-
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fect could be expected for China because the government’s long-term orientation and sub-
stantial financial support might lead to a better environment for innovation. However, our 
results show that the innovation-hampering aspects seem to overwhelm: inefficient struc-
tures, the absence of managerial knowledge and unhealthy ties between government and 
businesses (Choi et al., 2011). 
 In conclusion, our results show that Chinese companies seem to be able to successfully 
exploit acquisitions to increase their patent output under certain circumstances (e.g., in cross-
border acquisitions). This contradicts studies assuming a comparatively limited absorptive 
capacity of Chinese firms (Rugman and Li, 2007; Anderson et al., 2015). A potential expla-
nation lies in the transformative process China undergoes and the adaptability this process 
demands from companies, particularly in changing environments, such as during a transfor-
mation from imitation to innovation. For example, the industrial and institutional environ-
ment in China is highly dynamic and uncertain. This is because the transformation process 
leads to a variety of unique and often experimental industrial policies (Luo and Peng, 1999; 
Murray et al., 2005). This forces firms to adapt their products and strategies very quickly. 
Thus, this reality might prepare them for the hurdle of acquisitions and enable them, despite 
a potentially worse initial situation, to profit from acquisitions. Another explanation is that 
Chinese firms often exhibit a very inactive role when integrating acquired firms, which is 
contrary to public belief. Several studies indicate that Chinese firms often grant acquired 
firms considerable autonomy following an acquisition. This passive strategy aims to mini-
mize integration problems while simultaneously keeping an acquired firm as functional as 
possible, for example by keeping the old management in place (Liu and Woywode, 2013; 
Anderson et al., 2015). This not only enables the Chinese firm to profit from the acquired 
firm as much as possible but also contradicts the public image of Chinese firms only acquir-
ing firms to drain their knowledge. 
 This chapter is not without limitations. First, previous studies often try to consolidate 
companies and their subsidies, for example, using Dun & Bradseet’s “Who Owns Whom” 
database (e.g., Valentini, 2012). This is helpful when trying to grasp a company’s patent 
portfolio. However, the Chinese company landscape is very opaque and there is no common 
source for consolidation. To account for this, we generated and refined our search patterns 
in multiple iterations and are confident that we have identified an accurate patent portfolio 
through this process. A second limitation concerns our dependent variable (patent output). 
Patents suffer from the idiosyncrasies of the patenting process and other limitations. Despite 
these potential drawbacks, patents are by far the most frequently used measure of innovative 
performance in an acquisition context (e.g., Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Desyllas and Hughes, 
2010). 
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 This chapter also opens several avenues for further research. First, we focus on organ-
izational learning in acquisitions, which is one option for inter-firm knowledge transfer, al-
beit an important one. Thus, further research might examine other mechanisms of knowledge 
acquisition, such as strategic alliances or joint ventures in the specific context of China (e.g., 
Kale et al., 2000; Duso et al., 2010). Second, various contributions have highlighted the fact 
that the increase of China’s innovative capacity is remarkable in terms of quantity, but ques-
tionable in terms of quality (e.g., Li, 2012). Future research might find it interesting to assess 
patent quality in more detail. Due to the limitation in Chinese patent data, it might be inter-
esting to assess patent quality in an already established context in which data are reliably 
available, such as the United States. 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
Why do SMEs file trademarks? Insights 
from firms in innovative industries 
 
 
Trademark filings have increased markedly over time. Although prior research has investi-
gated the outcomes of trademark registration, including its effects on firm market valuation 
and productivity, little is known about why firms file trademarks. However, to interpret the 
increase in trademark filings and its economic effects, it is important to know and under-
stand why firms file trademarks. Because trademarks are particularly important to SMEs, 
this study analyzes trademarking motives using a survey of 600 SMEs in innovative indus-
tries. An exploratory factor analysis yields three distinct motives: protection, marketing, and 
exchange. A cluster analysis reveals four distinct clusters of firms with respect to the three 
trademarking motives. A comparison of these clusters reveals significant differences in sev-
eral industry- and firm-level characteristics, including participation in service industries 
and relation-ships with external parties. Implications for research on SMEs, trademarks, 
and intellectual property management are discussed. 
 
 
This chapter is based on Block et al. (2015).  
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6.1 Introduction 
Trademark applications have increased markedly in recent years. Statistics on trademark 
applications published by the WIPO indicate that trademarks are the most frequently filed 
form of intellectual property right (IPR) and that applications have nearly doubled over the 
last 10 years (WIPO, 2016a). Although the increasing importance of trademarks has 
spawned research investigating the effects of trademarks on the market valuation and 
productivity of firms (e.g., Krasnikov et al., 2009; Sandner and Block, 2011; Greenhalgh 
and Rogers, 2012), little is known about why firms file trademarks. However, to interpret 
the increase in trademark filings and its economic effects, it is crucial to know and under-
stand why firms file trademarks. Previous research identifies various motives for trademark-
ing, including the protection of marketing assets, brand building, and signaling quality (e.g., 
Ramello and Silva, 2006; Srinivasan et al., 2008; Sandner and Block, 2011). Nevertheless, 
an empirical investigation of trademarking motives remains lacking. We address this gap by 
analyzing the motives of firms to register trademarks using data from 600 SMEs in innova-
tive industries. 
 SMEs differ from large firms with regard to trademarking. Previous research observes 
that SMEs are relatively more active in trademarking than large firms are (Rogers et al., 
2007; Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2008). This difference can be explained by the specific con-
text of SMEs. In particular, SMEs experience liabilities stemming from their small size, 
which hinders the pursuit of cost leadership strategies based on economies of scale. Accord-
ingly, SMEs often focus on product differentiation or niche strategies (e.g., McDougall and 
Robinson, 1990; Carter et al., 1994; Lee et al., 1999). Trademarks can play a pivotal role in 
product differentiation by establishing and protecting brands and by distinguishing an 
SME’s products from those of its competitors, which often follow SMEs into these niches 
(Lee et al., 1999). Furthermore, trademarks may especially suit resource-scarce firms, such 
as SMEs in innovative industries. Trademark registration is relatively inexpensive and non-
complex and thus may serve an important appropriation function for SMEs interested in 
using IPRs. Additionally, one could expect that SMEs register trademarks for different rea-
sons than large firms do. Resource scarcity often forces SMEs to engage in exchange rela-
tionships with external partners to leverage their assets, enter new markets, or obtain addi-
tional financial resources. In such exchange relationships, trademarks can strengthen the 
negotiating position of firms and serve as quality signals (e.g., Srinivasan et al., 2008; Block 
et al., 2014a). 
 Our empirical analysis comprises three steps. First, we theoretically develop and em-
pirically validate the following set of three overarching trademarking motives: protection, 
marketing, and exchange. Second, these trademarking motives are employed as active clus-
ter variables in a cluster analysis to explore empirical variation in the configuration of trade-
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marking SMEs. The cluster analysis identifies four distinct clusters of SMEs based on trade-
marking motives; we label these four clusters as follows: trademark skeptics, marketing-
focused trademarking SMEs, marketing- plus protection-focused trademarking SMEs, and 
trademark advocates. Third, we compare the industry and firm characteristics of firms in 
these four clusters to gain insights into the clusters’ distinctions and characteristics. 
 Our findings contribute to innovation and marketing research in three respects. First, 
we enrich research on SMEs’ motives to file for IP protection. Previous empirical studies of 
why firms, and particularly SMEs, use IPRs focus mainly on patents (e.g., Cohen, 2000; 
Blind, 2006; De Rassenfosse, 2012). However, trademarks may also play an important role 
in the appropriation of innovation rents by SMEs (e.g., Helmers and Rogers, 2010; Flikkema 
et al., 2014). For example, the literature suggests that trademarks are complementary to pa-
tents and that the two are used in conjunction with each other to offer more complete pro-
tection of IP assets (Blind et al., 2006; Thomä and Bizer, 2013). Previous research in this 
area relies mainly on theoretical considerations and anecdotal evidence and does not provide 
a systematic empirical analysis of why firms file trademarks (e.g., Mendonça et al., 2004; 
Srinivasan et al., 2008; see Flikkema et al., 2014, for a notable exception). Against this back-
drop, the theoretically backed and empirically validated set of trademarking motives devel-
oped in this study provides valuable insights into the motives of SMEs to file for trademarks. 
 Our second contribution is the empirical identification of four distinct clusters of SMEs 
with regard to trademarking motives. This finding is in line with prior research that under-
scores the uniqueness and diversity of SME IPR use (e.g., De Jong and Marsili, 2006; 
Thomä, 2009; De Rassenfosse, 2012; Thomä and Bizer, 2013). Our results suggest that with 
regard to trademarking, SMEs should neither be treated as scaled-down versions of large 
firms nor viewed as a single entity. The four clusters of SMEs follow a hierarchical structure. 
Trademark skeptics engage in trademarking without a specific motive. Marketing-focused 
trademarking SMEs emphasize marketing motives, whereas marketing- plus protection-fo-
cused trademarking SMEs combine marketing and protection motives. Trademark advocates 
are positive about all three trademarking motives (i.e., marketing, protection, and exchange). 
 Third, comparing the four identified clusters based on passive cluster variables con-
tributes to previous trademark research, which focuses primarily on trademark (application) 
counts and their effects on market value, productivity, and firm survival (e.g., Srinivasan et 
al., 2008; Sandner and Block, 2011). Little is known about how industry and firm character-
istics relate to trademarking motives. Although this study is not a causal investigation of 
contingency factors relating to trademarking motives, our analysis provides exploratory ev-
idence of the factors by which trademarking SMEs differ. For instance, our results indicate 
that SMEs in the trademark skeptics cluster interact less with external parties compared with 
firms in the other three clusters, which suggests that their skepticism toward trademarks may 
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stem from being somewhat inward oriented. In contrast, we observe that SMEs seeking ex-
ternal innovation partnerships are overrepresented among trademark advocates, which take 
a holistic view of trademarking motives. 
 The remainder of the Chapter is structured as follows: Section 6.2 provides a literature 
review of SMEs’ potential motives for filing trademarks and presents the conceptual frame-
work of this study. Section 6.3 describes the data. Section 6.4 provides the empirical results 
of the factor and cluster analyses and compares the clusters with each other through descrip-
tive analysis. Section 6.5 discusses the implications of the study for theory and practice, 
details the limitations of the study, and suggests avenues for future research. 
6.2 Literature review and conceptual framework 
6.2.1 Existing research on motives for filing IPRs (especially patents) 
A number of previous empirical studies have examined motives for filing IPRs. Most of this 
research concerns patents and is based on samples of large firms. One early study conducted 
by Cohen et al. (2000) analyzes the motives of large US manufacturing firms to file patents. 
The authors observe that although most patents are filed to prevent imitation, they are also 
filed to block competitors from patenting similar inventions. Other less important motives 
include preventing lawsuits, improving negotiations, and enhancing firm reputation. Blind 
et al. (2006) explore patenting motives in a sample of German firms of various sizes. Em-
ploying factor analysis, they identify the following five motives: protection, blocking, repu-
tation, exchange, and incentive. Blind et al. (2006) observe that reputation motives (e.g., 
company image) are relatively more important for small firms than for large firms. However, 
protection and blocking motives remain the most important motives for patent applications, 
irrespective of firm size. This finding is consistent with the work of Keupp et al. (2009), 
which focuses on Swiss SMEs and observes that protection motives are the most important 
reasons for patenting, followed by piracy prevention. Financial motives (which Blind et al. 
(2006) refer to as exchange motives), such as attracting venture capital, are less important. 
In contrast, in a study that compares the patenting motives of SMEs and large firms, De 
Rassenfosse (2012) demonstrates that financial motives – specifically, attracting investors 
or licensees – are more important for SMEs because investors and licensees help SMEs to 
overcome financing constraints. Veer and Jell (2012) obtain similar results and highlight the 
importance of patents to SMEs that seek to generate licensing opportunities and to attract 
investors. Similarly, Holgersson (2013) studies a sample of Swedish SMEs and highlights 
the major role of patents in facilitating exchanges and improving a company’s reputation. 
The author argues that patents improve a firm’s reputation among customers and attract ven-
ture capital. 
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6.2.2 Existing research on the use, effects, and motives of trademarking  
The number of studies that analyze the use and effects of trademarks is increasing. One of 
the first studies of trademarking, Mendonça et al. (2004), discusses the use of trademarks as 
a proxy for firms’ innovation activities. Drawing on this study, subsequent research has 
demonstrated the effects of trademarking on firm value, productivity, and survival. 
 Sandner and Block (2011) analyze the effects of trademarks on firms’ market values in 
a sample of 1,216 large firms and observe that trademarks have a positive effect on firm 
market value. Similar results are reported by Fosfuri and Giarratana (2009), Krasnikov et al. 
(2009), and Block et al. (2014b). Using a sample of 1,600 large firms in the UK, Greenhalgh 
and Rogers (2012) observe that trademarks have a greater effect on the market values of 
service firms than on the market values of manufacturing firms. Furthermore, Greenhalgh 
and Rogers (2012) observe that trademarks have a positive influence on firm productivity. 
Similar results are obtained by Greenhalgh and Longland (2005). Although these studies 
focus on large firms, the importance of trademarks for SMEs is often highlighted (e.g., 
Helmers and Rogers, 2010; Flikkema et al., 2014). Using a sample of 1,435 small and new 
firms, Srinivasan et al. (2008) analyze how trademarks influence firm survival (dissolutions 
and being acquired). They observe that diverse product portfolios combined with trademarks 
delay exit by dissolution (in contrast to patents) and accelerate exit by acquisition (as do 
patents). Similarly, Jensen et al. (2008) demonstrate that trademarks significantly increase 
the chances of firm survival. Furthermore, Helmers and Rogers (2010) analyze the survival 
of new and mostly small firms in a sample of nearly 162,000 UK firms. They find that pa-
tenting decreases the likelihood of exit only in certain sectors, whereas trademarking de-
creases the likelihood of exit across nearly all sectors. Finally, Block et al. (2014a) investi-
gate the role of trademarks in start-up valuation by venture capitalists and demonstrate that 
the number and breadth of trademark applications exhibit an inverted U-shaped relationship 
with the financial valuation of start-ups. 
 Interesting results were also obtained by Amara et al. (2008), who investigate how 
firms combine different protection mechanisms. Their sample includes 2,625 Canadian 
knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS) of small as well as large size. In addition to 
analyzing the determinants of trademark filings (e.g., R&D investment, external knowledge 
sharing, and firm size), they observe that trademarks are complementary (rather than substi-
tutive) to patents, copyrights, and confidentiality agreements and independent of secrecy, 
complex designs, and lead time advantages. Thomä and Bizer (2013) analyze the appropri-
ation strategies of innovative small firms and demonstrate that the use of IPRs by these firms 
is highly selective and that trademarks are considered the second most important type of 
formal IP protection (after patents). Their results also indicate that trademarks can be com-
bined effectively with patents. 
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 Two particular studies provide first insights into the trademarking motives of SMEs. 
Keupp et al. (2009) study IPRs in Swiss SMEs and ask firms that frequently utilize trade-
marks about their primary reasons for trademarking. In a questionnaire, respondents were 
offered the following answers: “protection from competitors”, “protection from product pi-
rates”, “advertising impact” (which the authors also refer to as “publicity”), “importance to 
financing”, and “importance when negotiating contracts”. The descriptive results show that 
67.2% of the respondents indicated “protection from competitors” as their main reason to 
trademark, followed by “publicity”, which was indicated as important by 42.0% of the re-
spondents (multiple answers were possible). In contrast, the least important reason for filing 
trademarks was their “importance to financing”. Flikkema et al. (2014) survey trademark 
applications filed by 660 SMEs in the Benelux countries, focusing on whether trademarks 
are a suitable indicator for measuring different types of innovation. Before analyzing the 
suitability of trademarks for measuring different forms of innovation (i.e., product vs. pro-
cess innovations), the authors identify trademarking motives. The most important motives 
are “to avoid imitation”, “to support marketing activities”, “to protect IP”, and “to improve 
corporate image”. The authors show that building brand equity and signaling strategic 
change are more important to firms offering service and process innovations, whereas mo-
tives relating to formal protection are of greater importance to firms offering product inno-
vations. 
6.2.3 Conceptual framework: SMEs’ motives for filing trademarks 
Our literature review shows that empirical studies of firms’ motives for registering trade-
marks are scarce relative to studies on patenting motives. Thus, we cannot base our empirical 
analysis on a widely accepted conceptual framework of trademarking motives. Therefore, 
we develop an own conceptual framework of trademarking motives by drawing on the es-
tablished framework of patenting motives by Blind et al. (2006). The study of Blind et al. 
(2006) identifies five motives for filing patent applications: protection, blocking, reputation, 
exchange, and incentive. We discuss the applicability of each of these five motives to SME 
trademarking. Specifically, we argue that protection, reputation, and exchange motives are 
highly relevant to SME trademarking. Furthermore, we argue that reputation motives en-
compass more aspects in trademarking than in patenting and thus we refer to them as mar-
keting motives. Additionally, we argue that blocking and incentive motives are of limited 
relevance in trademarking. 
 Protection motives: IPRs were originally established to offer firms a means of pro-
tecting their IP assets. Unsurprisingly, protection is often the most important reason for filing 
patent applications (Cohen et al., 2000; Blind et al., 2006). Whereas patents are granted for 
technological inventions, trademarks protect marketing assets (e.g., Srinivasan et al., 2008; 
Jensen et al., 2008; Sandner and Block, 2011). Specifically, trademarks (e.g., symbols and 
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names) identify a firm’s goods or services and distinguish them from those of competitors 
(Mendonça et al., 2004; Fosfuri and Giarratana, 2009; De Vries, 2013). Importantly, trade-
marks form the legal basis of brands and indicate a firm’s willingness to protect its brands 
from free riding and adverse actions by competitors (Mendonça et al., 2004; Sandner and 
Block, 2011). Protection is crucial because strong brands are among a firm’s most valuable 
assets and can generate various benefits, such as increased customer loyalty and enhanced 
marketing effectiveness (for an overview, see Keller and Lehmann, 2006). Prior innovation 
research focuses on this classic protection function of trademarks (e.g., Srinivasan et al., 
2008; Fosfuri and Giarratana, 2009). In addition, studies that investigate multiple IP protec-
tion mechanisms, including trademarks, patents, and copyrights, highlight protection as a 
primary motive to file IPRs (e.g., Amara et al., 2008; Heimonen, 2012; Thomä and Bizer, 
2013). 
 Marketing motives: Marketing motives reflect a firm’s desire to improve its image 
among central stakeholders, such as customers. Whereas patents enhance the technological 
image of a firm, trademarks signal that a firm pursues a differentiation strategy and focuses 
on product quality. Trademarks help to reduce information asymmetry between sellers and 
buyers by providing information that facilitates the purchase of a product, thus reducing 
consumer search costs. Consequently, trademarks enable a company to sell larger quantities 
or charge higher prices for their products (Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2008; Srinivasan et al., 
2008; Jensen et al., 2008). Although a company’s reputation is established through brands, 
not directly through trademarks, marketing and innovation research highlight the pivotal role 
of trademarks in protecting and establishing the brands that support firms’ marketing strate-
gies (Von Graevenitz, 2007). Therefore, brand building, establishing customer loyalty, and 
pursuing differentiation constitute marketing motives (Mendonça et al., 2004). This motive 
is highly relevant for small firms because they are often unable to pursue cost leadership 
strategies based on economies of scale. Instead, small firms focus on differentiation and 
niche strategies that require a company to distinguish itself from its competitors to attract 
customers (McDougall and Robinson, 1990; Carter et al., 1994; Lee et al., 1999). Blind et 
al. (2006) and Holgersson (2013) highlight the particular importance of this motive for 
SMEs. 
 Exchange motives: Exchange motives reflect the desire of a company to improve its 
position relative to external partners who provide access to capital, licensing income, or col-
laboration. Trademarks may indicate firm innovativeness (Hipp and Grupp, 2005; Green-
halgh and Rogers, 2006) and market orientation (Srinivasan et al., 2008), and thus small, 
young firms may file trademark applications to signal such innovativeness and market ori-
entation to investors (Block et al., 2014a). Consistent with this rationale, empirical research 
provides considerable and consistent evidence of a positive relationship between firms’ 
trademarks and investor valuations for both small and large firms. Trademarks increase a 
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firm’s attractiveness to investors and reduce the cost of external capital (e.g., Ramello and 
Silva, 2006; Srinivasan et al., 2008; Block et al., 2014a). Exchange motives also include the 
licensing of trademarks to other firms (Mendonça et al., 2004). For SMEs, the extent of 
technology licensing may provide a motivation for trademark registration because small 
firms may lack the resources and capabilities to commercialize their innovations or market 
their products independently (Gans et al., 2002; Thomä and Bizer, 2013). Furthermore, 
SMEs may operate in a limited region and thus license their trademarks to firms in foreign 
markets or other regions. Trademark registration is also a prerequisite for franchising, which 
is often employed as a growth strategy by small and capital-scarce firms (Combs and 
Ketchen, 1999). Finally, trademarks facilitate exchange by providing a valuable asset in ne-
gotiations with other companies (such as suppliers) and increasing firm bargaining power 
(Mendonça et al., 2004). Due to the resource constraints of small firms – particularly with 
respect to finances – we expect exchange motives to play an important role for SME trade-
marking (e.g., De Rassenfosse, 2012; Veer and Jell, 2012). 
 The incentive and blocking motives introduced by Blind et al. (2006) for patents do not 
apply to trademarks. Blind et al. (2006) describe incentive motives as monetary or reputa-
tional rewards for employees who successfully patent their innovative ideas. In this respect, 
patents serve as an indicator of innovation performance because obtaining a patent requires 
substantial investments of money, time, and labor before an application can be filed and a 
patent can be granted. However, this is less true for trademarks, which do not require com-
parable ex-ante investments and are less complex. Indeed, the investments associated with 
trademarks (e.g., marketing to promote a brand) generally occur after registration (Sandner 
and Block, 2011). Thus, in contrast to a patent application, trademark registration is not a 
suitable performance indicator for the distribution of rewards. Blocking competitors from 
producing similar products, which is among the most important and common motives for 
patenting (Cohen et al., 2000; Blind et al., 2006), results from the specific mechanisms of 
patent law. A patent effectively prohibits the patenting of a similar invention because it 
would not pass the criteria of patentability (especially technological novelty and non-obvi-
ousness). Thus, a patent grants the holder technological room to operate by preventing com-
petitors from producing and using the patented invention. This exclusion right can be used 
to block competitors. In contrast, trademarks do not possess comparable blocking power 
because they are subject to different criteria (Mendonça et al., 2004). The production and 
sale of very similar products cannot be prohibited by a trademark and competitors can simply 
sell similar products using different trademarks or brand names. 
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6.3 Empirical approach 
6.3.1 Dataset and survey 
We conducted an online survey of SMEs in innovative industries to gather data on their 
trademarking motives. A sample of 46,963 firms was selected from CrunchBase (formerly 
TechCrunch), a free US-based database founded in 2007 that provides comprehensive cov-
erage of mostly US firms. 2 CrunchBase represents a relatively new data source but its use 
in entrepreneurship and innovation research is increasing (e.g., Block and Sandner, 2009; 
Sandner and Block, 2011; Alexy et al., 2012). CrunchBase focuses on the internet and tech-
nology sectors. In general, these sectors are active in trademarking and are therefore suitable 
for examining trademarking motives (Mendonça et al., 2004; Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2006; 
Amara et al., 2008). After retrieving the sample from CrunchBase in early 2012, we admin-
istered the survey through email by sending personal invitations to participate in the survey 
and providing a link. The survey was conducted in June and July 2012. We received re-
sponses from 1,891 firms. Because our sample contains mostly US firms, we follow com-
mon US practice and define SMEs as firms with fewer than 500 employees (USITC, 2010).3 
We did not introduce a minimum threshold because we are also interested in analyzing the 
smallest firms. Very small firms (i.e., firms with less than 10 employees) constitute an in-
teresting subgroup of SMEs that is often overlooked (Thomä and Bizer, 2013). Because we 
are interested in the motives for trademarking, we excluded firms that did not file trademark 
applications. Finally, we excluded firms that failed to complete the questionnaire. Our final 
sample includes exactly 600 SMEs. 
 Because we conducted a survey, we assess the possibility of non-response bias. Late 
respondents resemble non-respondents, and if late respondents are significantly different 
from early respondents, the survey might be biased (Armstrong und Overton, 1977; Radha-
krishna, et al., 2008). Therefore, we test for differences between early and late respondents 
following Miller and Smith (1983). We divide our sample of 600 firms into early respond-
ents (first 150 respondents, 25% of the sample) and late respondents (last 150 respondents, 
25% of the sample). No severe group differences could be identified. 
6.3.2 Variables used in the factor analysis  
The first empirical analysis comprises a factor analysis of firm trademarking motives. To 
measure the importance of these motives, we listed 10 items and asked participants to indi-
cate the importance of each item on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not important) to 
                                                          
2 Although worldwide trademarking systems vary with respect to relatively small details, we are not aware of 
significant differences between the trademarking systems of the US and Europe. The overall function of trade-
marks, the application process, and the use of trademarks is very similar in both regions. 
3 Using another threshold (e.g., 250 employees) does not change our main results. 
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5 (very important). The items refer to the three trademarking motives described in Section 
2: protection (“safeguarding revenues”, “Trademark (TM) registration is presently seen as 
only way to protect the marked product or service”, “preventing TM imitation”, “when other 
IPRs expire, products or services are still protected”), marketing (“supporting marketing ac-
tivities of products or services”, “strengthening the company image”, “enhancing customer 
loyalty”), and exchange (“increasing negotiation power with potential investors”, “increas-
ing attractiveness to potential licensees”, “ability to sell the TM in the future”). Table 1 
provides more details about the items and their measurement. 
6.3.3 Variables used as passive cluster variables in the cluster analysis 
The second empirical analysis constitutes a cluster analysis to explore different configura-
tions of SMEs regarding trademarking motives. In addition to using the factors identified in 
the factor analysis as active cluster variables, we use passive cluster variables to further dis-
tinguish the identified clusters. In conceptually unexplored fields, such as ours, the cluster 
analysis literature advocates a selection of passive cluster variables that enables a rich de-
scription of the characteristics of the identified clusters (e.g., Ketchen and Shook, 1996; 
Homburg et al., 2008). Therefore, we select and capture internal and external contingencies 
by including several industry- and firm-level variables that previous research has linked to 
the usage of and motivation for trademark registration. Overall, previous research has re-
vealed considerable differences in IPR filing motives across industries and across firm char-
acteristics, such as firm size and age (Cohen et al., 2000; Blind et al., 2006; Amara et al., 
2008). We also compiled data on firm- and industry-level characteristics from secondary 
data sources (CrunchBase and Compustat) and matched these with our survey data. In addi-
tion, we enriched the primary survey data with optional qualitative comments provided by 
the respondents. In the following we describe the passive cluster variables in detail. 
 Firm operates in service industry: The first industry-level variable captures whether 
the firm operates primarily in a service industry. We calculated a variable from our survey 
that takes a value of 1 if the firm is primarily active in services and a value of 0 otherwise. 
Innovation in manufacturing and service industries differs (Hipp and Grupp, 2005; Carree 
et al., 2015). Previous research has consistently shown that there is an overall lesser need for 
formal IP protection in service industries (e.g., Heimonen, 2012; Thomä and Bizer, 2013), 
and that trademarks are filed more frequently in manufacturing industries (e.g., Arundel et 
al., 2007; WIPO, 2016a). An explanation might be that manufacturing firms often protect a 
multitude of products with different trademarks, whereas service firms lack protectable 
products and are often restricted to a single trademark protecting their company brand. Fur-
thermore, we expect trademarking motives to differ. Products in manufacturing industries 
are often more tangible than services and information asymmetry regarding quality is thus 
lower. This intangibility of services may increase the importance of reputation and quality 
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signals established by trademarks to overcome this information asymmetry in service indus-
tries. We thus expect marketing motives to be of greater importance for service firms than 
for manufacturing firms when filing trademarks. Furthermore, we expect trademarks to be 
particularly important for service innovators, which constitute a particularly interesting sub-
group of service firms. Several studies argue that trademarks are a particularly well-suited 
indicator for measuring innovation in the service sector (e.g., Gotsch and Hipp, 2012; 
Flikkema et al., 2014; Carree et al., 2015). Trademarks are particularly apt for service inno-
vators because trademarks are often the only formal mechanism available to service firms 
(e.g., they do not require a technical invention or a tangible product) (Gotsch and Hipp, 
2012). Therefore, innovative service firms that are interested in utilizing formal IP protection 
mechanisms often protect their IP assets through trademarks, and should thus increasingly 
value the protection motive when filing trademarks.  
 Importance of B2B and B2C markets: We measure the importance of business-to-
business (B2B) and business-to-consumer (B2C) customers for firms on a 5-point Likert 
scale. Prior research in marketing frequently reveals differences in the buying behavior of 
B2B and B2C customers (Edwards et al., 2007). For example, Ahmed and D’Astous (1995) 
observe that country of origin, costs, and warranties are more important to B2B customers, 
whereas B2C customers consider branding to be more important. Although branding is use-
ful to firms who must reach a larger customer base in B2C markets, B2B customers are more 
informed and not as easily affected or persuaded by strong brands (e.g., Ahmed and 
D’Astous, 1995; Edwards et al., 2007). Therefore, marketing motives to file trademarks 
might be more important to firms that operate primarily in B2C markets. However, the dif-
ferences between the two groups are often overemphasized; brand equity also plays an im-
portant role in B2B exchanges (e.g., Gordon et al., 1993). 
 Industry R&D and advertising intensity: Because prior research finds that firms in 
technology-intensive industries tend to file trademark applications more often than firms in 
other industries do, we include the R&D intensity of the industry in which the firm is active 
as a contingency variable (Amara et al., 2008; Mendonça et al., 2004). Because marketing 
is especially relevant in technology-intensive markets (Mohr et al., 2010), we expect firms 
that are active in particularly R&D-intensive industries to find marketing motives more im-
portant. Furthermore, Fosfuri and Giarratana (2009) use trademarks to proxy for new adver-
tising rather than for innovation. Because trademarks are related to branding and brand ad-
vertisement, we include the advertising intensity of the industry in which the firm operates. 
We expect firms in advertising-intensive industries to trademark more often, especially for 
marketing reasons. Data for both variables were obtained from Compustat. We compute 
R&D intensity at the industry level as the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales for four-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes (e.g., Huselid et al., 1997; Heeley et al., 2007). 
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Similarly, we compute advertising intensity as the ratio of advertising expenditures to sales 
for four-digit SIC codes (e.g., Boyd et al., 2010). 
 Role of product and process innovation: Regarding firm characteristics, we include 
two variables to address firms’ innovation activities. Specifically, we asked respondents to 
indicate the role of product and process innovations at their respective firms. Amara et al. 
(2008) indicate that product innovations involve a higher degree of knowledge codification 
and tangibility compared to process innovations. Therefore, formal protection mechanisms 
(e.g., trademarks) should be better suited to product innovations, whereas process innova-
tions should rely more on informal protection mechanisms (e.g., secrecy) (Amara et al., 
2008). Consistent with this rationale, Amara et al. (2008) empirically demonstrate that pro-
cess innovation is negatively related to trademarking. Product innovations are often linked 
to market-related goals, such as increasing market shares or entering new markets. In con-
trast, process innovations focus on decreasing costs or increasing efficiency, neither of 
which are susceptible to trademarking because they are not market-related and thus require 
neither protection nor distinction in the eyes of customers. As stated above, process innova-
tions are often protected by secrecy and other informal mechanisms. As a result of the dif-
ferences between product and process innovations, we expect that the protection and repu-
tation motives for trademarking are more prevalent at firms where product innovations play 
an important role. 
 Number of employees: We also include firm size as measured by the number of em-
ployees reported in CrunchBase in our analysis. Previous research has shown that the mo-
tives to file IPRs differ by firm size (e.g., Blind et al., 2006; De Rassenfosse, 2012; Veer and 
Jell, 2012). Unlike large firms, smaller firms face resource constraints and are often unable 
to realize economies of scale. Although we only consider SMEs, we expect to observe size 
differences in trademarking motives within our sample. For example, previous research on 
patenting has identified marketing and exchange motives as more important to small firms 
than they are to medium-sized firms (e.g., Blind et al., 2006; De Rassenfosse, 2012). We 
expect to find similar relationships for trademarking motives. 
 Firm age: Data on firm age are also obtained from CrunchBase. Firm age can be con-
sidered a proxy for the life cycle of a firm. For example, Block et al. (2014a) indicate that 
trademarks as quality signals to investors might become less valuable to older firms, which 
are typically further along in their life cycle. This is because other, more credible signals are 
available (e.g., product prototypes), suggesting that the exchange function of trademarks 
becomes less relevant with increasing firm age. Therefore, older firms should not file trade-
marks for exchange motives as often as young firms do. Also, older firms are likely to oper-
ate in more mature markets. In mature markets, product offerings tend to be similar with 
regard to their technical attributes. Because of this, other attributes, such as price, appear-
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ance, or the associated brand may play a more important role in consumers’ buying deci-
sions. Therefore, establishing product differentiation and reputation via trademarks should 
be more important for older firms. Consequently, older firms should more often file trade-
marks for marketing reasons than younger firms. Taken together, we expect protection and 
marketing motives to become more important with increasing firm age, while exchange mo-
tives become less important. 
 Importance of external knowledge acquisition: We also include the extent of firms’ 
external knowledge sharing in our analysis. Because SMEs typically experience resource 
constraints and have limited knowledge bases, they often rely on external knowledge acqui-
sition. Amara et al. (2008) demonstrate that knowledge sharing with external research or-
ganizations positively influences the probability that knowledge-intensive service firms file 
trademark applications. Thus, we expect firms attributing high levels of importance to ex-
ternal knowledge acquisition to file trademark applications for exchange reasons. To meas-
ure this aspect, we asked each respondent to indicate the importance of external knowledge 
acquisition on a 5-point Likert scale. 
 Firm received external capital funding: The acquisition of external capital, particu-
larly venture capital (VC), is critical to SMEs operating in innovative industries because 
such firms often face challenges obtaining financing (e.g., De Rassenfosse, 2012). Addition-
ally, previous research has observed that trademarks are important to the valuation of start-
ups by VC investors, although the positive, value-enhancing effects of trademarks decrease 
as start-ups progress into later phases of the venture cycle (Block et al., 2014a). Because 
exchange motives specifically reflect start-ups’ intentions to acquire such financing, we ex-
pect firms that received external capital to emphasize exchange motives. A binary variable 
created from CrunchBase data captures whether the firm received external capital from, for 
example, venture capital firms, incubators, accelerators, or angel groups. 
 Extent of technology licensing: Finally, we include a variable that measures the extent 
of technology licensing in our analysis. Respondents were asked to indicate the percentage 
of firm technologies that are licensed to other firms. SMEs often license their products and 
technologies to achieve growth (Alkhafaji, 1990). Trademarks can support SMEs in tech-
nology licensing activities. Because licensing is also captured by exchange motives, we ex-
pect firms with more licensing to value exchange motives to a higher degree compared to 
companies with less licensing. 
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6.3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 6.2 (a) provides descriptive statistics for firm trademarking motives. The results indi-
cate that the most important motive for filing trademarks is to protect product and service 
offerings from imitation (mean = 4.2). Other important motives include the support of firm 
marketing efforts (mean = 4.3) and image (mean = 4.0). The least important motive is the 
sale of the trademark in the future (mean = 2.7). We observe considerable variance in the 
reported importance of specific trademarking motives, which supports our premise that 
SMEs have various underlying intentions for filing trademarks. In general, all motives are 
considered important to a certain degree. Therefore, all items were included in the explora-
tory factor analysis. 
 Descriptive statistics for the industry and firm characteristics of the 600 firms in our 
sample are provided in Table 6.2 (b). Due to missing data in Compustat or CrunchBase, 
some variables contain fewer observations (industry R&D/advertising intensity, number of 
employees, and firm age). With regard to industry characteristics, 34.2% of firms indicate 
that they primarily operate in a service industry. The firms in our sample report that B2B 
markets (mean = 4.1) are more important than B2C markets (mean = 3.5). The average R&D 
intensity of the industries in which our firms operate is 6.1%, and the corresponding adver-
tising intensity is 2.9%. To further describe the industries in which the firms in our sample 
operate, we draw on industry data available from CrunchBase. Many firms in our sample 
operate in the software industry (21.0%), closely followed by the web industry (15.5%) and 
e-commerce (7.5%). The remaining firms are distributed across various other industries, in-
cluding biotech (4.0%) and advertising (4.9%). Overall, the industry distribution reflects the 
focus of CrunchBase on firms that are active in internet and technology sectors. 
 With regard to firm characteristics, Table 6.2 (b) indicates that product innovations 
(mean = 4.4) are very important to the firms in our sample and are more important than 
process innovations (mean = 3.7). On average, the firms in our sample employ 15.5 people. 
However, the distribution is skewed toward smaller firms (median = 6). The maximum firm 
size is 435, whereas some firms report having only 1 employee (i.e., they are most likely 
operated by the owner). Similarly, our sample includes relatively young firms, with ages that 
range from 0.6 years to 33.4 years, with a mean of 3.8 years. As expected, external 
knowledge acquisition is of high importance to the sampled firms (mean = 4.0); SMEs seem 
to overcome their resource constraints by the acquisition of external knowledge. Further-
more, 27.8% of the firms in our sample have previously received external funding. Finally, 
the firms indicated an average extent of technology licensing of approximately 25.0%.  
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6.4 Empirical analysis 
6.4.1 Motives for filing trademarks: results of an exploratory factor 
analysis 
We conduct an exploratory factor analysis to categorize and aggregate the items describing 
the motivation of firms to file trademark applications into underlying and distinct dimen-
sions of trademarking motives. 
 We conduct a principal component factor analysis with varimax rotation. The results 
indicate a three-factor solution according to the latent root criterion (i.e., three factors have 
eigenvalues greater than 1) (e.g., Ozer, 2007; Thomä and Bizer, 2013). To assign items to 
specific factors, we employ a threshold of 0.50 for the varimax-rotated factor loadings. Table 
3 depicts the rotated factor loadings and extracted variances. Each item loads unambiguously 
onto one of the three factors and is thus assigned to only one factor. In sum, the three factors 
account for 63.6% of the total variance. A main assumption of factor analysis is that the 
factor variables are correlated. To test this assumption, we calculate Bartlett’s test of sphe-
ricity (1,816.2, p < 0.01) and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure (KMO = 0.84). According to 
Kaiser and Rice (1974), the KMO measure leads to “meritorious” results. Furthermore, Bart-
lett’s test indicates that the variables used in the factor analysis are not independent. There-
fore, our dataset is appropriate for factor analysis (Dziuban and Shirkey, 1974). 
Table 6.3: Factor analysis of motives for filing trademarks. 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Interpretation Exchange motives 
Marketing 
motives 
Protection 
motives 
1.  Safeguarding revenues 0.31 0.17 0.64 
2.  TM reg. seen as only way to protect product/service 0.22 0.02 0.74 
3.  Preventing TM imitation -0.07 0.07 0.78 
4.  When other IPRs expire, products/services still protected 0.35 0.26 0.57 
5.  Supporting marketing activities of products/services -0.09 0.77 0.27 
6.  Strengthening the company image 0.32 0.79 0.01 
7.  Enhancing customer loyalty 0.35 0.77 0.02 
8.  Increasing negotiation power with potential investors 0.71 0.33 0.15 
9.  Increasing attractiveness to potential licensees 0.73 0.39 0.06 
10.  Ability to sell the TM in the future 0.80 0.02 0.17 
    
Variance explained 21.8% 21.6% 20.2% 
Cronbach’s α 0.71 0.74 0.75 
Notes: N = 617 firms. The number of observations reaches a maximum of 600 in the other analyses because 17 
observations were excluded as outliers in the cluster analysis. Principal component analysis, varimax-rotated factor 
loadings. Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin Measure: 0.84, Bartlett’s test of sphericity: 1,816.20, p < 0.01. 
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 Our empirical results unambiguously support the theoretically derived distinction 
among protection, marketing, and exchange motives. Factor 1 represents exchange motives 
and includes increasing negotiating power relative to potential investors to obtain capital, 
increasing attractiveness to potential licensees to gain higher royalty fees, and generating 
future cash flows by selling trademarks. Thus, this factor focuses on facilitating exchanges 
with external stakeholders, namely, potential investors, licensees, and trademark acquirers. 
Although the group of external stakeholders is heterogeneous, the common underlying ra-
tionale is that SMEs file trademark applications to engage in external exchange relationships 
to generate financial resources. 
 Factor 2 represents marketing motives and includes supporting marketing activities, 
strengthening the company image, and enhancing customer loyalty. These motives reflect 
companies’ goals to pursue a product differentiation strategy fortified by an emphasis on 
brand building. This factor focuses on trademarks as the foundation of strong brands that 
generate brand awareness and brand association and thereby enhance a company’s image, 
attract and retain valuable customers, and generate premium prices. 
 Factor 3 represents protection motives and includes safeguarding revenues, preventing 
trademark imitation, protecting firm offerings, and accounting for expiring IPR mechanisms 
(e.g., patents). This factor reflects the traditional protection function of trademarks. 
6.4.2 Identifying a typology of SMEs based on trademarking motives: 
results of a cluster analysis 
We build on the results of the factor analysis and conduct a cluster analysis to identify a 
typology of SMEs based on their trademarking motives. Cluster analysis is a powerful tool 
to investigate heterogeneity in trademarking motivations among SMEs. Whereas factor anal-
ysis allows us to combine several (sub)motives into three main motives (i.e., protection, 
marketing, and exchange), the cluster analysis helps us to identify groups of SMEs based on 
these trademarking motives and facilitates the comparison of the identified groups. The three 
factors identified by the exploratory factor analysis constitute the active cluster variables. 
The factor values for each SME were generated by weighting the items assigned to each 
factor by their respective factor loadings. Combining factor and cluster analysis has two 
important advantages. First and foremost, grouping the highly correlated questionnaire items 
into combined factors avoids an overrepresentation of individual items in the cluster analy-
sis. For example, we measure the protection motive using four items, whereas the other two 
motives are each measured with only three items. Thus, if each variable was weighted 
equally in the cluster analysis, the results would be driven by the protection motives (e.g., 
Hair et al., 2008; Thomä and Bizer, 2013). Second, weighting the individual variables de-
rived through the factor analysis is likely to lead to more robust results, in part because 
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cluster analysis is not robust to outliers but also because factor analysis reduces multicollin-
earity problems. This is important because the 10 items that we use to measure trademarking 
motives are by construction highly correlated with each other (e.g., Hair et al., 2008; Thomä 
and Bizer, 2013). 
 We employ a two-step clustering procedure. First, we determine the most appropriate 
number of clusters. Second, we assign the firms to specific clusters. We begin by identifying 
outliers using single-linkage clustering and eliminate 17 firms as outliers because they form 
clusters on their own (Punj and Stewart, 1983). Next, we determine an appropriate number 
of clusters using Ward’s (1963) algorithm. Because Ward’s algorithm is sensitive to scaling, 
we standardize the three trademarking factors used as active cluster variables by means of a 
z-transformation (Milligan and Hirtle, 2003). Various test statistics are used to determine an 
appropriate number of clusters: Duda and Hart’s (1973) Je(2)/Je(1) index suggests a four-
cluster solution, the pseudo-T-squared index suggests a three-cluster solution, and Caliński 
and Harabasz’s (1974) pseudo-F index suggests a four-cluster solution. Consistent with clus-
ter analysis methodology, we also examine the face validity of these cluster solutions by 
visually inspecting the respective dendrograms. We opt for a four-cluster solution because 
it is suggested by two of the three stopping rules and exhibits the highest face validity when 
displayed in a dendrogram. To test the stability of the results, we randomly selected 20 sub-
samples containing two-thirds of the sample and reapplied the procedure. A four-cluster so-
lution is supported by this test. 
 In the second step of the cluster analysis, we assign observations to clusters using a 
hybrid approach. We employ Ward’s algorithm to obtain a starting solution and then employ 
a k-means algorithm to optimize this solution (Arabie and Hubert, 1994; Punj and Stewart, 
1983). Next, we test for the distinctiveness of the cluster solution. Kruskal-Wallis tests 
demonstrate that the means of the three factor variables used as active cluster variables differ 
significantly across clusters (p < 0.01). Moreover, a multivariate analysis of variance yields 
additional evidence of cluster distinctiveness because it indicates that the means of the 
groups are not equal (p < 0.01). 
 When interpreting the cluster solution for content validation, we focus on the means of 
the active cluster variables (i.e., the three trademarking motives). The results of this com-
parison are presented in Table 6.4. 
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Table 6.4: Results of cluster analysis. 
 Clusters  
Factors Trademark skeptics 
Marketing-fo-
cused trade-
marking SMEs 
Marketing- plus 
protection-fo-
cused trade-
marking SMEs 
Trademark 
advocates 
χ2 (Kruskal-
Wallis test) 
Protection motives 3.02 2.59 3.85 4.31 371.58*** 
Marketing motives 2.13 3.81 3.81 4.65 333.87*** 
Exchange motives 1.65 2.56 3.03 4.44 380.01*** 
N 95 169 198 138  
Percentage of firms 15.83 28.17 33.00 23.00  
Description Firms that have a 
passive approach 
towards trade-
marks. 
Firms that use 
trademarks 
mainly for mar-
keting purposes. 
Firms that use 
trademarks for 
marketing and 
protection pur-
poses. 
Firms that apply 
a holistic view on 
trademark pur-
poses. 
 
Notes: N = 600 firms. Values in cells refer to cluster means. *** p < 0.01. 
 Cluster 1 (Trademark skeptics): Although the firms in the first cluster engage in 
trademark filing, they exhibit low mean values for each motive and appear to have no spe-
cific motive for trademark registration. We call this group of firms trademark skeptics. This 
cluster is the smallest cluster and includes 95 (15.8%) of the 600 firms in the sample. The 
low mean values for each motive combined with statements provided by firms belonging to 
this cluster indicate a passive approach to trademarking. 
 A passive approach to trademarking is further reflected in the qualitative statements 
provided in the survey. For example, several respondents state that they use trademarks only 
to “prevent someone from taking our domain name away.” Internet domains are usually 
transferred to the person holding the trademark. These comments were also made with re-
gard to Facebook and Twitter, both of which also tend to assign websites to trademark-hold-
ers and are viewed as important tools for firms in the internet and web industries. Other firms 
indicate that they register trademarks to avoid litigation and that they do not actively pursue 
other functions. Underlining this passive approach to trademarks, one respondent stated that 
“[trademarking] is a deterrent. Most start-ups cannot afford legal wrangling so they are un-
likely to put these things to use.” Another respondent stated: “We have a funder who specif-
ically requires us to register trademarks as they are trying to increase intellectual property 
ownership in our company.” Although firms in this cluster exhibit an overall indifference 
toward trademarking, their main motive for trademarking is protection, which is the purpose 
for which trademarks were initially introduced (i.e., as a means of formal IP protection). 
Another reason why these firms file trademark applications might be that they want to imi-
tate the behavior of other industry participants. This firm behavior resembles mimetic iso-
morphism motives rather than strategic motives (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), which indi-
cates that firms file trademark applications to imitate competitors. If a company fails to 
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imitate a competitor, it risks losing innovative potential and legitimacy (Semadeni and An-
derson, 2010). Therefore, firms might file trademarks not for strategic reasons but to imitate 
competitors, especially when leading companies in the industry use trademarks to a signifi-
cant extent (Flikkema et al., 2014). 
 Cluster 2 (Marketing-focused trademarking SMEs). Firms in this cluster exhibit 
high values for marketing motives (mean = 3.8) but low or medium values for exchange and 
protection motives relative to the other three clusters. We label this cluster the marketing-
focused trademarking SMEs because these firms view trademarks as the foundation of a 
differentiation strategy but neglect the other trademarking motives (i.e., protection and ex-
change). Firms in this cluster manifest the dominant view in marketing research that trade-
marks are proxies for firms’ brand-building efforts (e.g., Krasnikov et al., 2009; Fosfuri and 
Giarratana, 2009). 
 This orientation is also reflected in the qualitative statements provided by the firms in 
this cluster. For example, respondents state that they file trademark applications “in order to 
create a defensible brand, and leverage it in the marketplace to effectively market a service, 
draw customer affinity and loyalty”, for “clearly identifying a technology based product”, 
or to “minimize consumer confusion as to product identity.” These comments refer to the 
branding function of trademarks, which allows companies to create perceptions of distinc-
tiveness among their customers. 
 Cluster 3 (Marketing- plus protection-focused trademarking SMEs). The third 
cluster refers to the largest group of SMEs, which includes 198 firms (33.0%). This cluster 
exhibits high mean values for protection (mean = 3.9) and marketing motives (mean = 3.8). 
Thus, this cluster includes the marketing- plus protection-focused trademarking SMEs. 
 Although these SMEs demonstrate both protection and marketing motives, they do not 
indicate intentions to leverage their respective trademarks in exchange relationships. In their 
qualitative comments, firms in this cluster highlight the protection function of trademarks 
(e.g., “why NOT protect your brand?”) and emphasize marketing motives (e.g., “branding”, 
“make us look like a bigger company”). Furthermore, most firms in this cluster refer explic-
itly to brands when asked about trademarks because a firm’s reputation is established 
through its brands and not directly via trademarks. The significant interconnection between 
protection and marketing motives is also reflected in prior innovation research on trade-
marks, which frequently describes brand protection as the main function of trademarks (e.g., 
Krasnikov et al., 2009; Fosfuri and Giarratana, 2009; Sandner and Block, 2011; Block et al., 
2014b). In addition, the different trademarking motives may have reinforcing effects on each 
other. Although the value of exchange motives is significantly lower than the values of the 
other two motives for this cluster, it is the second highest value for exchange motives among 
all clusters. 
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 Cluster 4 (Trademark advocates). The fourth cluster includes 138 of the 600 firms 
in the sample (23.0%) and exhibits high mean values for each trademarking motive (all three 
means > 4.3). Among all clusters, each trademarking motive reaches its maximum mean 
value in this cluster. We label this cluster trademark advocates because firms in this cluster 
seem to register trademarks to pursue a holistic set of motives: to support a differentiation 
strategy based on brands, to signal firm attractiveness to external stakeholders (i.e., exchange 
motives) and to protect their IP. The high mean values across all trademarking motives sug-
gest that firms in this cluster have an overall positive opinion of trademarks and recognize 
their numerous potential benefits. 
 The overall high importance of trademarks to these firms is also reflected in their qual-
itative responses. One respondent indicated that “our brand is the key asset that the business 
owns”, and another stated that brands are the company’s “road to success.” Because trade-
marks and brands are closely intertwined, both statements highlight that these companies 
view the overall effects of trademarks as positive. Rather than emphasizing particular aspects 
of trademarks as most important, the respondents indicate that the interplay of these motives 
is crucial. Furthermore, this cluster is the only cluster that exhibits a high mean for exchange 
motives. This indicates that SMEs striving to acquire external capital from investors, licen-
sees, or trademarks sales tend to view trademarking holistically. Furthermore, our results 
suggest that SMEs do not file trademark applications solely to acquire financial resources; 
rather, the acquisition of financial resources appears to be a positive side effect for firms that 
file trademark applications in pursuit of other motives. Because of their overall positive at-
titude, these different motives are likely to reinforce each other, which explains the very high 
value of each motive. 
 Interestingly, the SMEs in these four clusters exhibit a hierarchical structure of motives 
for trademarking. Whereas trademark skeptics have low mean values for all three motives, 
marketing-focused trademarking SMEs focus on only one motive, namely, marketing. Mar-
keting- plus protection-focused trademarking SMEs focus on protection as well as market-
ing. This mechanism of consistently enriching motives results in trademark advocates, which 
are motivated by all three factors – i.e., they are also motivated by exchange. This pattern 
suggests that SMEs that file trademark applications for specific reasons always consider 
marketing motives and that certain SMEs do not focus on exchange or protection motives 
alone. Thus, the marketing motive is a cornerstone of each SME trademarking strategy, 
whereas exchange and protection are enriching and complementary motives. 
6.4.3 Profiling and describing the typology: a comparison of the four 
clusters based on industry- and firm-level characteristics 
In this section, we further explore the specific characteristics of the four clusters by profiling 
differences in industry- and firm-level variables (i.e., passive cluster variables), as described 
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in Section 6.2. This profiling provides valuable information on how different characteristics 
at the firm, market, and industry levels relate to trademarking motives and on how the trade-
marking motives are (potentially) determined and shaped by those characteristics. Table 5 
provides the means and proportions of these variables for each cluster. First, we empirically 
test whether SMEs significantly differ with respect to these profiling variables by assessing 
differences in within-cluster values as well as across clusters and interpreting these results 
at the variable level (Thomä and Bizer, 2013). Second, we interpret these findings at the 
cluster level to further describe and differentiate the individual clusters. Notice however, 
that this approach and the developed taxonomy are of descriptive nature. Hence, even though 
we assume a logical pathway from industry and firm level characteristics to the trademarking 
motives, strictly speaking, we are not able to uncover such causalities. 
 Within-cluster results: For metric and quasi-metric variables, such as firm age, we con-
duct an analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test for differences among within-cluster means 
(Table 6.5 (a)). A significant test statistic indicates that the within-cluster mean of the con-
tinuous variable differs from cluster to cluster, which supports the assumption that this var-
iable is related to a specific trademarking motive. Variables that differ significantly therefore 
enable us to profile the clusters and to confine them more clearly. If a variable differs sig-
nificantly among clusters, we compare each cluster mean to the overall sample mean to in-
terpret whether the firms in a cluster exhibit above-average mean values (e.g., they are older 
than the other firms in the sample) or below-average mean values (e.g., they are younger 
than the other firms in the sample). 
 Across-cluster results: For binary variables, such as whether a firm has received exter-
nal financing or operates in a service industry, we test whether the distribution across the 
four clusters differs significantly from its distribution in the total sample (using a χ2 good-
ness-of-fit test) (Table 6.5 (b)). If this is the case, we suggest that the dummy variable is 
related to a specific trademarking motive. We compare the observed proportion of firms to 
the expected proportion based on the cluster size. Higher-than-expected proportions indicate 
that we observe more firms with a particular characteristic in this cluster than expected based 
on the size of the cluster and vice versa. The across-cluster values are especially helpful 
when profiling the clusters in a holistic way. 
 Industry characteristics: As Table 6.5 (b) indicates, the four clusters are not equally 
represented in service industries (p < 0.01). For example, firms that are active in service 
industries are overrepresented in the trademark advocates cluster and underrepresented in 
the marketing-focused trademarking SMEs cluster. Additionally, the results indicate signif-
icant differences between the various clusters with respect to the within-cluster means of the 
importance of B2C markets (p < 0.01). Table 6.5 (a) shows that firms that are more inten-
sively inclined toward B2C markets are more often assigned to the trademark advocates 
cluster (mean = 4.0), whereas firms that are comparatively less inclined toward B2C markets 
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are overrepresented among marketing-focused trademarking SMEs (mean = 3.1). Finally, 
the clusters differ significantly by industry R&D intensity (p < 0.01). Firms that are active 
in more R&D-intensive industries are overrepresented in the marketing-focused trademark-
ing SMEs cluster, whereas firms active in less R&D-intensive markets are found more fre-
quently in the trademark advocates cluster. 
 Firm characteristics: We observe significant differences in the role and importance 
of process innovations between clusters (p < 0.01). Firms that place more emphasis on pro-
cess innovations are more often assigned to the trademark advocates and marketing-focused 
SMEs clusters and less often present in the trademark skeptics cluster. This indicates that 
firms which attribute a high importance to process innovations more often register trade-
marks as a result of all three motives (trademark advocates cluster), whereas firms that rate 
process innovations as less important do not find any trademarking motive important (trade-
mark skeptics cluster). We also observe differences in the importance of the acquisition of 
external knowledge across clusters (p < 0.01). Firms that assign high importance to external 
knowledge sources are overrepresented in the trademark advocates cluster relative to the 
other three clusters. Similarly, the share of companies that received external funding is not 
evenly distributed across the clusters (p < 0.01); rather, firms that received external funding 
are underrepresented in the trademark advocates cluster and overrepresented in the cluster 
of trademark skeptics and marketing-focused trademarking SMEs. The across-cluster results 
indicate that firms which received external capital funding are most often assigned to the 
marketing-focused trademarking SMEs cluster (34.9% as opposed to the expected 28.2%), 
while only 16.9% of the firms that are assigned to the trademark advocates cluster received 
external capital (expected proportion: 23.0%). Finally, significant differences emerge in the 
extent of technology licensing (p < 0.01). Similar to the results relating to the acquisition of 
external knowledge, firms licensing their technology to external licensees to commercialize 
their knowledge are more frequently assigned to the trademark advocates cluster, whereas 
firms that are less engaged in licensing are overrepresented in the trademark skeptics cluster 
and thus exhibit a rather passive approach to trademarking. 
 The within-cluster means for the importance of B2B markets, industry advertising in-
tensity, the role of product innovations, number of employees, and firm age do not differ 
significantly between the clusters, which means that these variables should be treated care-
fully when describing differences across clusters. After reporting the differences at the var-
iable level, we subsequently profile each cluster.  
 Cluster 1 (Trademark skeptics): We observe that firms in the trademark skeptics 
cluster attach less importance to both product and process innovations compared with firms 
in the other three clusters. In addition, we find that trademark skeptics are characterized by 
a comparatively stronger inward orientation, reflected by the significantly lower values at-
tributed to the acquisition of external knowledge and technology licensing. Overall, a greater 
130 |  6. WHY DO SMES FILE TRADEMARKS? 
 
openness to external parties can positively influence a firm’s innovativeness (e.g., Laursen 
and Salter, 2006; Cheng and Huizingh, 2014). Although there is no coherent evidence on 
whether the benefits derived from openness to external parties differ between service and 
manufacturing firms (Huizingh, 2011), Arbussà and Coenders (2007) show that manufac-
turing firms often conduct internal R&D, whereas service firms often acquire external 
knowledge to improve their innovativeness. This suggests that the overrepresentation of ser-
vice firms in the trademarks skeptics cluster should be associated with higher importance 
attached to external knowledge acquisition and technology licensing. However, we find that 
the opposite is true. Innovation seems to play a different (and maybe lower) role for firms in 
the trademark skeptics cluster, thus partially explaining their skepticism toward trademarks. 
Such firms might not value or appreciate trademarks as much as firms in the other three 
clusters do because they have relatively less knowledge or marketing assets that could be 
protected or leveraged in exchange relationships through trademarks. For example, the sales 
of trademark skeptics could be based primarily on low prices, thus requiring less marketing 
and less trademark protection. Additionally, the exchange motive for filing trademarks plays 
a smaller role for trademark skeptics because they have little engagement with external par-
ties. The fact that firms in this cluster file trademark applications despite their skepticism 
toward trademarks could be explained by imitation of industry norms. Another explanation 
for why these firms still file trademarks could be the involvement of external investors in 
the formulation of their IP strategies, thus pressuring firms to file trademarks. Investors have 
been shown to value trademarks as quality signals and as signals of market orientation, spe-
cifically in firms in early stages of their venture cycle (Block et al., 2014). The results in 
Table 5 indicate that firms that received external capital are overrepresented among the 
group of trademark skeptics. Also, the fact that firms in the trademark skeptics cluster are 
the smallest and youngest firms in the sample (although this difference is not statistically 
significant) supports this argument. 
 Cluster 2 (Marketing-focused trademarking SMEs): Firms in this cluster file trade-
marks exclusively for marketing reasons. Our results show that manufacturing firms are 
overrepresented among this cluster of marketing-focused trademarking SMEs. Trademarks 
can be particularly important for firms in manufacturing industries (e.g., Arundel et al., 2007; 
WIPO, 2016a), mainly because manufacturing firms often produce tangible products, which 
are more suitable for formal IP protection than intangible products are. However, manufac-
turing firms are more often able to use patents and trademarks in combination. In such cases, 
it can be argued that the protection function is fulfilled largely by patents, explaining why 
firms in this cluster do not value the protection function of trademarks. The results further 
indicate that firms in this cluster tend to be older and larger than firms in the other three 
clusters. As mentioned earlier, firms in more mature markets more often face the need to 
distinguish themselves from their competitors via brands, which might explain why these 
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firms particularly file trademarks for marketing reasons. Adding to this, marketing-focused 
trademarking SMEs report that B2C markets are less important. This result is consistent with 
recent research on B2B branding that highlights the important function of brands for reduc-
ing the purchasing risk of industrial buyers (Homburg et al., 2010). The need for protection 
to avoid free riding by other firms is lower in B2B than in B2C markets because B2B rela-
tionships are often highly intertwined, more relational, less transactional, and less anony-
mous than firm-consumer relationships (Cannon and Perreault, 1999). For instance, indus-
trial customers often are very familiar with their suppliers and thus would recognize free 
riding by a third firm easily. Additionally, B2B buyers are often well-informed customers, 
which makes imitation by a third party difficult (Edwards et al., 2007). These arguments are 
particularly true for SMEs active in innovative and technology-intense B2B markets, which 
often have only few customers (Yli-Renko and Janakiraman, 2008) and thus build strong 
linkages with their industrial customers. 
 Firms that received external capital are also overrepresented in this cluster. This could 
be because many of the firms in this cluster are manufacturing firms. Relative to service 
firms, manufacturing firms require significantly higher levels of financial investment, for 
example, in facilities, equipment and/or inventory (Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Brouthers and 
Brouthers, 2003). Also, firms in the marketing-focused trademarking SMEs cluster are 
found to be active in R&D intensive industries, where firms must undertake large invest-
ments in R&D, which again underscores the high need for external capital by firms in this 
cluster. While these firms may have used external capital to establish their firms, they do not 
rely on trademarks to attract such funding. These firms seem to use other signals for this 
purpose, for example patents or prototypes, as indicated by their overrepresentation in man-
ufacturing industries. 
 Cluster 3 (Marketing- plus protection-focused trademarking SMEs): This cluster 
resembles the cluster of marketing-focused trademarking SMEs in many passive cluster var-
iables. Still, some differences can be observed. Firms in this third cluster are smaller and 
younger (although not statistically significant), more often operate in service industries, and 
are active in less R&D intensive industries. This, as well as the additional emphasis on pro-
tection motives in addition to marketing motives, suggests that these firms could be de-
scribed as service innovators. As outlined earlier, trademarks are important in the context of 
service innovation (Gotsch and Hipp, 2012). Particularly for service innovators, trademarks 
may function as the most important formal IP protection mechanism, thus explaining the 
higher value of protection motives when compared with the second cluster. As indicated 
earlier, the marketing function of trademarks enables service firms to overcome the infor-
mation asymmetries associated with intangible services, hence explaining the high im-
portance of marketing motives in this cluster. 
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 A further difference is that the firms in this cluster place a relatively stronger emphasis 
on licensing their technology. This tendency can help to explain their strong emphasis on 
both protection and marketing motives. Licensing technology and sharing knowledge about 
technology and products requires protection. The risk of imitation and other adverse effects 
increases if the licensed assets are not sufficiently protected. Trademarks can help to protect 
relationships with customers and thus reduce the risk of free riding by (former) licensees. 
Employing trademarks enables SMEs to benefit from licensing while simultaneously pro-
tecting their underlying knowledge and marketing assets. This argument holds true espe-
cially for resource-scarce SMEs that cannot afford to implement other protection mecha-
nisms, such as expensive legal contracts or patent infringement lawsuits. 
 Cluster 4 (Trademark advocates): Our cluster comparison indicates that service 
firms are overrepresented in the cluster of trademark advocates. This underscores the poten-
tially high value of trademarks in innovative service settings and industries, in which trade-
marks are critical to differentiation and protection strategies. Acknowledging this important 
role, SMEs in the trademark advocates cluster emphasize marketing and protection motives 
for filing trademarks. The characteristics of the other passive cluster variables reflect to some 
degree the strong service orientation of firms in this cluster. For instance, the cluster com-
parison indicates that SMEs in the trademark advocates cluster consider external cooperation 
to be important (Tether, 2005; Leiponen, 2005). We observe that SMEs in the trademark 
advocates cluster rate the acquisition of external knowledge as very important and rely on 
technology licensing. This is in line with the findings of, for example, Arbussà and Coenders 
(2007), who show that service firms tend to acquire knowledge from external sources more 
often than manufacturing firms do; manufacturing firms often rely on internal R&D. Rela-
tionships with external partners underscore the need to enhance firms’ negotiating positions 
in exchange relationships. Hence, SMEs in the trademark advocates cluster emphasize ex-
change motives, in addition to marketing and protection motives, for filing trademark appli-
cations. It is surprising, however, that these firms did not receive external capital funding 
even though they file trademarks for exchange motives. This indicates that these firms use 
trademarks primarily as signals in the context of licensing, selling, or negotiations, which 
are also regarded as exchange motives. These firms do not rely as much on external capital 
funding because they are less capital-intensive, as indicated by their underrepresentation in 
manufacturing industries. In summary, trademark advocates can be described as innovation-
oriented SMEs that are active in knowledge-intensive (service) industries. They pursue an 
outward-focused firm strategy and engage in exchange relationships with external partners 
to create and capture the value of their innovations. 
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6.5 Discussion and conclusion 
6.5.1 Summary of main findings and implications for theory and prac-
tice 
Our study derives three motives for filing trademarks from a sample of 600 SMEs using 
factor analysis. Next, we conduct a cluster analysis to identify four clusters of SMEs with 
regard to trademarking motives. Finally, we compare these four clusters using industry-, 
market- and firm-level variables. The implications for theory and practice are outlined be-
low. 
 First, we empirically identify three trademarking motives, namely, protection, market-
ing, and exchange motives. Thus, we extend patent-focused research on firm motives for 
filing IPRs to trademarking (e.g., Cohen, 2000; Blind, 2006). Our findings indicate that SME 
decisions to file trademark applications depend on multiple factors rather than on a single 
factor. Previous research has mainly relied on theoretical considerations and tended to high-
light only one main motivating factor of filing trademark applications. Our findings suggest 
that this approach is too simplistic because these motives are integrated in a hierarchical 
structure in our sample of trademarking SMEs. 
 Stimulating usage of IP protection plays an important role in SME innovation policy 
(Thomä and Bizer, 2013). Our findings can help policy makers understand the motivations 
of SMEs to file trademark applications. Policy makers will be better able to develop policies 
that help SMEs strengthen their usage of IP protection and IP strategy. Often, policies ad-
dressing SME trademarking focus on simplifying registration or reducing costs. For exam-
ple, the USPTO stated in a May 2014 press release that it aims to provide trademark protec-
tion in the most cost-efficient way possible, especially to “lessen the burden for 
entrepreneurs to obtain the crucial trademark protection they need to grow their businesses” 
(USPTO, 2014). Our findings suggest that policies of this kind might not be well suited to 
all SMEs. Consider, for example, a firm that files trademarks to signal to investors that it 
cares about marketing and produces valuable products or services. This quality-signaling 
function of trademarks is undermined if trademarks are increasingly cheap and easy to ob-
tain. 
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 Second, we perform a cluster analysis to explore the combinations and relationships 
among trademarking motives in this sample of SMEs. By providing a typology of firms 
according to their trademarking motives, we extend existing trademark research with a focus 
on SMEs (e.g., Helmers and Rogers, 2010; Amara et al., 2008; Block et al., 2014a). We 
distinguish among trademark advocates, marketing-focused trademarking SMEs, market-
ing- plus protection-focused trademarking SMEs, and trademark skeptics. We observe a hi-
erarchical structure across the four clusters with regard to trademarking motives. For exam-
ple, trademark advocates value all motives highly, while marketing-focused trademarking 
SMEs prioritize marketing motives and do not file trademark applications for exchange or 
protection. The results of our cluster analysis thus provide a holistic view of the combina-
tions of motives that trigger SME trademarking. Heterogeneity in trademarking motives is 
evident even though we analyze firms facing similar environmental conditions, i.e., firms in 
a limited set of industries, in one country, of a certain size.  
 Knowledge of these trademarking clusters can improve the understanding of policy 
makers how trademark motives interact, allowing trademarking policies to be better aligned 
with cluster-specific needs. For example, improving the protection offered by a trademark 
will not lead marketing-focused trademarking SMEs to file more or broader trademarks. 
Additionally, some trademarking SMEs have negative opinions or passive approaches to-
wards trademarking. These SMEs are an interesting target group for policy makers because 
they engage in trademark filings but may not understand or fully utilize their trademarks. 
SME IP policy could address this shortcoming and provide instruction on employing trade-
marks to protect marketing assets and appropriate innovation rents. 
 The cluster analysis indicates that exchange motives are not a singular and overly im-
portant motive for SME trademark applications. This motive is only important for trademark 
advocates who also file applications for marketing and protection reasons. This finding con-
flicts with research on patents, in which exchange is an important motivator of patent appli-
cations (De Rassenfosse, 2012; Veer and Jell, 2012). However, often exchange motives are 
also not an autonomous motive to file patent applications. While SMEs may not consider 
their trademarks as quality signals to potential investors, research indicates that investors 
actually do pay attention to trademarks, especially during the early phases of the firm life 
cycle (Block et al, 2014a). Thus, SMEs may emphasize on their trademarks when negotiat-
ing with external investors. 
 Third, we use industry- and firm-level variables to profile each cluster. We extend 
trademark research by providing an initial assessment of how these variables differ among 
clusters and how they relate to trademarking motives. For example, we note considerable 
differences with regard to whether firms operate in service industries or rely on innovation, 
external knowledge, or financial capital. Although we are not able to analyze the causal 
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effects of these profiling variables on trademarking motives, our results indicate considera-
ble heterogeneity among the identified clusters. For example, trademark advocates tend to 
be SMEs active in knowledge intensive service industries, while marketing-focused trade-
marking occurs more often in R&D-intensive manufacturing industries with B2B customer 
relationships. These findings will inform future research about which trademarking motives 
matter by industry or firm context. Policy makers can use these cluster-specific industry and 
firm characteristics to develop industry-level IP policies. 
6.5.2 Limitations and future research 
The limitations of this study suggest fruitful avenues for future research. Our study employs 
survey data, which can lead to a common method bias. To mitigate this bias, we draw upon 
secondary data from Compustat and CrunchBase. Supplementing survey data regarding 
trademarking motives with secondary data is a promising area for further research. For ex-
ample, future research could combine survey data on trademarking motives with perfor-
mance data (e.g., sales growth, profitability, or innovation output) to enable an investigation 
of important performance-related questions, such as the link between trademarking motives 
and firm performance and how internal and external contingencies moderate this relation-
ship. In addition to performance variables, we were unable to include firm-level R&D ex-
penditures or innovation strategies. 
 We explore the role of trademarks independent of alternative IP protection mecha-
nisms, such as patents and secrecy, which often either complement or displace trademarking 
(e.g., Amara et al., 2008; Thomä and Bizer, 2013). Although trademarks are a viable IP 
protection mechanism for SMEs, previous research has demonstrated that informal protec-
tion mechanisms, especially lead time advantages and secrecy, are more important to SMEs 
than formal protection mechanisms are (Thomä and Bizer, 2013). Thus, future research 
could investigate the interplay among different IP protection mechanisms, trademarking mo-
tives, and types of trademarks. For example, trademark advocates might be affected by pos-
itive experiences with other formal protection methods, such as patents. Firms in this cluster 
might have an overall positive opinion toward formal IP protection mechanisms that is not 
determined by trademarking alone; that is, they are formal IP advocates rather than simply 
trademark advocates. Similarly, Thomä and Bizer (2013) note that trademarks can be effec-
tively combined with patents to establish technology brands that help firms to protect and 
leverage their technological assets. An analogous argument exists for trademark skeptics. 
Firms in this cluster might not be skeptical about trademarks in particular but skeptical with 
regard to formal IP protection mechanisms in general. 
 Future research could validate or modify the identified set of motives for large, estab-
lished firms. Both large and small firms are important parts of a national economy and in-
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novation system. Prior research on patenting motives has demonstrated differences in mo-
tives between small and large firms. Reputation and exchange motives have been found to 
be relatively more important to small firms than to large firms (e.g., Blind et al., 2006; De 
Rassenfosse, 2012; Veer and Jell, 2012); we expect a similar pattern to hold for trademarking 
motives. Following De Rassenfosse (2012), we expect exchange motives for trademarking 
to be more important for small firms than for large firms. In contrast to large firms, small 
firms face resource constraints and can use trademarks to attract outside (financial) re-
sources. In addition to validating the identified motives in other samples, future research 
could further validate our cluster distinction and profiling. For example, our results indicate 
that innovation plays a different role for trademark skeptics who – despite being active in 
innovative industries – do not use trademarks for any of the reasons that we identified. Future 
research could try to gain a better understanding of the differences between the identified 
clusters. Also, our approach used to distinguish the identified clusters is descriptive. As this 
study is of an exploratory nature, we are not able to validate causalities, which limits the 
implications of our study. Future research could build upon this and try to validate our find-
ings using methods that allow for greater causal inferences. 
 Finally, we observe a hierarchical structure in trademarking motives. Future research 
could try to identify whether there is a connection between this particular structure of trade-
marking motives and the development of a firm along its life cycle. For example, protection 
motives might become more relevant for firms with developed products and a larger, more 
diversified product portfolio. For protection motives to be highly relevant, firms must first 
establish products or services that are worth protecting. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
This final chapter (Chapter 7) provides a conclusion to the thesis. In Section 7.1, the main 
results of the previous chapters are outlined with regard to the research questions presented 
in Chapter 1, section 1.2. Section 7.2 discusses the main findings of this thesis. Implications 
for both theory and practice are outlined in Section 7.3. This thesis concludes with a brief 
description of limitations and an outline for future research. 
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7.1 Findings per chapter 
This section provides a brief overview of the main findings of this thesis. The research ques-
tions addressed in the individual chapters are again displayed in Figure 7.1. 
Table 7.1: Research questions addressed in this thesis. 
# Research question Answered in 
RQ 2.1 How do universities worldwide compare with regard to their patenting output? Chapter 2 
RQ 2.2 How do university characteristics (e.g., location, size, publication record) affect a university’s patent output? Chapter 2 
RQ 3.1 How did Chinese university patenting develop in terms of patent quantity and qual-ity over the past 20 years? Chapter 3 
RQ 3.2 What are the effects of two types of governmental subsidy programs on Chinese uni-versities’ patent quantity and quality? Chapter 3 
RQ 4 How does the value of Chinese patents compare to the value of international pa-tents? Chapter 4 
RQ 5.1 To what extent can Chinese firms increase their patent output following an acquisi-tion? Chapter 5 
RQ 5.2 Which acquisition-specific factors influence the post-acquisition patent output? Chapter 5 
RQ 6 Why do SMEs file trademarks? Chapter 6 
7.1.1 University patenting: A comparison of 300 leading universities 
worldwide (Chapter 2) 
Chapter 2 examines whether and how university characteristics affect a university’s patent 
output using a sample of 316,393 patents filed between 2001 and 2011 by 300 leading uni-
versities worldwide. With regard to RQ 2.1, Chapter 2 provides a comparative overview of 
the universities’ patent applications: While the ranking shows a huge predominance of US 
universities when investigating PCT applications (which provide a greater international 
comparability), Chinese universities take the top spots when only considering the total num-
ber of patent applications. 
 With regard to RQ 2.2 the results reveal that patent applications by US and Asian (es-
pecially Chinese) universities increased strongly, while European universities lagged be-
hind. Additionally, universities across all regions applied for significantly more patents in 
their home country, indicating a “home advantage effect”. Regarding other university spe-
cific characteristics, the results show that university’s with a technological focus in the areas 
of chemistry, electrical engineering, and mechanical engineering file more patent applica-
tions. However, the size of a university (measured by number of R&D staff) as well as the 
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quality of its scientific publications do not significantly influence the number of patent ap-
plications. 
7.1.2 Chinese university patents: Quantity, quality, and the role of sub-
sidy programs (Chapter 3) 
As shown in Chapter 2, university patenting in China has gained tremendous momentum. In 
order to increase university patenting, the Chinese government has issued various initiatives 
in recent years. Chapter 3 focuses on two particular types of subsidy programs: First, China 
introduced cost-reimbursement subsidy programs at the regional level, which enables patent 
applicants to receive a (partial) reimbursement of the costs of the patent application. Second, 
the Chinese government introduced a large subsidy program to promote research excellence 
at selected leading Chinese universities and establish world-class universities (“Project 
985”).  
 Chapter 3 uses a panel dataset of 155 leading universities from 1991 to 2009 that in-
cludes 121,184 patent families and is extended by regional data on Chinese provinces. With 
regard to RQ 3.1, the results of Chapter 3 reveal a strong increase in patent applications 
(patent quantity). However, when investigating the accompanying development of patent 
quality, the results indicate that the development of patent quality lags behind the increase 
in patent quantity. With regard to RQ 3.2, the results show that both subsidy programs con-
tributed significantly to this increase in patent quantity. Furthermore, the research excellence 
subsidy increases patent quality, while the cost reimbursement subsidy does not affect patent 
quality. 
7.1.3 The value of Chinese patents: An empirical investigation of cita-
tion lags (Chapter 4) 
Using a dataset of 60,000 patent families, Chapter 4 deals with the economic value of Chi-
nese patents in a more detailed way. Chapter 4 analyzes the hazard ratio of a patent receiving 
forward citations using survival time analysis. Addressing RQ 4, the results show that the 
citation lag is largest for Chinese patents, especially when compared to US and European 
patents, indicating an overall lower patent value. This is particularly true for patents filed 
domestically (i.e., Chinese applicants that file a patent in China). 
 However, by analyzing further patent characteristics, the findings show that the longer 
citation lag is considerably shortened by a higher number of patent references. This is par-
ticularly true for Chinese patents, where the moderation effect is the most pronounced. More 
patent claims also shorten the citation lag. Again, the highest positive moderation is achieved 
with patents by Chinese applicants. Finally, the results also show that patents applied for 
more recently have a higher patent value, indicating a recent and positive development in 
China. 
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7.1.4 The impact of acquisitions on Chinese acquirers’ patent output 
(Chapter 5) 
To assess whether Chinese firms profit from acquisitions in terms of their innovation per-
formance and the acquisition-specific factors that influence the outcome, Chapter 5 uses a 
sample that contains publicly listed Chinese firms in the manufacturing sector. The sample 
combines financial data, patent data, and data on acquisitions from the period 2000 until 
2013. Drawing on an absorptive capacity framework, the results show that, overall, acquisi-
tions do not have a statistically significant effect on the acquirers’ patent output (RQ 5.1). 
 Investigating deal-specific factors (RQ 5.2), the results show that a higher absolute size 
of the acquired knowledge base has a positive effect that decreases at higher levels. The 
results show a similar effect with regard to the technological relatedness of the acquirer 
knowledge base. A larger relative size of the acquired knowledge base decreases the post-
acquisition patent output. Additionally, the results show that cross-border deals positively 
influence the post-acquisition outcome, while state-owned enterprises are not able to benefit 
from acquisition in a way that private enterprises do, for example, because they are more 
inflexible and not as prone to learning. 
7.1.5 Why do SMEs file trademarks? Insights from firms in innovative 
industries (Chapter 6) 
While the previous chapters deal with patenting in China, Chapter 6 explores the question 
of why SMEs file trademarks (RQ 6). To provide a systematic investigation of SMEs’ trade-
marking motives, an empirical analysis, comprising three steps, using data from 600 SMEs 
in innovative industries was conducted. 
 First, Chapter 6 draws on the extensive literature on patenting motives (e.g., Cohen et 
al., 2000; Blind et al., 2006) and develops a set of potential trademarking motives. Three 
trademarking motives are identified and empirically validated using factor analysis: protec-
tion, marketing, and exchange. Second, these trademarking motives are used as active cluster 
variables in a cluster analysis to explore the empirical variation in the sample firms. The 
cluster analysis reveals four different clusters that follow a hierarchical structure with regard 
to the trademarking motives: Trademark skeptics file trademarks without a specific motive, 
marketing-focused trademarking SMEs primarily file trademarks for marketing motives, 
while marketing- plus protection-focused trademarking SMEs pursue marketing and protec-
tion motives. Finally, trademark advocates find all three motives important. Third, the iden-
tified clusters are compared with regard to passive cluster variables in order to provide a 
more detailed and nuanced description of the companies within these clusters (e.g., with 
regard to market, industry, and firm characteristics). 
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7.2 Discussion of the main findings of the thesis 
The first research topic addressed in this thesis refers to the antecedents of patenting in China 
as well as the value of the patents. This thesis finds that an increase in patenting in China is 
partly due to increases in university patenting, which in turn is fostered by two subsidy pro-
grams. Also, the results show that Chinese companies profit from acquisitions by increasing 
their innovation performance under certain conditions, thereby contributing to the overall 
increase in patenting. For example, Chinese firms successfully draw on the often more de-
veloped knowledge in foreign countries and use cross-border acquisitions to catch-up to de-
veloped countries in terms of innovation (Anderson et al., 2015; Morck et al., 2008). While 
the increase in patent applications in China is remarkable, several findings in this thesis also 
indicate that patent quality and patent value did not rise to a similar degree. 
 As outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, university patenting is an important source of technol-
ogy transfer that can positively influence a nation’s innovative capacity (Etzkowitz and 
Leydesdorff, 2000; Mowery and Sampat, 2005b). Chapter 2 finds that this is particularly 
true for China when compared to other countries. While this quantitative increase in patent-
ing is fostered by several governmental initiatives (i.e., cost-reimbursement subsidy pro-
grams and research excellence subsidy), these initiatives partially fail to increase patent qual-
ity (Chapter 3). However, the development of patent applications of high-quality is 
important to realize a meaningful and sustainable increase in a nation’s innovative capacity, 
and to ultimately become a leading innovative nation, which is one of China’s main goals 
(Hu and Mathews, 2008; Liang, 2012). 
 This finding is directly related to the findings of Chapter 4, which show that the value 
of patents filed by Chinese applicants is, overall, lower than that of patents from the US, 
Europe, Japan, or Korea. The rather quantitative orientation of China in terms of patents is 
reflected in several ways. For example, Huang and Wu (2012) describe a general interest in 
China in receiving a patent, not necessarily its quality or usage. Providing another quantita-
tive incentive, the cost-reimbursement subsidy assessed in Chapter 3 subsidizes patent ap-
plications and disregards whether the patent is eventually granted or upheld (Li, 2012). Ad-
ditionally, Shapira and Wang (2009) describe that researchers at universities have clear 
incentives to engage in patenting: Similar to peer-reviewed scientific publications, patent 
applications can be relevant for their scholarly careers, for example, as part of the criteria 
for a tenure track position. This intention of China to produce measurable outcomes in terms 
of innovation is also reflected at the national level: As part of the “National Patent Develop-
ment Strategy”, China states that its primary interest in terms of patents is to increase patent 
applications multiple times by 2020. An increase in patent quality is only mentioned 
vaguely. Taken together, these findings indicate that even though China is trying to become 
a leading innovative nation, it has not yet reached its goal. 
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 Even though China has a strong interest in producing measurable outputs, this thesis 
also finds some evidence that patent quality and patent value in China are increasing, albeit 
more slowly than patent quantity. First, Chapter 3 shows that the research excellence subsidy 
(“Project 985”), which was issued by the government in 1998 and aims to strengthen the 
overall research performance of selected leading universities, led to significant increases in 
both patent quantity and patent quality. In contrast to the cost reimbursement subsidies, this 
indicates that general investments in universities seem to be useful in fostering innovation 
more comprehensively. Second, Chapter 4 shows that the value of Chinese patents is in-
creasing in recent years. While the value is still lower overall, this suggests that there is some 
dynamic underway in China that indicates China is also catching-up in terms of the value of 
its patents. This is a necessary condition for China to meet its goal of reaching the world’s 
innovation frontier and becoming one of the leading nations in terms of innovation. 
 The second research topic of this thesis refers to trademarking motives. Chapter 6 
shows that SMEs file trademarks for protection, marketing, and exchange motives. The find-
ings indicate that there is considerable variation among trademarking firms. In addition to 
revealing the three trademarking motives, the results of our cluster analysis show that trade-
marking firms often combine these motives when filing trademarks instead of relying on a 
single factor. This is an important finding, because previous research on trademarking has 
often only focused on the classic protection or marketing function of trademarks (e.g., Srini-
vasan et al., 2008; Fosfuri and Giarratana, 2009; De Vries et al., in press), which other stud-
ies have also highlighted as the main motive to file IPRs (e.g., Amara et al., 2008; Heimonen, 
2012; Thomä and Bizer, 2013). While the results of Chapter 6 also underline the importance 
of the protection function for trademarking in general, they further show that the protection 
motive is not the sole motive, nor is it always the most important motive for filing trade-
marks. Thus, reducing trademarks to the protection function is an approach that is too sim-
plistic and underestimates the variety of reasons for why firms file trademarks. This finding 
is of particular interest for policy makers and has important implications that are discussed 
in the following section. 
7.3 Implications for theory and practice 
7.3.1 Implications for theory 
The main contribution of this thesis with regard to patenting in China can be divided into 
three subcategories. 
 University patenting (Chapters 2 and 3): The findings contribute to the literature on 
patenting in China in multiple ways. While universities are acknowledged to be an important 
part of China’s innovation system (e.g., Li, 2012), previous literature on university patenting 
has been focused on the US and Europe (e.g., Henderson et al., 1998; Sampat et al., 2003; 
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Geuna and Rossi, 2011). By taking an international perspective (Chapter 2) and focusing on 
China in particular (Chapter 3), the findings extend previous research and provide new and 
interesting insights on university patenting as a whole. Specifically, previous literature on 
university patenting has often focused on the impact of regulatory changes or other forms of 
governmental initiatives in trying to stimulate university patenting (e.g., Henderson et al., 
1998; Mowery et al., 2002; Geuna and Nesta, 2006; Geuna and Rossi, 2011). This thesis 
adds to the literature by analyzing and comparing the effects of two different types of subsidy 
programs introduced in China on universities’ patent quantity and quality. Chapters 2 and 3 
also underline the importance of university patenting for the overall increase in patenting by 
providing a detailed account of the patenting performance of Chinese universities, for ex-
ample in comparison with universities from other countries. 
 Patent value (Chapters 3 and 4): The impressive increase in patent quantity might 
hide the fact that the catch-up of China in terms of innovation is rather superficial. Thus, this 
thesis contributes to the literature on patenting in China by providing an initial assessment 
of the patent quality of Chinese university patents (Chapter 3) as well as by analyzing the 
value of Chinese patents in general and in comparison to other international patents (Chapter 
4). By providing empirical evidence for an increasing divergence between patent quantity 
and quality (Chapter 3) as well as an overall lower patent value (Chapter 4), the results ques-
tion the meaningfulness and substantiality of the increase in patenting in China, but also 
indicate that patent value is increasing in recent years. 
 Acquisitions (Chapter 5): Access to technology and knowledge is often named as an 
important motivation for Chinese companies that engage in acquisitions (e.g., Deng, 2004; 
Morck et al., 2008; Buckley et al., 2014). This thesis shows under which circumstances Chi-
nese acquirers’ are able to profit from acquisitions in terms of innovation performance. Pre-
vious research has relied on samples from developed countries (e.g., Ahuja and Katila, 2001; 
Cloodt et al., 2006; Desyllas and Hughes, 2010), and it is unclear whether the post-acquisi-
tion effects in China are similar. This thesis contributes to this line of research by introducing 
the unique context of China, for which the applicability of results from other contexts has 
previously been questioned (e.g., Murray et al., 2005; Zhao et al., 2011; Barkema et al., 
2015). The results show that certain previous findings do apply to the Chinese context, but 
further show that characteristics which are unique to the Chinese environment, such as state 
ownership, also shape acquisition outcomes. 
 With regard to SMEs’ trademarking motives (Chapter 6), this thesis makes several 
important contributions to trademark research. First, previous research on the motives to file 
IPRs has been focused on patents (e.g., Cohen et al. 2000; Blind et al., 2006; De Rassenfosse, 
2012). However, trademarks play a very important role for the appropriation of innovation 
rents, particularly when considering SMEs in innovative industries (e.g., Helmers and Rog-
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ers, 2010; Flikkema et al., 2014). Chapter 6 provides the first comparable, empirically vali-
dated set of motives to file trademarks. The results enrich previous research and add a new 
layer of discussion to the existing trademark literature, which has often analyzed trademarks 
as a determinant of different firm characteristics (e.g., Srinivasan et al., 2008; Krasnikov et 
al., 2009; Sandner and Block, 2011). In addition, the results contribute to previous literature 
on trademarks by further exploring clusters of firms according to their trademarking motives. 
As such, four different clusters are identified (i.e., trademark skeptics, marketing-focused 
trademarking SMEs, marketing- plus protection-focused trademarking SMEs, and trade-
mark advocates) and analyzed further with regard to firm and industry characteristics to bet-
ter distinguish these companies. The results contribute to previous research on trademarks 
and IPRs in general by showing the uniqueness and variability of SMEs with regard to their 
usage of IPRs (e.g., De Jong and Marsili, 2006; Thomä, 2009; De Rassenfosse, 2012; Thomä 
and Bizer, 2013). 
7.3.2 Implications for practice 
This thesis’s findings have several implications for practitioners and policy makers. First, 
stimulating university technology transfer and thus university patenting has been one of the 
main goals for policy makers in recent years (Henderson et al., 1998; Siegel et al., 2003b; 
Geuna and Rossi, 2011). As such, various regulations to facilitate technology transfer and 
increase university patenting have been implemented worldwide. Prominent examples in-
clude the US (Mowery and Sampat, 2005a), France (Malva et al., 2013), Germany 
(Czarnitzki et al., 2011) and Italy (Baldini et al., 2006). Previous research in this domain has 
largely analyzed the effects of these regulations and has provided important information on 
how policy makers can stimulate university patenting. However, the overall effect of these 
policies is not always straightforward across countries and with regard to its effects on patent 
quantity and quality (e.g., Henderson et al., 1998; Sampat et al., 2003). By investigating two 
different types of subsidy programs in China, this thesis provides policy makers with infor-
mation on the effects of different types of subsidies. The results indicate that policies in-
tended to increase innovation in a whole and sustainable way (i.e. increasing innovation 
quantity and quality), should take the form of general investments into universities. In con-
trast to subsidizing application fees, which only stimulate patent quantity, these general in-
vestments to promote research excellence can play an important role in developing a func-
tional national innovation system in which universities play a more pronounced role. Hence, 
innovation policies that also intend to stimulate patent value and quality should concentrate 
on increasing university R&D instead of cutting the cost of patenting. This finding is of 
particular relevance to Chinese policy makers, as China might still be interested in further 
increasing patenting by stimulating university patenting. 
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 In addition, previous research indicates that these initiatives cannot be adapted in the 
same way to different countries, and university IPR regulations remain extremely differen-
tiated worldwide (e.g., Geuna and Rossi, 2011). However, previous research has also indi-
cated that considerable differences exist between universities within the same country. This 
heterogeneity is likely to be at least partially reflected in their technology transfer activities 
and is thus likely to influence university patenting (Hewitt-Dundas, 2012). Policy makers 
should take this heterogeneity into account. For example, the results of Chapter 2 suggest 
that a university’s characteristics, such as whether the university is a technical university or 
whether it specializes in the area of chemistry (for example), play an important role for a 
universities’ patent output. Policy makers aiming to stimulate university patenting should 
thus take these university specific characteristics into account when developing initiatives, 
as they are unlikely to affect universities within a country in a uniform way. For example, 
policy makers might be interested in further stimulating patenting by technical universities, 
which are typically already stronger in this regard, or might choose to promote initiatives at 
non-technological universities to help them catch up in terms of technology transfer. 
 Second, this thesis provides practitioners and policy makers with a better understanding 
of the economic value of Chinese innovations, which is a crucial characteristic when evalu-
ating the sustainability and meaningfulness of innovations from China (e.g., Li, 2012). The 
finding that more recently filed Chinese patents are of higher value (Chapter 4) shows that 
China is likely to further catch-up to developed countries in terms of innovation. This devel-
opment can be seen as an indication that China is slowly but successfully undergoing a trans-
formation from an imitation- to an innovation-based economy. This finding informs practi-
tioners that Chinese patents may become more meaningful in the near future and can be 
attractive investment opportunities for firms interested in acquiring or sustaining a very 
large, high-value patent portfolio. An overall higher patent value can also serve as a signal 
function for actors who plan to invest in Chinese companies. Furthermore, the results are of 
particular interest for policy makers in the US and Europe, as they show that engagement is 
needed in order to remain in the lead in terms of innovation, as China is not only catching-
up and surpassing them in terms of quantity, but maybe also do so in terms of quality in the 
future. 
 Third, access to technology is one of the primary motives of acquisitions by Chinese 
companies (e.g., Deng, 2004; Morck et al., 2008). Moreover, these acquisitions are fre-
quently negatively portrayed in the media: Chinese acquisitions, particularly those where 
the target is located in a developed country, are often associated with the fear of knowledge 
drains, and focus on a potential negative effect for the acquired companies (e.g., “Being 
eaten by the dragon” (Economist, 2010a), “China buys up the world” (Economist, 2010b)). 
While Chapter 5 cannot address this question fully because it does not observe knowledge 
drains in the acquired companies in detail, previous research has assumed that emerging 
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market firms may not profit from acquisitions because they lack the absorptive capacity to 
successfully exploit acquired knowledge (Narula, 2012; Anderson et al., 2015). However, 
the results show that Chinese companies are able to profit from acquisition by increasing 
their own post-acquisition innovation performance under certain circumstances. This con-
tradicts the public image of Chinese firms only acquiring firms to drain their knowledge. 
More importantly, Chapter 5 also shows that the phenomenon of Chinese acquisitions is not 
as large as its portrayal often suggests: Only 5 percent of the acquisitions were cross-border 
acquisitions (78 of 1,545), indicating that Western companies’ fears might be exaggerated. 
Managers in Asian countries might find the results interesting because they provide infor-
mation about important deal characteristics that facilitate learning from acquisitions. Policy 
makers in China and western countries might find the results interesting because they indi-
cate that acquisitions can be a profitable catch-up strategy with regard to innovation perfor-
mance. 
 Fourth, because stimulating IPR usage by small firms is of particular interest for inno-
vation policies (Thomä and Bizer, 2013), this thesis’ findings on SMEs’ trademarking mo-
tives have important practical implications. Often, policy makers try to reduce the costs of 
IPR protection and provide a cost-effective protection to small firms (USPTO, 2014). How-
ever, while the costs of IPRs might be important to some firms (e.g., trademark skeptics), 
other firms (e.g., trademark advocates) would likely not find these initiatives very appealing. 
For example, the efforts of a firm that is using trademarks as an asset in exchange relation-
ships to acquire financing would be undermined if trademarks become increasingly cheap 
and easy to obtain. Furthermore, policies aimed at improving the protection offered by a 
trademark will not lead marketing-focused trademarking SMEs to file more trademarks. Ra-
ther, policy makers could use the findings to provide the heterogeneous group of small firms 
interested in trademarking with more nuanced initiatives that better motivate them to in-
creasingly engage in trademarking. The findings from Chapter 6 suggest that policies of this 
kind might not appeal to all SMEs in the same way. 
7.4 Limitations and avenues for future research 
This thesis is not without limitations. First, patents are the mostly frequently used measure 
for innovation (outputs). This is because patents have multiple advantages. For example, 
patents are only granted for the development of a new technology that is commercially useful 
and thus of economic significance (e.g., Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Alcaide-Marzal and 
Tortajada-Esparza, 2007; Godinho and Ferreira, 2012). Also, patents provide a lot of addi-
tional information that is frequently used in innovation research (e.g., patent citations, patent 
claims, family size) and patent data are fairly accessible and easy to use compared with other 
innovation indicators (e.g., survey-based measures) (Alcaide-Marzal and Tortajada-Esparza, 
2007). In spite of its widespread usage, the reliance upon patents as a proxy for innovation 
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is not without limitations: Not all inventions are patentable, not all inventions are patented, 
and patented inventions differ greatly with respect to the technological progress they entail, 
especially with respect to the industry sector or company size (e.g., Levin et al., 1987; Pavitt, 
1988; Griliches, 1990; Trajtenberg, 1990). This limitation applies to Chapters 2 through 5, 
which use patent data as a proxy for innovative outputs. 
 Second, Chapters 3 and 4 use forward citations to measure patent quality and patent 
value (i.e., the citation lag used in Chapter 4 is calculated based on the first forward citation 
a patent receives). Even though patent citations are the most frequently used proxy of patent 
quality and value (e.g., Harhoff et al., 2003; Acosta et al., 2012), citation-based measures 
have several caveats. For example, citations can be added by the inventors themselves or by 
the patent examiner (e.g., Criscuolo and Verspagen, 2008; Azagra-Caro et al., 2011; Alcácer 
et al., 2009). Also, forward citations involve the problem of right truncation. To ensure a 
better comparability, forward citations are usually collected within five years of the patent 
application or grant (e.g., Mowery and Ziedonis, 2002). This most notably leads to a data 
loss in recent years (Chapter 3). While Chapter 4 uses the measure of the citation lag to 
circumvent this limitation, information on very recent years is still lost. This is particularly 
unfortunate because the most recent years provide a lot of new information on the very recent 
development of patent quality. 
 Third, patent information on the respective applicants (e.g., universities, companies) is 
extracted on the basis of their name. Specifically, search patterns are manually generated 
that search the PASTAT database, which is currently the most comprehensive international 
database on patents, especially with respect to China (Liegsalz and Wagner, 2013). These 
search patterns are refined in multiple iterations and account for different spellings of the 
entities name or name changes. Even though this approach yields valid results (see Chapter 
3), only patents that explicitly name the respective university or company as an applicant 
could be identified. This approach excludes patents that are owned by a university or a com-
pany but list an individual (e.g., employee, professor) as the inventor. Additionally, this does 
not include patents that were applied for in joint research collaborations, joint ventures, or 
in spin-offs. As a consequence, the estimates for each entity’s patent portfolio should be 
interpreted as a rather conservative estimate that could be extended if more information was 
available. 
 In spite of these limitations, this thesis also opens a number of avenues for future re-
search. First, the upsurge in Chinese patenting is a very recent phenomenon that is still on-
going. Because the Chinese patenting surge has not ceased, it will be interesting to continue 
the analysis of this development. While this thesis investigates the contribution of two pre-
viously unexplored antecedents, universities and acquisitions, this development is still far 
from completely explored. For example, little is known on the role of public research insti-
tutes with respect to the overall increase in patenting. Historically, these research institutes 
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have played an important role in the Chinese innovation system. It would be very interesting 
to conduct a similar analysis to Chapter 3 on these research institutes. Similar to Chapter 5, 
future research might also look at other mechanisms of knowledge acquisition, such as stra-
tegic alliances or joint ventures, which might serve as vehicles for firms to considerably 
increase their innovation performance. 
 Second, this thesis finds some evidence of slowly increasing patent quality. Because 
China is still actively trying to become a leading innovative nation, it would be very inter-
esting to assess patent quality from very recent years. However, due to the limitations of 
citation data, this requires additional data that is not currently available. Future research 
might take the findings of this thesis as a starting point to provide a more far-reaching anal-
ysis of the development of patent quality or patent value. Additionally, using citation-based 
data to assess patent value and quality has limitations (as outlined in Chapter 3 and 4). There-
fore, future research could conduct a more thorough investigation of patent value and con-
sider other potentially interesting determinants, such as patent claims (Tong and Frame, 
1994) or patent renewal data (Lanjouw et al. 1998; Bessen 2008). Chapter 4 indicates con-
siderable differences between different kinds of applicants in China. Because of their com-
mercial impact, it might be particularly interesting to investigate the patent quality and patent 
value of patents applied for by Chinese companies. 
 An important limitation of Chapter 6 is that the role of trademarks is studied in isolation 
from other protection mechanisms. Previous research has shown that other formal (e.g., pa-
tents) or informal protection mechanisms (e.g., secrecy, lead time advantages) are often used 
in conjunction with trademarks or are used to replace trademarks (e.g., Amara et al., 2008; 
Thomä and Bizer, 2013). With particular regard to SMEs, they more often draw on informal 
protection mechanisms to protect their IP assets (Thomä and Bizer, 2013). In light of this 
limitation, future research could focus on investigating the interplay of these protection 
mechanisms with regard to the motivation for filing IPRs. For example, trademark skeptics 
might prefer other informal protection mechanisms and thus only file trademarks to comple-
ment these mechanisms. In particular, they might not be skeptical towards trademarks, but 
skeptical towards formal IPRs in general. In contrast, trademark advocates might be affected 
positively by a prior successful usage of formal protection mechanisms. 
 A second limitation concerns the focus of Chapter 6 on small firms in innovative in-
dustries. While this group of firms is particularly interesting with regard to their IP usage, 
the generalizability of the results to the population of all firms is questionable. Previous 
research on patenting motives has indeed identified differences between the patenting mo-
tives of small and large firms (e.g., Blind et al., 2006; De Rassenfosse, 2012; Veer and Jell, 
2012). Particularly large firms might have additional motives for filing IPRs or weigh these 
motives differently. Therefore, future research could try to validate or extend the identified 
set of motives for large, established firms. Also, trademarking motives might differ across 
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industries. While the sample covers a lot of industries, classical “non-innovative” industries 
are missing from the sample. Thus, future research might find it interesting to apply the 
findings of this thesis to more traditional industries. 
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Intellectuele eigendomsrechten (engl. intellectual property rights, of IPR’s) spelen een zeer 
belangrijke rol bij innovaties. Ze dienen als mechanisme om het intellectuele eigendom van 
vernieuwers (bijvoorbeeld particulieren, bedrijven, universiteiten) te beschermen, en zorgen 
ervoor dat de houder van een IPR van de innovatie profiteert. De twee belangrijkste en meest 
gebruikte IPR’s zijn patenten en handelsmerken (engl. trademarks). Dit proefschrift bevat 
vijf empirische studies die ingaan op ontbrekende elementen in het recente onderzoek naar 
octrooien en handelsmerken. 
 Wat patenten betreft richt dit proefschrift zich op patentaanvragen in China. Hier heeft 
zich recentelijk een opmerkelijke en explosieve groei voorgedaan: nog maar 15 jaar geleden 
vroegen Chinezen slechts 1,9% van het aantal patenten in 2014 aan. De belangrijkste oor-
zaak van toename is China’s streven om zich te ontwikkelen van een economie gebaseerd 
op imitaties, tot een economie gebaseerd op innovaties. Hoewel China zich nadrukkelijk en 
actief inzet om innovaties aan te moedigen en op dit gebied toonaangevend te worden, is het 
wereldwijd gezien nog verre van een innovatiekoploper. In het licht van dit groeiende en 
nog relatief weinig onderzochte fenomeen, behandelt dit proefschrift een aantal belangrijke 
aspecten rondom de achtergrond en de waarde van patenten in China. Hoewel kennis over 
deze aspecten van cruciaal belang is, is hier tot dusverre weinig aandacht aan besteed. Dit 
proefschrift gaat in het bijzonder in op de volgende specifieke onderwerpen: het verkrijgen 
van patenten door universiteiten, de impact van acquisities op innovatieresultaten, en de 
waarde van patenten in China. 
 De resultaten laten zien dat het hogere aantal patentaanvragen door Chinese universi-
teiten, aangemoedigd door twee subsidieprogramma’s, een belangrijke drijver is van de meer 
algemene toename van het aantal patenten in China (hoofdstukken 2 en 3). Ook laat dit pro-
efschrift zien dat Chinese bedrijven profiteren van acquisities waarmee ze na de overname 
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onder bepaalde omstandigheden hun innovatieresultaten verbeteren, wat weer zorgt voor een 
hoger aantal patenten (hoofdstuk 5). Zo maken Chinese bedrijven met succes gebruik van 
de vaak meer ontwikkelde kennis in het buitenland, en nemen ze bedrijven in het buitenland 
over om op patentgebied de achterstand op ontwikkelde landen in te halen. Hoewel China 
een opmerkelijke toename van het aantal patentaanvragen heeft doorgemaakt, laten verschil-
lende resultaten in dit proefschrift tegelijkertijd zien dat de kwaliteit van deze patenten niet 
evenredig is toegenomen (hoofdstuk 3), en dat de waarde van een Chinees patent over het 
algemeen lager is dan die van patenten in andere landen (hoofdstuk 4). Als China een 
koploperrol wil spelen op het gebied van innovatie zijn patentaanvragen van hoge kwaliteit 
en waarde echter wel belangrijk bij het zinvol en duurzaam verbeteren van het innovatiever-
mogen. 
 Vergeleken met het onderzoek naar patent, waarbij het merendeel van de basale vragen 
al grondig is onderzocht en er vraag is naar een genuanceerder perspectief (bijvoorbeeld 
door zich te richten op het proces rondom octrooien in China), staat het onderzoek naar 
handelsmerken nog relatief in de kinderschoenen. Handelsmerken zijn voor bedrijven zeer 
belangrijke IPR's om zich van de concurrentie te kunnen onderscheiden, en worden op po-
sitieve wijze geassocieerd met de marktwaardering, overlevingskansen, en productiviteit van 
een onderneming. Er is echter maar weinig bekend over de redenen waarom bedrijven han-
delsmerken vast laten leggen. Het laatste onderzoek in dit proefschrift (hoofdstuk 6) richt 
zich daarom op deze redenen. 
 Een beter begrip van de redenen voor het vastleggen van handelsmerken is erg belan-
grijk om de zinvolheid en het belang van handelsmerken goed te kunnen begrijpen. Dit pro-
efschrift analyseert daarom de redenen van bedrijven om handelsmerken vast te leggen, en 
maakt daarbij gebruik van gegevens van kleine en middelgrote bedrijven (MKB) in innova-
tieve branches. Door middel van deze analyse worden er drie redenen voor het vastleggen 
van handelsmerken geïdentificeerd en op empirische wijze gevalideerd: bescherming, mar-
keting en uitwisseling. Dit proefschrift maakt ook duidelijk dat bedrijven op basis van hun 
redenen voor het vastleggen van handelsmerken kunnen worden ingedeeld in vier groepen 
(te weten: bedrijven die sceptisch staan tegenover handelsmerken, MKB-bedrijven die han-
delsmerken vastleggen voor marketingdoeleinden, MKB-bedrijven die handelsmerken vast-
leggen met het oog op marketing en bescherming, en voorstanders van handelsmerken). 
Deze resultaten, waaruit de unieke en onderscheiden wijze blijkt waarop MKB-bedrijven 
omgaan met hun IPR’s, verrijken eerdere bevindingen, en dragen bij aan nieuwe discussies 
over handelsmerken. De implicaties van deze vondsten zijn belangrijk, aangezien innovati-
ebeleid zich vooral richt op het stimuleren van het gebruik van IPR’s door kleine bedrijven. 
Met deze kennis kunnen beleidsmakers beleid ontwikkelen dat beter aansluit bij de hetero-
gene groep MKB-bedrijven, en deze bedrijven doelgerichter motiveren meer werk te maken 
van handelsmerken. 
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Rechte an geistigem Eigentum (engl. intellectual property rights, IPRs) spielen eine große 
Rolle für Innovationen. Sie stellen einen Mechanismus dar, mit dem Innovatoren (z. B. In-
dividuen, Unternehmen, Universitäten) ihr geistiges Eigentum schützen können. Gleichzei-
tig ermöglichen sie es dem Rechteinhaber von der Innovation zu profitieren. Patente und 
Markenrechte (engl. trademarks) sind die beiden wichtigsten und am meisten genutzten 
Rechte an geistigem Eigentum. Die vorliegende Dissertation besteht aus fünf empirischen 
Studien, die aktuelle Forschungslücken rund um Patente und Markenrechte adressieren. 
 Bezogen auf Patente beschäftigt sich diese Dissertation spezifischer mit Patenten in 
China. In den letzten Jahren kam es in China zu einem bemerkenswerten und explosionsar-
tigen Wachstum bei Patentanmeldungen: Vor 15 Jahren haben chinesische Entitäten nur 
1,9% der Patente angemeldet, die sie im Jahr 2014 angemeldet haben. Hierin spiegelt sich 
das chinesische Bestreben wieder, sich von einer imitationsbasierten zu einer innovations-
basierten Volkswirtschaft zu entwickeln. Obwohl China aktiv und intensiv versucht Innova-
tionen zu fördern und eine bei Innovationen führende Nation zu werden, hat China den An-
schluss an weltweit führende Volkswirtschaften bisher nicht hergestellt. Auf Grund der 
aktuellen und andauernden Entwicklung im chinesischen Patentgeschehen adressiert diese 
Dissertation verschiedene wichtige und bisher weitgehend unbeachtete Fragestellungen rund 
um die Ursachen dieses Anstiegs sowie bezogen auf den Wert chinesischer Patente. Im Spe-
ziellen betrachtet die Dissertation die Entwicklung chinesischer Universitätspatente, den 
Einfluss von Akquisitionen auf das Patentgeschehenl sowie den Wert chinesischer Patente. 
 Die Dissertation zeigt, dass ein Anstieg chinesischer Universitätspatente, die durch ver-
schiedene staatliche Programme stark geördert werden (Kapitel 2 und 3), entscheidend zum 
Gesamtanstieg von Patenten in China beiträgt. Neben einer steigenden Anzahl an Universi-
tätspatenten tragen auch Akquisitionen zu diesem Gesamtanstieg bei (Kapitel 5). So zeigt 
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diese Dissertation, dass Chinesische Unternehmen nach Akquisitionen unter bestimmten 
Vorraussetzungen mehr Patente anmelden: Beispielsweise profitieren chinesische Unterneh-
men insbesondere von Akquisitionen von ausländischen Unternehmen, die ihnen einen Zu-
gang oftmals weiter entwickelten und bisher unbekanntem Wissen ermöglichen. Während 
der Anstieg an Patentanmeldungen bemerkenswert ist, zeigen verschiedene Ergebnisse die-
ser Dissertation jedoch, dass die Qualität der Patente nicht im gleichen Ausmaß angestiegen 
ist, wie deren Quantität (Kapitel 3) und das der Wert von chinesischen Patenten insgesamt 
niedriger ist als der Wert von Patenten aus anderen Ländern (Kapitel 4). Die Entwicklung 
von qualitativ hochwertigen Patenten ist jedoch ebefalls wichtig um eine nachhaltige Ent-
wicklung der nationalen Innovationskraft zu erreichen. 
 Im Gegensatz zur Forschung über Patente ist die Forschung über Markenrechte noch 
wenig entwickelt und vergleichweise jung. Markenrechte stellen ein sehr wichtiges Recht 
dar, mit dem sich Unternehmen von ihren Wettbewerbern differenzieren können. Die bishe-
rige Forschung hat gezeigt, dass sich Markenrechte positiv auf den Marktwert, das Überle-
ben und die Produktivität von Unternehmen auswirken können. Trotz dieser positiven Ef-
fekte ist wenig darüber bekannt, warum Unternehmen überhaupt Markenrechte anmelden. 
Diese Frage steht daher im Mittelpunkt der letzten Studie dieser Dissertation (Kapitel 6). 
 Um die Bedeutung und Wichtigkeit von Markenrechten besser zu verstehen, ist ein 
besseres Verständnis der Motive von Unternehmen Markenrechte anzumelden erforderlich. 
Anhand von Daten von von kleinen und mittleren Unternehmen (KMUs) in innovativen In-
dustrien werden im Rahmen dieser Dissertation drei Motive identifiziert und empirisch va-
lidiert: Schutz, Marketing, und Austausch. Weiterhin können die Unternehmen auf Basis 
ihrer Motive in verschiedene Gruppen (engl. cluster) eingeteilt werden: Skeptiker gegebüber 
Markenrechten, marketing-fokussierte KMUs, marketing- und schutz-fokussierte KMUs 
und Befürworter von Markenrechten. Diese Ergebnisse unterstreichen die große Varianz in 
KMUs mit Berzug auf deren Nutzung von Rechten an geistigem Eigentum. Die Stärkung 
der Nutzung von Rechten an geistigem Eigentum durch KMUs ist häufig ein Ziel von staat-
lichen Förderprogrammen. Daher ermöglichen die Ergebnisse dieser Dissertation die Ent-
wicklung von besser auf individuellen Bedürfnise der heterogenen Gruppe der KMUs zuge-
schnittenen Förderprogrammen und -initiativen. 
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received little attention so far. In particular, this thesis addresses the more speciﬁ c topics of university 
patenting, the impact of acquisitions on innovation performance, and patent value in China.
In contrast to research on patenting, research on trademarking is in comparatively early stages. 
Trademarks are a very important IPR for ﬁ rms to distinguish themselves from competitors and have been 
linked positively to the market valuation, survival, and productivity of ﬁ rms. However, little is known on 
why ﬁ rms ﬁ le trademarks, which is the focus of the ﬁ nal study in this thesis.
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